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 As the United States looked forward to its future as an independent nation at the 
end of the eighteenth century, many saw commerce as a way to secure the nation’s future. 
American commerce, however, was plagued by a number of commercial problems. 
Solving these commercial problems facilitated an interest in science and the practical arts 
as engineers, inventors, mechanics, public officials, and everyday tinkerers innovated 
new apparatuses to preserve, promote, and protect American commerce. Many of 
America’s commercial problems in the early nineteenth century, however, resulted from 
the young nation’s varied geography and environments. Combating the environment’s 
unrelenting forces often exceeded the resources of private citizens and necessitated the 
involvement of the state. This can be seen in the advent of government agencies such as 
the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Survey, and the Light-House Establishment. 
Notwithstanding, the government’s involvement in practical science and innovation 
proceeded cautiously and unevenly. This caution and uneven involvement on the part of 
the government derived from societally held values of Jeffersonian republicanism.  
Republican values of civic duty, prudence, honesty, and self-reliance, thus shaped the 
government’s role in advancing practical science and the arts in the early nineteenth 
century United States. 
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Currently in the United States there is a debate over the value of science and 
technology. Scott Pruitt, the newly confirmed head of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), for instance, denies the existence of global warming despite the wealth of 
scientific evidence that the planet is undergoing severe changes in climate. The 
Administration has expressed its desire to eliminate the EPA. According to the 
Administration, eliminating the EPA benefits business by reducing the costly burden of 
complying with environmental protection policies. In addition to the Administration’s 
plans for the EPA, the Administration’s proposed budget drastically cuts funding for 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has voiced similar concerns over the 
devaluing of science. Scientists have organized a protest march at the Nation’s capital in 
April to push back against the Administration’s stance on science and to demonstrate the 
importance of science to the public good. 
The current debate over science and the government’s involvement in scientific 
practice is nothing new. Between the late eighteenth century and the middle of the 
nineteenth century, a similar debate raged over the government’s involvement in practical 
science and the mechanical arts. The eighteenth and nineteenth century debate, however, 
did not question the validity of science and it did not see science as a hindrance to 
business and commerce. Rather, in the early 1800s, science was seen as a boon for 
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commerce. The debate from two centuries ago sought justification for the government’s 
involvement in science and whether or not the military was better suited for scientific 
production than the artisan craftsmen, merchants, and everyday tinkerers. Similar to the 
present Administration’s focus on business, commerce and the economy were major 
concerns for the government that ultimately shaped their decision to become involved.  
The environment also played role. Dissimilar from the current Administration’s 
views that environmental regulations are an obstacle to business, early nineteenth-century 
Americans saw the environment itself as challenging commerce and economic growth. In 
many instances, however, the unrelenting forces of nature proved too much for private 
enterprise. The natural world forced the government into pursuing practical science and 
innovation in order to protect the nation’s commerce.  
The project that follows is a study of the interaction between science, technology, 
commerce and the state in the early United States. As commerce in the first half of the 
nineteenth century relied heavily on maritime shipping this project examines the Army 
Corps of Engineers’ work in constructing port infrastructure, the Coast Survey’s charting 
of the coastal boundaries and hazards, the Light-House Establishment’s attempts to 
protect maritime commerce from navigational hazards, and the private network of marine 
telegraphs efforts to improve port efficiencies. The following chapters examine the 
interaction of these institutions in defining the role of public and private involvement in 
commerce and science. The wreck of the Union on Baker’s Island in Massachusetts 
provides an excellent illustration of the interaction between science, technology, 
commerce and the state. 
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In the wee hours of the early morning on February 27, 1827, the Union began its 
final approach toward the harbor at Salem, Massachusetts. Captained by a 31-year old 
shipmaster named William Osgood, the Union and its crew were returning home after a 
nine-month voyage to Pulo Penang in the Far East.1  The Union carried a cargo of pepper 
and block tin valued at $80,000 ($1.47 million in 2015 dollars).2 Unfortunately, as the 
Union was nearing the end of its journey, the ship encountered a surprise snowstorm. The 
sea became rough as a result. Combined with the darkness of the new moon, the 
snowstorm made it impossible for the crew to ascertain their location. The Union’s only 
hope for determining their exact position was the lighthouse on Baker’s Island. Yet, when 
Osgood and the crew spotted the beacon, they mistook it for the Boston Harbor Light. In 
what proved to be a fatal mistake, Osgood ordered the crew to turn south causing the 
Union to run aground on Baker’s Island. As the grounded Union lay helpless, the storm 
surge almost immediately began ripping the ship apart. Within hours, the cargo was 
strewn along the island’s shore and the Union was a complete loss. Osgood however was 
not entirely at fault for causing the disaster by ordering the crew to turn southward. Eight 
months earlier, the government announced plans to make extensive repairs the Baker’s 
																																								 																				
1 Pulo Penang is located in the Strait of Malacca off the coast of Malaysia. Historically, 
Pulo Penang has been known as the Prince of Wales Island, Areca Island, and many other 
names. Today, Pulo Penang is known simply as Penang Island. 
2 George Granville Putnam, Salem Vessels and Their Voyages: A History of the Pepper 
Trade with the Island of Sumatra (Salem, MA: The Essex Institute, 1922), 43. “Baker’s 
Island Lights,” Salem Gazette (Massachusetts) May 29, 1818. Dollar values for 1817 
were converted to current values using Samuel H. Williamson, “Seven Ways to Compute 
the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to present,” Measuring Worth, 2015, 
http://www.measuringworth.com (accessed December 18, 2016). Use of Williamson’s 
currency converter is for illustrative purposes only to aid in comprehension of the ship’s 
value.  
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Island Lighthouse.3 The repairs included altering the height of the tower and 
extinguishing the light’s second lamp, which had been a fixture on Baker’s Island since 
the government established the lighthouse there in 1798. Osgood expected the lighthouse 
at Baker’s Island to confirm his position within the approaches of the harbor, but it did 
not. The lighthouse failed to meet Osgood’s expectations because the alterations made 
the Baker’s Island Light indistinguishable from the Boston Harbor Light. Osgood and the 
crew of the Union were unaware of the alterations. The Union had already set sail for the 
Far East when the notice of the proposed changes was published. Fortunately, Osgood 
and all of the crew survived the wreck despite the loss of the ship and cargo.4 Stephen 
Phillips and George Pierce, the owners of the Union, carried insurance on the ship and its 
cargo, but the loss exceeded the insurance coverage by $35,000.5 After three years of 
ongoing complaints by mariners that the Baker’s Island Lighthouse was inadequate for its 
intended purpose, the government was forced to relight the second lamp. It did nothing in 
regards to restoring the light to is original height.6 
As previously stated, the wreck of the Union illustrates the relationship between 
science, technology, commerce, and the state in the United States in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Several factors influenced innovation and the development of 
practical science in America. Commerce, for instance, was a driving force behind the 
state establishing its authority over the navigation in 1789 with the just the ninth act of 
																																								 																				
3 H.A.S. Dearborn, “Notice to Mariners,” Nantucket Gazette (Nantucket, MA), July 1, 
1816. 
4 Putnam, 43-5. 
5 Putnam, 44. James Risk, “Ship to Shore: Infrastructure and the Growth of American 
Seaports, 1790 – 1850, (MA thesis, UMBC, 2011), 25-6. 
6 Risk, 26. Edward Rowe Snow, The Lighthouses of New England, (1945; repr., Beverly, 
MA: Commonwealth Editions, 2002), 154. 
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the new constitutional Congress. This act stipulated that the federal government would 
assume all responsibilities for the administration, maintenance, and support of the buoys, 
lights, and public piers to ensure safe navigation “within any bay, inlet, harbor, or port of 
the United States.”7 Previous to the act, these assets were administered by the individual 
states under the Articles of Confederation. In passing the act, Congress showed its intent 
to facilitate commerce and the economic growth of the young nation. Congress saw the 
protection of the nation’s commercial interests as means of securing and protecting the 
nation itself. Nearly 90 percent of the nation’s revenue came from customs duties in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.8 Shipwrecks impacted the state’s revenues 
through lost customs duties. They also impacted the local economy through lost wages 
and profits on sellable goods. A single shipwreck could mean financial ruin for a 
merchant or ship owner. 
In 1802, Congress established the Army Corps of Engineers at West Point. In the 
beginning, the Army Corps of Engineers primarily focused on building defenses for the 
nation’s major ports. Harbor defenses were not only necessary for the security of the 
nation; they were also important for the safety of American commerce. This was 
especially true for a young developing nation like the United States, making American 
ports more susceptible to attack. One of the surest ways to cripple an enemy combatant is 
to cripple their economy and attacking American ports was sure to cripple its ability to 
fight. As previously mentioned, the majority of economic activity around the world 
remained tied to the maritime sector and the ocean’s access to global markets in the first 
																																								 																				
7 United States Congress, An act to provide for the establishment and support of 
Lighthouses, Beacons, Buoys, and Public Piers, 1st Cong., 1st sess., ch. 9, sec. I, 1789. 
8 Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 339. 
6 
decades of the nineteenth century. 
Five years later, Congress, at the request of President Thomas Jefferson, created 
the Coast Survey to chart harbors, shipping lanes, shoals, and other aspects of the coast 
related to navigation. Here again, the government’s primary concern was for the 
preservation of commerce. As Samuel Whittlesey Dana, a Federalist Congressman from 
Connecticut, argued, the coast survey would be in the “interest of our merchants” and 
benefit the nation’s revenue. Dana also believed a survey of the coast would protect 
mariners engaged in commercial shipping from being impressed by the British into the 
Royal Navy. An accurate survey might force the British to respect America’s sovereignty 
within twenty leagues of the land where most of the impressments occurred.9 
Early American ports were vulnerable because of the young nation’s fledging 
military. Although the American colonies had defeated the most powerful nation on earth 
to establish their independence, the threat of war continued to loom large for the United 
States in the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth 
century. Americans divided their political loyalties between two of Europe’s most bitter 
enemies – Britain and France – who were either at war themselves or on the verge of war 
until the fall of Napoleon in 1815. This division left the United States without a firm ally. 
Britain had not forgotten the American rebellion and eyed any opportunity to reassert its 
power and reclaim its former colonies. France, who aided the American colonies in their 
bid for independence, turned against the United States in a quasi-war because of 
America’s refusal to reciprocate the aide during France’s war with Britain. For these 
																																								 																				
9 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2nd sess., 1807, 152.  
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reasons, the United States Army Corps of Engineers focused their efforts on protecting 
the young nation’s port cities by building fortresses and improving harbor defenses. 
The federal government’s concern for commerce and the government’s actions in 
response to that concern therefore made it the state’s responsibility to ensure the Baker’s 
Island Lighthouse provided protection against the possibility of shipwreck. Yet, Osgood 
and others blamed the inadequacy of the Baker’s Island Lighthouse for doing the exact 
opposite – causing shipwrecks. The alterations of the Baker’s Island Lighthouse and the 
wreck of the Union that followed is a classic example of James C. Scott’s argument in 
Seeing Like a State. Scott argues the state’s good intentions did not always square with 
the reality of the situation and sometimes good intentions by the state led to bad 
outcomes.10 
The government’s involvement in innovation and practical science, however, was 
also quite uneven. This was due in part to the how the state appropriated money to 
science and the arts as well as how the state managed its involvement in those fields. In 
terms of appropriations, the state was limited in its financial resources at the end of the 
eighteenth century and for a significant portion of the early nineteenth century. Congress 
had to prioritize those resources and divide them as they saw fit. This often left the 
agencies involved in practical science short of the money they needed to adequately 
perform their duties and engage in science. On the management side, Congress did not 
legislate science and the arts, but instead left decisions of agency oversight to the 
superintendents of the various organizations. These superintendents took it upon 
																																								 																				
10 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition have Failed, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 247, 258, 287, 
408. 
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themselves to craft scientific agendas and pursue science within their departments. Thus, 
the state built its knowledge base through scientific-minded institutions such as the Army 
Corps of Engineers, the Coast Survey and the Light-House Service. As these institutions 
gained a respect for their scientific endeavors, their skills became more valuable to the 
general good of the nation and the demand for their expertise grew exponentially. 
STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
Chapter 2 examines the role of commerce in innovation, practical science and the 
arts in the early United States. This opening chapter introduces commerce as an important 
factor shaping American innovation and identifies some of the problems facing the 
nation’s commerce. The chapter also looks at what science and the practical arts meant to 
inventors, merchants, and even consumers. Individuals were undoubtedly concerned with 
profits, but they were also interested in solving everyday problems. Maritime disasters 
and port efficiency were major concerns for the individuals. Many of the inventors 
discussed in the following chapters were actually merchants who tinkered on the side. 
Others were retired shipmasters whose maritime experience provided them with an 
intimate insight into the commercial needs of their local communities, states, and the 
nation as a whole. A few of the innovators were even government agents. Most of these 
inventors, however, engaged in tinkering because they saw an opportunity to solve 
commercial problems and possibly make a small profit form their efforts. Few expected 
to get rich or to make innovation their livelihood.  
Chapter 3 introduces the environmental need for practical science and the 
involvement of the state. The chapter identifies ways in which the natural world shaped 
innovation and science in the early nineteenth century United States. The environment 
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posed many challenges for Americans with regard to commerce. From the dangerous 
shoals and maritime hazards to the obstructed views of approaching ships, the natural 
world created both a need for science and the arts as well as a space in which science and 
innovation could thrive. The environment provided resources for innovation and science. 
Contractors used the environment’s natural resources to build lighthouses and marine 
telegraph stations, often drawing on the immediate area surrounding the structure for the 
necessary building materials. Elevated spaces gave these structures the height needed to 
observe or warn approaching ships. In other cases, the environment presented challenges 
that individuals and the state sought to overcome. At Carysfort Reef off the Florida Keys, 
the hollow shoal forced engineers to redesign the foundation of an offshore lighthouse in 
order to properly anchor it to the sea floor. For the marine telegraph, the environment 
influenced the use of particular colors on signal flags due to those colors’ higher visibility 
in various weather conditions. 
Chapter 4 provides a scientific and technological solution to the commercial and 
environmental challenges laid out in the first two chapters. That solution was the Light-
House Establishment. Chapter 4 examines the science and innovation that occurred in the 
Light-House Establishment prior to the 1850s. Similar to Hugh Richard Slotten, Thomas 
G. Manning, and Todd Shallat’s narratives of the Coast Survey and Army Corps of 
Engineers, Chapter 4 argues the Light-House Establishment was one of the state’s first 
scientific enterprises. This argument goes against many of the mainstream histories of the 
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Light-House Establishment, which portray the agency as anti-science.11 At issue with the 
previous narratives is what constitutes science in the early United States to make the 
assumption that the Establishment was anti-science. Chapter 4 looks at a variety of 
innovations and experiments conducted under the aegis of the Light-House Establishment 
to demonstrate the extent that the establishment engaged in scientific practice. Many of 
the innovations and experiments discussed in this chapter not only meet the criteria of 
science in the early nineteenth century, but would also qualify as science in a more 
modern twentieth century understanding of the term. 
The state’s involvement in innovation and science was also influenced by the 
political climate of the time. Republican values, such as civic duty, prudence, honesty, 
and self-reliance, played an important role in shaping the state’s involvement with 
science. Chapter 5 looks specifically at these republican values and argues for their role 
in shaping the state’s involvement in innovation, practical science and the arts. 
Americans articulated these republican values during the revolutionary period. After the 
American Revolution, republicanism continued to dominate political thought well into 
the nineteenth century. The irony of American republicanism is that the ideology often 
appeared opposed to science even though its leader, Thomas Jefferson, was intimately 
engaged in natural philosophy, practical science, and the arts. This, however, was clearly 
not the case and Chapter 5 makes an argument for how Jeffersonian republicanism 
shaped scientific progress in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
																																								 																				
11 Francis Ross Holland, Jr., America’s Lighthouses: An Illustrated History, (1972; repr., 
New York: Dover Publications, 1988). Theresa Levitt, A Short Bright Flash: Augustin 
Fresnel and the Birth of the Modern Lighthouse, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2013). Eric Jay Dolin, Brilliant Beacons: A History of the American Lighthouse, (New 
York: Liveright Publishing, 2016). 
11 
Most scholars of Jeffersonian republicanism, including Drew R. McCoy and Lance 
Banning, fail to discuss republican values in relation to science in the early United 
States.12 John Lauritz Lawson and Daniel Walker Howe may be two exceptions. Lawson 
and Walker discuss republicanism in broad terms as they discuss internal improvements, 
but their narratives imply the relationship between science and republicanism more than 
implicitly stating the connection.13 
The final chapter examines the state’s uneven involvement in scientific practice 
by exploring the three aforementioned state agencies, how they interacted with each 
other, and how they used innovation, practical science, and the arts to meet the nation’s 
needs and advance the scientific enterprise in the United States. This chapter shows how 
science and innovation were part of a broader system of commercial governance. 
Previous histories of the Army Corps of Engineers, Coast Survey, and Light-House 
Establishment have examined the institutions in isolation and have looked internally at 
																																								 																				
12 Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America, 
(1980; repr., Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1996). Lance Banning, The Jefferson Persuasion: 
Evolution of a Party Ideology, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980).  
13 John Lauritz Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of 
Popular Government in the Early United States, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2001). Daniel 
Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought? The Transformation of America, 1815-1848, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
12 
the individual agencies.14 The final chapter seeks to remedy those errors. 
CHRONOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE 
I set the perimeters of the project between the establishment of the constitutional 
government in the United States and the American Civil War. I set these perimeters, 
because of how I define the state’s involvement in innovation and practical science. 
Generally, in referring to the state, I am referring to the federal government and all of its 
entities. Prior to the ratification of the constitution, the individual states held more power 
under the Articles of Confederation. This limited the federal government’s relationship to 
science, technology, and commerce. At the other end of the spectrum, the American Civil 
War marked a drastic turning point in the history of the United States. By the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1860, the state was fully engaged in commerce, science and technology. 
Additionally, by the mid 1850s, most of the historical actors in this study were dead. 
																																								 																				
14 Hugh Richard Slotten, Patronage, Practice, and the Culture of American Science: 
Alexander Dallas Bache and the U.S. Coast Survey, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). Todd Shallat, Structures in the Stream: Water, Science, and the Rise of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994). Thomas G. 
Manning, U.S. Coast Survey vs. Naval Hydrographic Office: A 19th Century Rivalry in 
Science and Politics, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1988). Henry E. 
Barber and Allen R. Gann, A History of the Savannah District U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, (Savannah, GA: Savannah District USACE, 1989). Frank N. Schubert, ed., 
The Nation Builders: A Sesquicentennial History of the Corps of Topographical 
Engineers, 1838-1863, (Fort Belvoir, VA: USACE, 1988). Aubrey Parkman, Army 
Engineers in New England: The Military and Civil Work of the Corps of Engineers in 
New England, 1775-1975, (Waltham, MA: USACE New England Division, 1978). 
Harold Kanarek, The Mid-Atlantic Engineers: A History of the Baltimore District U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, 1774-1974, (Washington: Superintendent of Documents GPO, 
1975). George Rockwell Putnam, Lighthouses and Lightships of the United States, (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1917). Francis Ross Holland, Jr., America’s Lighthouses: 
Their Illustrated History Since 1716, (Brattleboro, VT: Stephen Greene Press, 1972). 
Dennis L. Noble, Lighthouses and Keepers: The United States Lighthouse Service and Its 
Legacy, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999).   
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Geographically, this study is mostly limited to the Atlantic coast, Great Lakes, 
and Gulf coast where the majority of the Army Corps of Engineers, Coast Survey, Light-
House Establishment, and private marine telegraph’s work took place between 1789 and 
1860. This is not meant to discount the scientific work of these institutions occurring on 
the Pacific coast, which for the most part, did not occur until the very latter part of this 
study. Including work on the Pacific coast may be an area of consideration should this 
dissertation ever become a published manuscript. 
CAST OF IMPORTANT CHARACTERS 
The individuals highlighted in this study were a diverse lot. They came from 
every walk of life – rich, poor, and middle-class –, included various ethnicities and races, 
and comprised both men and women of every age. Children were not excepted. A few 
individuals make repeated appearances throughout the narrative. It is therefore necessary 
to introduce this important cast of characters here. 
James Elford was a retired sea captain and prominent figure in Charleston, South 
Carolina until his death in 1826. Elford migrated to Charleston from Bristol, England. In 
the late 1810s, Elford established a navigational school on East Bay Street directly across 
from the Merchant’s Exchange. Understanding the commercial needs of Charleston’s 
merchants and shipmasters, Elford designed a semophoric system for communicating 
between ships and the shore, which he patented in 1823. While most others involved in 
marine telegraphs applied the science locally, Elford envisioned a universal system that 
could be used by any ship, in any port, at any time and still be understood by all who 
were familiar with the system. 
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Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler was a Swiss mathematician who immigrated to the 
United States after conducting several government-sanctioned surveys in Europe. 
Hassler’s presence in the United States was instrumental in the establishment of the Coast 
Survey. Thomas Jefferson and the American Philosophical Society both supported the 
creation of the Coast Survey as a means for providing Hassler with employment for his 
scientific expertise. Congress approved Hassler’s appointment as the first Superintendent 
of the Coast Survey in 1807. Hassler was removed as Superintendent of the Coast Survey 
in 1816 when an act of Congress prohibited civilians from participating in the survey, but 
was reappointed as superintendent of the survey in 1832 because of the lack of progress 
made by the military. Hassler remained the Superintendent of the Coast Survey until his 
death in 1843. 
Benjamin Henry Latrobe was the United States’ “first” architect and engineer. He 
studied in England under Samuel Pepys Cockerell and John Smeaton, respectively before 
coming to the United States. Latrobe was appointed the Chief Surveyor of Public 
Buildings, oversaw the construction of the Bank of Philadelphia and the dome on the 
United States Capitol Building. In the first decade of the 1800s, Latrobe designed an 
elaborate lighthouse structure for the mouth of the Mississippi River. His designs were 
held up by the inaction of Congress and the War of 1812. The Treasury Department, 
which oversaw the Light-House Establishment, ultimately approved a design by 
Latrobe’s son, however because Latrobe’s son succumbed to yellow fever, the elder 
Latrobe later supervised construction of the lighthouse. Latrobe succumbed to yellow 
fever in 1820. 
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Lieutenant Isaiah William Penn (I. W. P.) Lewis was an engineer in the Army 
Corps of Engineers’ Topographical Bureau and the nephew of the Light-House 
Establishment’s main contractor, Winslow Lewis. In the mid-1830s, Lieutenant Lewis 
was commissioned to conduct a survey on the condition of the Light-House 
Establishment. His report was extremely critical of Stephen Pleasonton’s administration 
of the Establishment and of his uncle’s contract work for the agency. Lieutenant Lewis 
invented an oil lamp for use in the Light-House Establishment and was a staunch 
supporter of importing the French-made Fresnel lens to improve coastal lighting. 
Lieutenant Lewis also designed the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse in the late 1840s. 
Winslow Lewis was a retired sea captain from Wellfleet, Massachusetts who 
tinkered with inventing and improving lighting apparatuses for ships and coastal 
navigations. In 1810, Lewis patented a knock-off of Ami Argand’s oil lamp and sold the 
patent to the United States government. Lewis’ contract with the government called for 
him to maintain the lamps and provide oil to all of the nation’s lighthouses. He later 
began contracting to build lighthouses for the Light-House Establishment. Lewis 
maintained his contract for supplying the Establishment with his patented lamp and 
reflector system until the early 1850s. In the mid to late 1810s, Lewis became embroiled 
in a patent lawsuit with his business partner, David Melville. 
Lieutenant George Gordon Meade was an engineer in the Army Corps 
Topographical Bureau. He later became known as the Union general who opposed 
General Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Gettysburg. Lieutenant Meade was assigned to 
build the Brandywine Shoal Lighthouse in the Delaware Bay in 1848, where he first 
learned of and used the screwpile foundation pioneered by Alexander Mitchell, a blind 
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Irish engineer. In the early 1850s, Lieutenant Meade was assigned to build lighthouses in 
Florida. One of Lieutenant Meade’s assignments was the completion of the Carysfort 
Reef Lighthouse. Captain Howard Stansbury started construction on the Carysfort 
Lighthouse, but was reassigned to survey the Great Salt Lake in Utah. During the 
construction of the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse, engineers had to modify the proposed 
screwpile foundation design and created what is now known as the diskpile foundation. 
Due to the change in leadership at Carysfort, some historians credit Lieutenant Meade 
with the invention of the diskpile foundation. It is more plausible to believe the diskpile 
foundation was already installed by the time Meade arrived. Meade invented a hydraulic 
oil lamp that he installed at the Sand Key Lighthouse, which was later adopted by the 
Light-House Board for general use. 
David Melville was a Newport, Rhode Island stationer and hardware merchant. In 
the first and second decades of the nineteenth century, Melville became interested in 
natural gas lighting. He formed a business partnership with Winslow Lewis to promote 
natural gas lighting for homes and businesses. In Melville’s spare time, he tinkered with 
improvements to the Argand style oil lamp. 
Lemuel Moody was a retired sea captain from Portland, Massachusetts (Maine 
after the Missouri Compromise of 1820) who established a marine telegraph station in 
1807 based on Captain David Porter, Sr.’s signals in Baltimore. Moody also created maps 
and charts of Portland’s harbor in 1825. Moody ran the telegraph until his death in 1846. 
John Rowe Parker was a Boston merchant who invested in the marine telegraph, 
particularly the system designed by James Elford of Charleston, South Carolina. Parker’s 
main business was the Franklin Music Warehouse, which sold musical instruments and 
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sheet music. As an agent of Elford’s system, Parker sought to universalize the marine 
telegraph from the 1823 until his death in 1844. His telegraph operators, Charles Beck, 
Frederick W.A.L. Brown, and Jonathon Bruce all conducted scientific experiments on 
cloths and dyes. 
Stephen Pleasonton served as the Fifth Auditor of the Treasury from 1820 until 
the early 1850s. During his tenure as Fifth Auditor, Pleasonton was charged with 
overseeing the Light-House Establishment. His administration came under heavy 
criticism in the mid to late 1830s because of his failure to import the superior Fresnel 
lighthouse lens and the poor overall condition of the nation’s lighthouses. 
Captain David Porter, Sr. established the first marine telegraph in the United 
States on Federal Hill overlooking the Patapsco River in Baltimore in 1797. He was the 
grandfather of Admiral David Porter and the great-grandfather of Commodore David 
Dixon Porter. Admiral Porter served in the Barbary Wars and the War of 1812. 
Commodore David Porter served in the American Civil War. 
Captain Howard Stansbury was an engineer with the Army Corps of Engineers 
Topographical Bureau. Stansbury was assigned to build the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse, 
which utilized a design by Irish engineer Alexander Mitchell known as the screwpile 
foundation. Sources appear to support Stansbury as the originator of the diskpile 
innovation that derived from the screwpile, but as stated earlier, some historians claim the 






As Ann Johnson noted in her essay “STEM in the EAR,” science and technology 
are mostly invisible in the historiography of the early United States.15 Johnson argues this 
invisibility is due to the “ubiquity, as much as its poor resemblance to post-WWII 
science.”16 A small handful of works from the late 1980s to the present confirm 
Johnson’s assessment. These works include Judith McGaw’s Most Wonderful Machine 
(1989), Carroll Pursell’s edited volume Technology in America (1990), Eda Kranakis’ 
Constructing a Bridge (1996), John F. Kasson’s Civilizing the Machine (1999), David E. 
Nye’s American Technological Sublime, and Andrew J. Lewis’ A Democracy of Facts 
(2011).17 Aside from Lewis, most of the works discussing science and technology in the 
early United States do not limit themselves to that period and go well into the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. McGaw’s narrative, for instance, chronicles papermaking in 
Berkshire, Massachusetts through the mid 1880s and Nye’s study includes a discussion 
on the sublimity of electricity in the late nineteenth century. Science and technology in 
the history of the early United States is thus scattered and sporadic in the literature and 
historians must attempt a scavenger hunt of sorts to locate relevant information. 
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Johnson’s own work examines the role of engineers in “shaping the nation – both 
physically and culturally – in the early republic.”18 Johnson asks scholars to consider 
“what counted as science?” and “why did a particular activity or body of knowledge 
count as science?”19 If scholars follow Johnson’s advice and consider the stakes for 
“making a claim of being scientific” in the period, it becomes easier to identify science 
and technology in the history of the early United States and thus easier to write about it.20 
Science was not just practiced by great men such as Thomas Jefferson, Joseph Henry, and 
Alexander Dallas Bache. It was also practiced by the James Elfords, Winslow Lewises, 
David Melvilles, and Lemuel Moodys of the world. This study thus adds to the history of 
science and technology in the early United States with its attempt to answer Johnson’s 




18 Johnson, 3. 
19 Johnson, 4. 
20 Johnson, 4. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN COMMERCE 
Commerce was the driving force behind many Americans’ involvement in 
practical science and the mechanical arts. Commerce, however, was intricately tied to 
shipping and navigation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Shipping 
and navigation came with its own set of challenges. Navigating the open sea required 
mariners to understand the principles of astronomy because they used the stars to 
pinpoint their location. Navigating the shipping lanes and coastal waters were fraught 
with numerous hazards. Protecting commerce meant having to solve these commercial 
challenges and many Americans found solutions to these challenges by engaging in 
scientific practice. In fact, solving commercial problems drove many Americans to 
science and the arts who otherwise might not have ventured into those fields. What 
follows are examples that illustrate the types of commercial problems Americans faced 
and the solutions they created for those problems using practical science and the 
mechanical arts.  
In 1798, a Wellfleet, Massachusetts shipmaster named Winslow Lewis wrote to 
the Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, that he, Lewis, “was passing a Barber shop 
in Boston and observed an Uncommon Light being thrown into the street from the 
window.” Lewis’ curiosity with the light led him into the barber’s shop where he 
discovered the shop owner “had got a Lenses [sic] about two inches in Diameter Placed 
into the Window behind which he had a Candle.” Lewis realized the lens caused the light 
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to be thrown “a great distance altho the Night was Unusuly [sic] Dark.” He surmised that 
a similar apparatus “would have a good effect in a Light house.” Lewis set about creating 
a lens and reflector unit that could be used in coastal beacons. To Lewis’ dismay, 
however, he “found that the Lenses Could Not be made in this Country of the size 
Suitable for Light houses.”1 
Lewis returned to the sea following his “discovery.” For the next several years 
Lewis was “constantly Employed in Foreign Voyages.”2 The Embargo Act of 1807, 
signed into law by Thomas Jefferson, abruptly ended Lewis’ time at sea and Lewis 
resumed his work in the mechanical arts hoping to support his growing family. Lewis’ 
tinkering in the mechanical arts resulted in the invention of his “Patent sky Light for 
ship[’]s decks.” A year later in 1808, Lewis created his “Patent Reflecting bin[n]acle 
illuminator.”3  
Lewis’ inventions met with such great reception that word of his work came to the 
attention of Commodore John Rodgers. Rodgers was interested in finding a way to 
provide better lighting for the ammunition magazines on the navy’s ships of war. The 
naval officer asked Lewis if he could construct an apparatus to that effect. Lewis said he 
could and for the next several months Lewis tinkered with various materials to construct 
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something that would satisfy the commodore’s request. After four months, Lewis 
presented his reflecting magazine lantern to Commodore Rodgers.4 
After patenting his reflecting magazine lantern, Lewis spent a year perfecting his 
lamp and reflector system (Figure 2.1) for lighthouses that he envisioned in 1798. In May 
1810, Lewis received permission from Albert Gallatin to test his lamp and reflector in the 
Cape Ann Lighthouse north of Boston. The experiment proved successful and Lewis 
patented his lamp and reflector system that summer.5  
There are no records indicating how much Lewis made off his binnacle 
illuminator and reflecting magazine lantern patents. It does not appear that he entered into 
manufacturing them long term. His patent for the lighthouse lamp and reflector system 
did not pay dividends until 1812 when the government purchased the rights to the patent. 
Thus, it appears Lewis did not profit much from his tinkering in the mechanical arts. In 
November 1810, Lewis returned to the sea and his livelihood as a shipmaster engaged in 
foreign and transatlantic voyages.6 
Lewis’ November voyage took him to Holyhead, England. While there, Lewis 
found the lighthouse at Holyhead fitted with reflectors. This discovery must have alarmed 
Lewis, for upon his return to the United States, Lewis defended his lens and reflector as 
being solely his idea. 
I am confident that there was never a reflector made 
before my invention in any Optical principal[.] Now I 
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Figure 2.1 Winslow Lewis Lamp and Reflector Patent #1305, June 8, 1810. Courtesy of 
the Smithsonian Institution NMAH / Maritime. 
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have no idea that the principle of reflecting and 
magnifying by reflectors [&] lenses was ever before 
attempted. The principle of my reflector is allowed by all 
scientific men to be a thing not before known. that the 
Whole Combination of the apparatus is not an invention 
of mine never has been doubted. I can aDD no stronger 
proof than my oath on the specification [sic] – Mr. Loy 
[&] Mr. Quincy, Mr. Turner [&] Mr. Green - all have 
long known me [&] are well acquainted with my 
character [&] the progress of my inventions from the 
commencement of them.4 
Although Lewis installed his lamp and reflector in the Cape Ann lighthouse before his 
visit to Holyhead, the impulsiveness of his defense seems suspicious; almost self-
incriminating. According to the British lighthouse engineer Alan Stevenson, Britain had 
been using a parabolic reflector in their lamps since at least 1794, or almost 20 years 
before Lewis patented his system in the United States.5 Captain R. R. Crocker testified in 
a letter to revenue collector John P. Norton that “Captain Winslow Lewis, of Boston, 
took the plan of the house and reflectors at Holyhead.”6 Several historians, including 
Amy K. Marshall, Terry Pepper and Wayne Wheeler, have also claimed Lewis “stole” 
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the design for his lamp from that of François Pierre Aimé Argand.7 Marshall cites Lewis’ 
nephew, Army Corps of Engineers Lieutenant I.W.P. Lewis, who charged his uncle with 
plagiarizing the lighting of the South Stack Lighthouse at Holyhead.8  
François Pierre Aimé Argand was a Swiss physicist who patented an oil-burning 
lamp in 1781. Argand died in 1803, but his lamp had been installed in English 
lighthouses as early as 1792 and was widely adopted in non-maritime applications 
throughout Europe.9 (It was also introduced in the United States among early republic 
elites including Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George Washington.)10 As 
Winslow Lewis had been a shipmaster prior to his inventions in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century, it is conceivable that he witnessed Argand’s lamp on a previous trip 
to Europe before he installed his lamp and reflector at Cape Ann. Argand’s patent in 
England, however, was invalidated due to similar lamps being in use prior to issuing the 
patent. Correspondence of Johann Sabastian Clais in the Conservatoire des Arts et 
Metiers in Paris indicate Argand witnessed a demonstration of Benjamin Franklin’s oil 
lamp in England and returned to Paris to construct a lamp of Argand’s own design.11 
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After Argand’s patent was invalidated in Britain, the French Minister forced Argand to 
end his patent dispute with Ambriose L’Ange and file joint ownership of the invention.12  
Regardless of the origin of Lewis’ lighthouse lamp, its successful 
use in beacon at Cape Ann prompted him to solicit the federal government 
for adoption in all of the nation’s lighthouses.  
The Patent having always had in mind the view the 
Service he might render the public and in particular 
navigation more than pecuniary emoluments will convey 
his Patent right to the United States for twenty thousand 
dollars, this to include the Patent rights for the Lights 
already fitted as he has never received any compensation 
whatever for his time employed in fitting the three lights 
now in operation.13  
The success of Lewis’ lamp was the reduction in oil consumption. According to a Mr. W. 
Carrington, Lewis’ workman who attended to the lamps at Cape Ann, the twelve lamps in 
Lewis’ new system consumed 30 gallons of oil from May 15, to June 23, 1811. 
Previously, the lighthouse consumed 28 gallons per week.14 
Lewis further agreed to eliminate the government’s risk in purchasing his patent 
rights by giving “satisfactory Bonds such as shall be deemed good security to reimburse 
the money paid for the Patent as well as every Expense government may have been att 
[sic] in Fitting up the Light houses in the New system if they should be found not to 
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answer the purpose now calculated & that the saving of oyl [sic] is not equal to one half 
the quantity consumed in the present system.” Lewis also warranted his system for seven 
years after it had been installed in a lighthouse. At the time, the Treasury Department 
could not authorize wider adoption of Lewis’ lamp as “extending the improvement to all 
the light houses…would however exceed the ordinary appropriations.”15  
Albert Gallatin deemed Lewis’ scientific enterprise as a “great success” for the 
United States “both as to the brilliancy of the light and the saving of the oil.” As 
Secretary of the Treasury and the man responsible for overseeing the nation’s 
lighthouses, Gallatin begged leave of Congress to “lay the subject before the committee 
of commerce and manufactures,” for a decision on the expense.16 The Committee on 
Commerce and Manufactures responded favorably to Gallatin’s request finding it “proper 
to authorize the expense” and “introduce an item to that effect in the general 
appropriation law.”17 Lewis’ contract with the federal government, commenced March 
26, 1812. 
The contract called for Lewis to be paid “the sum of Twenty Four Thousand 
Dollars” plus “a rate of five hundred dollars a year, for keeping all apparatus as aforesaid 
in repair during seven years.”18 By 1817, Lewis had fitted up every lighthouse in America 
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with his lamp and reflector system. The government renewed Lewis’ contract that same 
year for fitting up any new lighthouses that were to be built.19 
As Lewis’ lighthouse lamp and reflector example demonstrates, science and 
commerce were intricately related in the early United States; a fact that could be the 
subject of an entire book. This chapter seeks to explore two aspects of the science – 
commerce relationship in the first half of the nineteenth century in America. First, 
Americans used practical science and the mechanical arts to solve commercial problems. 
Although the United States was expanding westward, the nation’s commerce remained 
heavily dependent on shipping and global trade. Commercial problems were often 
shipping problems. Sometimes solving commercial problems meant protecting commerce 
from the natural world. Lewis almost immediately recognized the utility of placing a lens 
in front of a lighthouse lamp to protect shipping. The lens provided for a stronger 
illumination by projecting the light further into the darkness, which in turn allowed better 
visibility in adverse weather and better discernibility of underwater hazards. At other 
times, solving commercial problems might mean improving port operations. The marine 
telegraph, for instance, solved the problem of ships arriving unannounced. The arrival or 
unannounced ships delayed the collection of customs duties, unlading of cargoes, and 
selling of imported goods. These delays directly impacted the efficiency of shipping by 
indirectly causing ships to lay idle in port for longer periods of time.20 As most merchants 
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and shipmasters knew, a ship only makes money while it is sailing. Ships lying idle in 
port for extended periods of time was, and still is, a drag on the commercial economy. 
Second, science and the practical arts provided commercial opportunities for 
those engaged in scientific practice. Science allowed individuals, such as Lewis, to profit 
from their ideas and skills. Whether or not Lewis was entitled to a patent on his lamp and 
reflector system is a separate issue. The fact that Lewis profited handsomely from his 
patents illustrates the types of opportunities created by science and the mechanical arts. 
Science and the mechanical arts did not limit who could participate in the scientific 
enterprise. Early republic entrepreneurs with little to no scientific training or background 
in the practical arts seized upon these opportunities. In the United States, science and 
mechanical arts were not limited to the educated elite natural philosophers, but instead 
were performed by anyone who had the financial means or the intellectual ability to work 
in those fields. Andrew J. Lewis’s study of natural philosophy in the early American 
republic indicated this was the democratization of natural philosophy.21 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Literature on intersection of science and commerce in the early United States is 
spread sporadically throughout historical narratives on the history of science. Christopher 
Beauchamp’s Invented by Law (2015), for instance, dedicates the first chapter of his 
narrative on Alexander Graham Bell and the invention of the telephone to the exploring 
the role of United States patent law in promoting commerce in the early American 
republic. Beauchamp argues, “patenting activity grew less from specific developments in 
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technology than from broad-based economic factors.”22 Similarly, the final chapter in  
James Delbourgo’s A Most Amazing Scene of Wonders (2006) explores the world of 
physicians selling electrotherapies to the public for improved health. Delbourgo claims 
charlatan doctors sold electric tractors to unsuspecting consumers for as much as $25 
dollars a set. The tractor was a set of two small metallic rods measuring approximately 
three inches in length. The rods were constructed of iron and brass which the quack 
physician claimed used electricity to cure certain ailments when the rods were passed 
over the body.23 And Andrew J. Lewis’s A Democracy of Facts (2011) uses a single 
chapter to explore the market economy of plants and rocks in the expansion of 
knowledge. Lewis puts forth the idea that naturalists bought plant and rock specimens 
from “ordinary Americans” as a means for increasing the naturalists’ knowledge.24 
Full length narratives on the intersection of science and commerce often focus on 
manufacturing and distribution. Judith McGaw’s Most Wonderful Machine (1987), for 
instance, explores the social and cultural impact of mechanization in the early American 
paper making industry. Part of that social change was the advent of steamboat 
transportation and the opening of the Erie Canal. McGaw argues these forces, along with 
improvements in factory mechanization, opened new markets for the Berkshire paper 
manufacturers and increased Berkshire’s share of business in New York City. Daniel 
Walker Howe’s What Hath God Wrought (2007) examines how improvements in 
transportation and communication expanded the American economy between the War of 
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1812 and the Mexican-American War. Howe argues these developments helped diversify 
the American economy, placing industry on the same foothold as agriculture.  Perhaps 
the best narratives exploring the intersection of science and commerce is Paul Lucier’s 
Scientists and Swindlers (2008). Lucier argues American men of science were 
entrepreneurs engaged in self-promotion. Lucier sees this scientific entrepreneurship as 
the foundation for the rise of the consulting industry and subsequently the rise of 
scientific corruption.25  
While the importance of McGaw’s and Howe’s studies are unquestioned, they 
diminish the fact that America remained tied to the ocean for much of its commerce and 
economy. This chapter focuses on the shipping side of commerce and seeks to 
demonstrate the role of science and the practical arts in promoting commerce within a 
maritime context. Additionally, this chapter most closely fits with Lucier’s Scientists and 
Swindlers in arguing that those engaged in science and the practical arts were merchants 
and businessmen more than they were scientists and artisans. Similar to Lucier’s 
narrative, this chapter also looks at the commercial corruption the merchants’ 
innovations. 
SOLVING COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS 
 Commerce in the early American nineteenth century was fraught with many 
problems. First, physical geography and the environment posed obstacles that endangered 
cargos and the lives of mariners. Mariners, merchants, shipmasters, public officials, and 
anyone with an interest in commerce sought to reduce these dangers, or at least the losses 
associated with these hazards. Additionally, the Light-House Establishment and Coast 
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Survey were established with these ends in mind, while the Army Corps of Engineers 
eventually assumed the role of building the public infrastructure for ensuring the safety of 
commerce. Second, British impressment of American sailors robbed the young nation’s 
commerce of much needed labor. Political leaders, such as Connecticut Congressman 
Samuel W. Dana, believed accurate charts and maps could reduce these infractions on 
American commerce. Finally, inefficient shipping processes caused merchants and ship 
owners to lose money when their vessels lay idle in port for extended periods. Although 
efficiency is rarely mentioned specifically in the historical documents, (it is often masked 
in the language of expediency), the concern over inefficient processes is easily found in 
the actions of those concerned with commerce. Several historians, including John K. 
Moulton, Marc Levinson, Kenneth Pomeranz, and the trio of Alex Roland, W. Jeffrey 
Bolster, and Alexander Keyssar all acknowledge the importance of efficiency in shipping 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, even though, as previously noted, the term itself 
did not obtain its quantitative definition until later in the nineteenth century.26 Solving 
these commercial problems, and others, became a priority for many Americans and 
pushed them to pursue scientific endeavors to preserve America’s commercial enterprise. 
THE PROBLEM OF SHIPWRECKS 
One of the biggest commercial problems of the early Untied States was providing 
for safe passage of cargoes, passengers, and crew. As commerce and shipping increased 
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with the growth of the United States in the early nineteenth century, the rate of maritime 
disasters increased. According to historian Donald Shomette, the Chesapeake Bay, upon 
which Baltimore was the leading port, witnessed nearly 140 shipwrecks between the 
1790 and 1850.27 The approaches to Boston fared worse. Minot’s Ledge near Cohasset 
Harbor south of Boston became a graveyard for more than 40 ships between 1832 and 
1841; an average of more than four groundings annually. Cape Cod proved even more 
hazardous claiming an average of 50 wrecks annually in the 16 years between 1843 and 
1859 and a high of more than 82 marooned ships in 1844 alone.28 
Shipwrecks disrupted the local economy. In the early nineteenth century United 
States, a ship’s cargo averaged between $300,000 and $400,000 with the ship owner 
realizing at least a 30% profit.29 With so much money riding on a single voyage, the loss 
of even one ship could easily bankrupt a local merchant. This was the case with the 
wreck of the Union in 1817, which was highlighted in the previous chapter. Although the 
ship’s owners, Stephen Phillips and George Pierce, carried insurance on the Union and its 
cargo, the loss exceeded the insurance by $35,000 ($599,000 in 2013 dollars).30 This loss 
reverberated through the local economy in the loss of income, employment, and tax 
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The loss of a ship disrupted the national economy as well through the loss of 
customs duties. As United States Congressman James Jackson of Savannah 
acknowledged, “commerce would be embarrassed and our revenue will be lessened and 
destroyed” by the failure to provide safe passage for shipping.31 Jackson noted, “the 
revenue of the United States is to be derived from navigation and commerce.”32 In 1823, 
for instance, annual customs duties accounted for slightly more than 88 percent of the 
total federal income.33 
In addition to disrupting the local and national economies, historian Jamin John 
Wells notes shipwrecks also impacted the social, material, and cultural world.34 The loss 
of life, or even the possibility of loss, brought communities closer together in mourning 
and the concern over the fate of loved ones. The hardships of loss were often comforted 
and relieved through churches or charitable organizations such as the Portland Marine 
Society. Material goods lost in shipwrecks could be replaced, at an expense, with another 
shipment, but until then, the loss of material goods left a void in the lives many. Rich 
socialites would have to survive a little while longer without the manufactured goods that 
gave them their societal status while the less privileged would have to do without 
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altogether. Culturally, shipwrecks impacted the exchange of knowledge. As goods and 
lives were lost, so was the knowledge gained from travels to foreign countries. 
Ship wrecks nudged Americans toward science as solving this commercial 
problem immediately became a priority. For the previously stated reasons, Americans 
sought to protect commerce from shipwrecks and other maritime hazards and they used 
practical science and the mechanical arts to achieve those ends. The scientific work of 
private citizens is seen most prominently in the Light-House Establishment, where 
regional superintendents relied heavily on merchants and inventors for improvements to 
lighthouse apparatuses. In November 1816, for instance, David Melville, a Newport, 
Rhode Island businessman, met with Winslow Lewis, William Simons, and Captain 
George Shearman, the keeper of the Newport Lighthouse. As all four men were either 
intimately involved with maintaining the lighthouses or were interested in their efficient 
operation, their conversation turned to the difficulty of keeping the lights lit in sub-
freezing temperatures of winter.35 Captain Shearman acknowledged he had experienced 
difficulties in the winter because the spermaceti oil used by the United States Light-
House establishment congealed in temperatures below 30 degrees Fahrenheit, causing the 
light to extinguish itself.36 Lewis’ solution had been to recommend placing a small stove 
in the lantern room of the lighthouse to keep the air warm and thus the oil in a liquid 
																																								 																				
35 David Melville, An exposé of facts… relating to the conduct of Winslow 
Lewis…addressed to the Hon. the Secretary of the Treasury, (Providence, RI: Miller & 
Hutchins, 1819) 4, PRHC, no. 470, HAG. 
36 Ibid. Stephen Pleasonton to Thomas Corwin, March 8, 1852 in United States Treasury, 
Light-Houses: Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury…in Reply to a Report Made to 
Congress by the Light-House Board, by Thomas Corwin, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 1852, H. 
Doc. 88, 7. 
36 
state.37 While Lewis’ suggestion worked in theory, it was hardly a very practical solution. 
Most lighthouse lanterns barely have enough room for the keeper and the light let alone 
the addition of a wood- or coal- burning stove. Additionally, carrying a stove up the 
narrow, often spiral, staircases to the top of the lighthouse was a cumbersome task. The 
safety of the ships, however, left the keepers with little choice. The preservation of life 
and commerce mandated they carry out the task regardless of the difficulty. 
During the conversation, Melville asked Lewis if there was a way to keep the oil 
heated without a stove in the lantern of the lighthouse. Lewis responded, “no, my dear 
Sir, that is impossible.” Melville then proceeded to explain to Lewis how one might go 
about heating the oil using the same flame that burned the oil. Melville then, at Lewis’ 
request sketched out his plan.38  
While Melville fully intended to profit from his idea, his improvement to the 
lighthouse lamp was also driven by the need to protect commerce and the lives of 
mariners. If the spermaceti oil congealed from the cold winter temperatures, the flame in 
the lighthouse lamp would extinguish itself. An extinguished beacon created a hazard to 
mariners and their cargos. Mariners used the lights not only to navigate coastal and 
underwater hazards, but also to pinpoint their location. An unlit lighthouse could easily 
result in a shipwreck similar to the previously mentioned wreck of the Union. Melville 
recognized this fact and the importance of his invention, but he only stood to profit from 
the invention if the congealing of the oil were a real problem for commerce. As will be 
discussed later, Lewis adopted Melville’s plan for adding an oil heating tube to the lamp. 
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Other industrious individuals also sought to protect commerce through science 
and the mechanical arts. In 1844, Alonzo Farrar of Boston, for instance, devised a method 
of protecting a lighthouse’s parabolic reflectors from losing their reflective power. Farrar 
pointed out the reflectors then in use were made of copper and coated with silver. As 
smoke and dust accumulated on the apparatus, the reflectors required frequent cleanings. 
Farrar noted that the silver coating often tarnished or wore off as a result of these 
repeated cleanings. His improvement to protect the reflective finish was to apply a 
“surface of flint glass, or in fact, what may be termed a parabolic lens (when the reflector 
is parabolic), and when it is of any other shape, a lens made perfectly symmetrical with 
the reflecting surface of the mirror” which was then “cemented or hermetically sealed to 
the mirror or reflector around its perimeter or edge.”39 Farrar’s patent attempted to 
provide for the safety of commerce and mariners lives by ensuring a lighthouse’s 
reflector remained consistently brilliant and therefore allowing for the most powerful 
light. 
Protecting commerce was not limited to lighthouse innovations. Throughout the 
early 1800s, many local entrepreneurs, such as Lewis Brantz of Baltimore and Lemuel 
Moody of Portland, Maine, took it upon themselves to survey their ports and the 
surrounding waters for the safety of commerce. In the 1810s, Brantz surveyed 
Baltimore’s harbor and the Patapsco River leading into the port. Brantz’s survey 
employed the latest scientific methods including using lead weights to take depth 
soundings of the river’s bottom. By documenting the depth soundings on his map, which 
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Brantz published in 1819, the cartographer gave mariners an accurate picture of the deep-
water shipping lanes approaching the harbor to help guide ships safely to the docks.40 
Lemuel Moody produced a similar map of Portland in 1825.41  Moody’s map 
indicated the position the underwater shoals off Stanford Point, Spring Point, and near 
Little Hog Island (present day Little Diamond Island). Moody charted the shallow 
shipping lane between Banges Island (present day Cushing Island) and Peake’s Island 
and the narrow passage between Peake’s Island and Little Hog Island showing the depth 
of the water in each instance.42 Prior to the Coast Survey’s first chart in 1835, it is logical 
to assume every port had a local entrepreneur who charted the waters for the safety of 
commercial shipping. 
Another problems hindering commerce was the buildup of silt and debris in the 
harbor. Pile-driven wharves restricted the flow of water adding to the buildup of silt and 
debris that accompanied normal runoff. Silt and debris reduced the depth of shipping 
lanes and wharfage making it difficult to conduct business on the water.  In 1827, civil 
engineer Edward Clark proposed building a floating dock 
by forming a float of timbers, which is intended to 
constitute the bottom of the structure, and which, by its 
buoyancy, is to support a vessel within the dock, with its 
keel above the surface of the water…this float is to be 
																																								 																				
40 Lewis Brantz, This Survey of the River Patapsco and part of the Chesapeake Bay, 
1819, BCA, RG 12, Series 11, Folder 8, Item MB3697, Baltimore, MD. 
41 Lemuel Moody, Chart of Portland Harbour…drawn from the survey of Des Barres 
with additions and corrections, (1825), Map FOS 39, MeHS. 
42 Ibid. Lemuel Moody, Portland Harbor and Islands and Harbors Adjacent, (1825), 
MeHS. Little Hog Island is known today as Little Diamond Island. 
39 
made in the form of a large hollow box, formed of 
strong logs firmly joined together and calked so as to 
render it water tight. The capacity of the hollow part 
must be such that when exhausted of water, by means of 
pumps, it shall be sufficiently buoyant to sustain itself 
with its load.43 
Clark believed his floating dock would provide for the safety of commerce by 
preventing this build up. The civil engineer submitted his proposal to his peers at 
the Franklin Institute for their opinion on the expediency, feasibility, and 
practicality of his proposal, to “which the committee award to the inventor much 
credit for the ingenuity which the plan displays.” The committee, however, were 
unable to support the idea of a floating dock, noting that ships “undergo in nearly 
every instance a change in form after they are launched” causing the floating dock 
to “be much more liable” because the lift was “calculated to resist the effects of 
the purpose to which they are to be subjugated.”44 
From the federal government’s point of view, the task of providing safe 
passage was left to the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Survey, and the 
Light-House Establishment. Their efforts were sometimes aided by the private 
marine telegraph. The Army Corps of Engineers removed underwater obstacles, 
consulted on the dredging of harbors (or physically performed the act of dredging 
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themselves), and constructed protective breakwaters all for the safety of 
commerce.45 In 1815, for instance, a hurricane completely destroyed all the docks, 
several ships, and many warehouses in Newport, Rhode Island because the port 
lacked the necessary breakwater piers to protect the harbor from storm surges.46 
In Cape May, New Jersey, businessmen, residents, and public officials feared a 
similar situation. In 1838, several Cape May individuals, many of them pilots 
responsible for bringing ships safely into port, petitioned the government for a 
breakwater to “decrease, if they cannot entirely remove, the evil” of “the repeated 
and extensive loss of lives and property.”47 They argued that although a 
breakwater existed at Cape Henlopen and Lewistown, the “number and extent of 
the shoals” in the Delaware Bay made the Bay “far more dangerous…in windy 
weather, than the main ocean.” Cape May residents saw existing breakwaters “as 
useless as if [they] were at Cape Henry [Virginia],” because the existing 
breakwaters, constructed under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers in the 
early 1800s to the benefit of Philadelphia’s merchants and shipping, were situated 
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on the opposite side of the channel leading into the Bay.48 The petitioners 
believed a “stone pier from half to three-quarters mile in length” constructed by a 
skilled engineer could obviate many of the serious difficulties associated with 
their shipping in the Delaware Bay.49 
The New Jersey petitioners also argued that the breakwater was not only in their 
best interests, but that the Western states were also interested in protecting shipping on 
the Delaware Bay “as a large quantity of tobacco, pork, lard, hams, bacon, flour, grain, 
and other articles of western produce poured into Philadelphia through those channels, 
which find a market in Eastern States by the Delaware coasters, which bring back fish, of 
which an immense quantity is shipped west through these channels.”50 
Building lighthouses, breakwater piers, and wharves required more than just basic 
engineering knowledge and knowing the strength of various building materials. 
Engineers also needed to have an understanding of the natural world. Breakwaters had to 
withstand the impact of ice floes, which were essentially miniature icebergs. They had to 
be able to withstand the powerful crashing waves of storm surges. For these, and many 
other reasons, engineers needed to have knowledge of tidal currents, winds, and the mass 
of potential ice floes. They had to understand the differences in the sea floor to 
understand how to anchor structures for safety and stability. Captain Henry Stansbury 
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understood this when he developed the diskpile anchoring system for offshore beacons.51 
Stansbury added iron flanges to the screwpile foundation invented by British engineer 
Alexander Mitchell. Stansbury’s flanges, or disks, provided additional security for the 
screwpile foundation by diffusing the weight of the structure on the disks when the 
structure was anchored in hollow shoals. Because engineers had to understand tidal 
currents, winds, the mass of ice floes, and the differences in the sea floor, the Treasury 
Department and the Army Corps of Engineers created a set of rigid standards for the 
construction of lighthouses and expected engineers to adhere to the standards. The 
specifications provided general standards regarding the type of lighthouse being 
constructed (brick tower, screwpile, etc.) and specific standards related to the geographic 
location of the light, such as those at Atchafalaya Bay, Louisiana and Cape Canaveral, 
Florida.52 
The state also sought to provide safe passage for commerce through the placement 
of buoys, daymarks, and other aids to navigation. These aids provided a visual signal of 
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nearby hazards when visibility was clear and helped mariners confirm their position 
similar to how Global positioning systems are used to pinpoint a ship’s location today. 
When adverse weather affected the visibility of these navigational aids, bells and cannons 
were used as audio warnings. This became the responsibility of the Light-House 
Establishment in 1789 when Congress passed An act for the Establishment and support of 
lighthouse, beacons, buoys, and public piers for the purpose of rending navigation 
“within any bay, inlet, harbor, or port of the United States…easy and safe.”53 Although 
these aids could not prevent all shipwrecks, they drastically reduced the number of 
disasters along the early American coasts. Beginning in 1834, the Corps of Engineers 
built beacons for the Light-House Establishment, reported on the condition of existing 
lighthouses, and surveyed sites to determine the practicality of constructing navigational 
aids.54 
Lastly, the state established the Coast Survey to address commercial issues and to 
be “subservient to the commercial interests” of the nation. The Coast Survey’s 
responsibilities included charting the “islands and shoals, with the roads or places of 
anchorage, within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States; and also 
the respective courses and distances between the principal capes or head lands, together 
with other such matters” as deemed necessary for the complete and accurate charting of 
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the coast.55 Surveying and navigation were the premier sciences in the early nineteenth 
century Untied States. The Coast Survey’s mapping of the physical environment provided 
for the safety of commerce through very precise mathematical calculation known as 
triangulation. In the early 1850s, the surveying of sites for lighthouses had been added to 
the list of Coast Survey responsibilities. 56   
These surveys resulted in more accurate charts than had been previously 
available. Prior to the U.S. Coast Survey’s charts, commercial shipping relied on the 
charts of foreign nations, sailing directions published in The American Coast Pilot, or as 
previously mentioned, charts and maps of local entrepreneurs. Foreign-made charts and 
maps were heavily relied on in the early nineteenth century because the foreign nations 
had more experience in the field of cartography. When Benjamin Henry Latrobe designed 
the lighthouse at the mouth of the Mississippi River in 1805, Albert Gallatin, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, ordered “A copy of a Spanish chart of the coast published at 
Madrid,” for Latrobe’s assistant Lewis Dumain to use in surveying the site of the 
lighthouse.57 Foreign maps, however, were often regional or local in nature and were 
frequently outdated due to the constantly changing environment. Many were drawn years 
earlier during America’s colonial period by the British, French, or Spanish Empires. 
The marine telegraph also provided some measures for the safety of commerce. 
According to the New York Spectator and Eastern Argus newspapers, “Vessels entering 
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[the port] in distress, which require immediate assistance from the city, often for the 
preservation of lives as well as property” can “communicate their wants and distress to 
the shore” through the marine telegraph.58 Several years earlier, The Columbian reported 
that marine signals “may prove the salvation of both vessel and crew, as the necessary aid 
can in that case be always promptly afforded.”59 In fact, that is precisely what happened 
at Cohasset rocks to the south of Boston in January 1827. According to the Eastern 
Argus, the marine telegraph communicated “a vessel ashore on Cohasset rocks,” causing 
the port of Boston to respond by sending a cable and anchor via the schooner Ardent. The 
grounded vessel was towed off the ledge and brought safely into port.60 The rescue of the 
grounded ship saved the ship owner, merchants, and insurance company from the loss 
that would have been sustained at the hands of the pounding sea by a prolonged 
grounding on the ledge. In another incident, the ship Undine of Doxbury arrived at New 
York from Cadiz in “great distress” after 57 days at sea. The captain of the Undine 
requested the aid of six men to help bring her into port because the ship’s crew was 
“unable to work.” The port of New York responded by sending the men and other 
necessary requisites within two hours, avoiding the possibility of the ship encountering 
further disaster.61 
Whereas lighthouses, beacons, and buoys sought to eliminate shipwrecks, marine 
telegraphs were used to communicate wrecks when they did occur so that assistance 
could be sent to the marooned vessel. In advocating for the establishment of the marine 
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telegraph in New York, Taomas Mercein, the Comptroller of the Port, noted, “it 
frequently happens that vessels are becalmed off the Hook for many days unknown to 
their owners.” Mercein believed telegraphic communication from Sandy Hook could 
relay information about the stranded vessels and alleviate some of the uncertainty.62   
The establishment of the marine telegraph was believed to reduce the indirect 
costs of doing business. In both of the previously mentioned incidents, ship owners, 
merchants, and insurers were saved the high cost of an insurance claim. According to 
economic historian Christopher Kingston, some early nineteenth-century insurers, such as 
the Insurance Company of North America, refunded a portion of the premium to the ship 
owner upon the ship’s safe return.63 In New York, Comptroller Mercein claimed that 
communication of stranded vessels could relieve ship owners, “who supposing them out 
of time are induced to effect additional insurance at advanced premiums,” from having to 
take costly extra precautions.64 
The use of science and the mechanical arts to protect commerce extended beyond 
maritime shipping. According to James B. Calvert, railroads began considering 
telegraphic signals as early as 1845. In that year, civil engineer Ashbel Welch inquired of 
Joseph Henry, one of premier scientists in the United States at the time, about the 
practicality of using telegraphic signals on the Pennsylvania Railroad.65  Calvert notes the 
first fixed semaphore signals were “the well-known ball signals derived from nautical 
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tide signals.”66 Additionally, Farrar’s patent method for protecting the polished surfaces 
of reflectors was also used on railroads.67 By the mid-1840s, the time of Farrar’s patent 
and Welch’s inquiry of Joseph Henry, railroads were emerging as a commercial force. 
They had already proved more viable than canals for transporting goods to the interior of 
the continent and were on their way to becoming the dominant form of distributing goods 
over land. 
THE PROBLEM OF BRITISH IMPRESSMENT 
British impressment of American sailors also threatened the safety of commerce 
and pressured the United States to engage in the practical science of coastal surveying. 
Impressment was the forced recruitment and service of mariners for naval service in the 
British Royal Navy. Forced recruitment and service often came without notice. It robbed 
commerce of the much-needed maritime labor that looked after the ships employed in the 
nation’s commerce and the cargoes that fueled the economy. Despite the crown’s defeat 
in the American Revolution, Britain did not recognize naturalized American citizenship. 
The crown and parliament considered Americans to be British citizens, which made them 
subject to naval impressment. Jay’s Treaty in 1795 sought to address grievances between 
the two nations in the decade and a half following the American Revolution, but it failed 
on the point of impressment. In the early 1810s, the issue of impressment remained a 
contentious subject between the two nations, resulting in the United States declaring war 
on Britain in 1812. 
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Some thought British impressment of American sailors might cease with the 
establishment of the Coast Survey. In particular, Connecticut Representative Samuel 
Dana argued the Coast Survey would be useful for the establishment of maritime 
precincts within the United States “within which, of course, the navigation ought to be 
free from the belligerent searches and seizures” of foreign nations.”68 In other words, 
Dana believed by establishing accurate boundaries of the United States coast, American 
ships, particular those involved in the coastal trade, could be free of British impressments 
simply by remaining in U.S. waters and therefore under U.S. law and jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately, Dana did not seem to realize the scope of the task at hand and the 
improbability that the Coast Survey would ever impact the impressment of American 
sailors. Due to the continual shifting of responsibilities for the Coast Survey in its early 
years, and the monumental task set before it, the Survey would not produce its first chart 
of the American coast until 1835 and even then, it was only a chart of Bridgeport 
Harbor.69 Britain ceased impressing American sailors in 1814, some twenty-one years 
earlier. Still, the perception was that science could solve this important commercial 
problem, even if in reality the problem ceased to exist before the survey had the 
opportunity to resolve it.  
THE PROBLEM OF PORT EFFICIENCY 
Similarly, the problem of port efficiency pushed many Americans toward 
practical science as a way to solve this costly commercial problem. Although this issue is 
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not specifically mentioned in any of the primary source documents, time in port had to 
weigh heavily on merchants and ship owners’ minds. Ships only make money when they 
are at sea, trading goods in a network of economic exchanges. Unless ships returned 
immediately to the sea upon unloading their cargo, they lost money sitting idle in port 
through wharfage fees, lost profits and wages, and the ship’s slow depreciation and decay 
at the hands of the marine environment. Time was money and in early American seaports, 
time cost ship owners a great deal of money. In April 1828, the owner of the schooner 
Two Sisters paid 20 cents per day for the privilege of docking at the John Gladding’s 
wharf in Providence, Rhode Island.70 While 20 cents per day may not seem like a lot of 
money, comparably is it equal to about $151.00 in 2015.71 
Idle time in port resulted from one of three things – waiting to unload 
merchandise, making necessary repairs to the ship, and securing an export cargo. One of 
the advantages science and the mechanical arts had with commerce was the ability to 
reduce port idle time. As historians Alex Roland, W. Jeffrey Bolster, and Alexander 
Keyssar note, even modest improvements in port operations, “translated into increases in 
overall economic productivity, even without improvements in production.”72 
Technologies, such as the construction of warehouses, the advent of the American packet 
ship, the the establishment of a marine telegraph station greatly impacted a ship’s time in 
port.  
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Kenneth Pomeranz surmises the simple establishment of a storage facility cut 
shipping idle time to “50 days.”73 Roland, Bolster, and Keyssar found, “time in port was 
reduced, sometimes by half,” with the advent of storage facilities.74 Warehouses 
eliminated the ship as a holding facility by allowing merchants a place to store unsold 
merchandise. Having a place to store cargoes also allowed stevedores to unload cargoes 
sooner, thus reducing a ship’s time in port by freeing the ship for acceptance of the 
outbound shipment. Additionally, warehouses allowed for merchants to store their goods 
prior to export, further reducing a ship’s idle time in port because the outbound shipment 
was already near the docks and ready for loading. 
Packet service provided an additional reduction in port time. As Andrew Gibson 
and Arthur Donovan note, strict adherence to schedules took priority over a full cargo 
hold. Packet ships left precisely on schedule regardless of whether or not they were full.75 
The packets’ routine schedule of arrivals and departures improved port operations by 
standardizing processes associated with time schedules such as loading and unloading 
and freeing wharves for other ships. 
Prior to the establishment of regular packet service in the 1830s, the marine 
telegraph provided a similar modest improvement in port operations. The marine 
telegraph was a communication system that used flags, pendants, burgees, and balls to 
send messages between ships at sea and the shore. It required a visual line of sight, 
usually with the aid of a telescope, and a vantage point that allowed the signaler an 
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unobstructed view of the ocean. The marine telegraph was primarily used in American 
port cities to announce the arrival of a ship into port while it was still a great distance 
away, but it could also be used to bring other news from passing ships to the port. Two of 
the factors responsible for extended port idle times (unloading and securing an export 
cargo) could be reduced with the assistance of an early communication system. By 
announcing the arrival of a ship earlier, the marine telegraph gave ship owners and 
merchants the additional time they needed to hire stevedores for unloading, sell their 
goods, secure storage for unsold merchandise, and arrange for an outbound shipment.76  
Today, these improvements in port operations would be known as efficiencies. 
However, just as the box container of Malcom McLean and Leslie Harlander did not exist 
in the nineteenth century, neither did the concept of efficiency. According to Jennifer 
Karns Alexander, efficiency is a twentieth-century notion that developed out of “an 
obscure philosophical concept” concerned “with the causes of change and the ways of 
God, and only during the Industrial Revolution was it linked with human powers and 
abilities.” Thus, efficiency, as we conceive it today, first concerned itself with the 
mechanics of nineteenth-century industrialization as “engineers and physicists [sought] to 
measure the performance of machines, and, in particular, to relate a machine’s output to 
the inputs it had used.”77 This concept was instrumental in the early twentieth century as 
men such as Henry Ford and Fredrick Winslow Taylor applied science to the 
management of production.78  
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Alexander sees two distinct types of efficiency – one static and one dynamic. First 
is Alexander’s notion of efficiency as control. According to Alexander control is static 
and is based on Samuel P. Hays’ thesis regarding conservation.79 The second is efficiency 
as progress, or dynamic transformation. This type of efficiency is focused on changing 
processes. As Alexander notes, the historical actors did not use terms like efficiency, but 
rather spoke in a language of terms that lacked clear definitions such as “mechanical 
power,” “natural effective power,” and “used effect.”80 She continues stating that the 
term “efficiency” did not receive a clear quantitative definition until the late nineteenth 
century.81 The historical actors in this study were not necessarily men of science and it 
would be hard to classify some of them as mechanical or practical artists. They were 
mariners and entrepreneurs who used technology to solved their commercial issues. They 
spoke in even more ambiguous terms of “advantages,” and “expedients.” Use of the term 
efficiency here will simultaneously mean both control of and transformation of processes. 
The marine telegraph controlled port operations by directing merchants and shipowners 
to action once their approaching vessel was reported. The marine telegraph transformed 
the port operations by changing when men were moved into action. Rather than acting 
when the ship arrived at the dock, interested parties began acting at the first sign of 
arrival. 
Two case studies of idle time in port indicate the science and technology of the 
marine telegraph may have played a significant role in improving port operations, thus 
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intersecting with commerce by reducing ship idle times. Looking at ship arrivals and 
departures in the year immediately preceding and following the establishment of a marine 
telegraph to calculate idle time in port isolates ships’ time in port to the improvement in 
ship to shore communication. Analysis of port time in Baltimore indicates a noticeable 
increase in port efficiency through the decline in port idle time, while a similar analysis in 
Portland (Maine) demonstrates the possibility of a downward trend for a ship’s idle time 
in port. Statistically, however, the data for Portland is not enough to make the claim for 
improved efficiency. The small data set and smaller variance in port idle times for each 
ship in the data set renders such a claim statistically insignificant. 
Baltimore and Portland were chosen for several reasons. Both ports held status as 
year-round ports, eliminating concerns over weather closures affecting port idle time. The 
availability of ship arrival and departure records for Baltimore and Portland, as well as a 
discernable date for the establishment of the marine telegraph, were important 
considerations for calculating the port idle time before and after the establishment of the 
observatories.82 At this time, it has been impossible to establish the exact date for the 
establishment of the marine telegraph at Charleston, Newport, and Philadelphia, while the 
ship departures at New York were not available for the periods immediately preceding 
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and following the establishment of the telegraph in 1812.83 The observatories at 
Baltimore and Portland were also established in different economic times. David Porter’s 
telegraph in Baltimore was established in a time of economic prosperity, whereas the 
“brown tower” in Portland was completed just two months before the start of Jefferson’s 
embargo.84 Additionally, Baltimore was one of the four primary seaports in the early 
American republic, while Portland ranked as a secondary port. The diversity of economic 
times and port size add to the validity of the data by showing studies of both primary and 
secondary ports in different economic times obtained similar results. Lastly, the telegraph 
at Baltimore and Portland served a single port unlike that at Boston. Boston’s signal 
station served the entire area including the smaller ports of Beverly, Salem, and 
Marblehead. Therefore, it was impossible at this time to conduct case studies of those 
ports for comparison.  
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Both case studies found similar results in the average time in port, indicating at 
the very least there is some validity to the argument marine telegraphs improved 
commercial operations in early American seaports through the advanced notification of 
ship arrivals. In both cases studies, only ships which could be positively identified as the 
same ship (ship type, ship owner, shipmaster, port of call, destination, etc.) arriving and 
departing the port were used. While this methodology reduced the usable samples, it 
assured the accuracy of the data sets. 
Captain David Porter commenced signaling at his marine telegraph on Federal 
Hill in Baltimore, on April 9, 1797.85 In the year prior to Porter erecting his flagstaff, 
Baltimore’s vessels remained in port an average of 28 days. While this is significantly 
lower than Pomeranz’s “50 Days,” it was still a substantial amount of time for a ship to 
lay idle in port and a considerable loss for merchants and ship owners. Immediately 
following the founding of Porter’s signal station, ships lingered in port an average of only 
16 days, a reduction in idleness of almost two full weeks.86 This is similar to Roland, 
Bolster, and Keyssar’s claim that warehouses reduced ship idle time by half. It is 
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impossible to put a dollar amount on this improvement in port time, however, the 
reduction in the average idle time undoubtedly contributed to the rise in the economy. 
Less time in port meant more voyages, which in turn translated into an expansion of the 
economy. 
A similar reduction in port time was found in Portland after the establishment of 
its observatory. Prior to the construction of Captain Lemuel Moody’s lookout station, 
Portland’s vessels lay idle an average of 50 days, consistent with Pomeranz’s estimate. 
Moody began signaling arrivals in August 1807, just months before Jefferson convinced 
Congress to pass the Embargo Act of 1807. The Embargo had a profound effect on 
shipping, especially in New England, where ports such as Portland relied almost solely 
on its maritime industries. Despite the Embargo, many ships continued to sail into and 
out of Portland, as witnessed by the continued reporting of ship departures in the local 
newspapers. After Moody began signaling ship arrivals, Portland’s average idle time fell 
by approximately 10 days, as vessels remained in port an average of 40 days.87 Some of 
this decline can be attributed to Portland’s conversion to the coastal trade, however, the 
rate of decline being similar to that in Baltimore suggests the possibility of a trend related 
the the establishment of the marine observatory. Portlanders continued to engage in the 
global market through illicit smuggling, but the arrival and departure records for these 
illegal shipments would not have been published in the city’s two most prominent 
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newspapers, the Eastern Argus and the Portland Gazette.88 Therefore, it is only possible 
to speculate the possibility of a reducing trend in port idle time following the 
establishment of the marine observatory. 
With similar results between two ports of different commodities, geographies, 
size, and economic times, it seems plausible that other ports might have experienced a 
reduction in port idle time with the establishment of their local marine telegraph stations. 
Unfortunately, the methodology cannot be carried forward to other ports at this time for 
the reasons previously stated. As additional research resolves those issues, additional case 
studies can be added to validate the findings in Baltimore and Portland. 
As the previous examples demonstrate, solving commercial problems was a 
driving force for early Americans engaging in practical science, innovation, and the 
mechanical arts. That is not to say those same individuals rejected the idea of making a 
profit. Some, if not most were interested, in profiting from their tinkering. Rather, the 
intent is to recognize the importance of commerce in the production of science and the 
arts in the early United States. Commercial problems needed solutions that could only be 
provided by practical science and the mechanical arts. Commercial problems, thus 
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CREATING COMMERICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
If solving commercial opportunities pushed many Americans toward scientific 
practice, their engagement in science and the mechanical arts created many commercial 
opportunities in the early nineteenth-century United States. Merchants and entrepreneurs 
with little or no scientific background tinkered in science and the practical arts with the 
hopes of someday profiting from their ideas. David Melville, for instance, is best known 
for his natural gas patents in the early 1800s. Yet, Melville’s primary business was selling 
hardware and stationary.89 Melville hoped to profit handsomely from his gas lighting and 
the wide spread introduction of gas lighting. Melville was particularly interested in a 
government contract with the Light-House Establishment for his gas lights.90  
It does not appear, however, that Melville ever profited much from his venture in 
gas lighting. According to gas light historian David Mattausch, sales of gas lamps and 
lighting equipment were slow for Melville. Melville charged $13.00 per light, which 
many found too costly.91 Melville’s equipment was also crudely manufactured and often 
defective. In some lights it was impossible to get the gas to flow “from the condenser to 
the cistern,” whereas others leaked gas from poorly crafted pipes.92 In 1813, an explosion 
resulting from Melville’s gas lighting at the Arkwright mill in Providence, Rhode Island, 
caused the death of Abraham Churchill and the complete destruction of an out building.93 
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This incident lead many to question the safety of natural gas lighting and Melville’s gas 
enterprise never fully recovered from the accident. 
Additionally, Melville’s experiment at the Newport lighthouse in 1817 lost money 
for the inventor. The government contract for the experiment did not allow for 
reimbursement of any of Melville’s expenses. Melville paid for the entire year-long 
experiment out of his own pocket, including the installation of the gas piping and the 
building of the gas house. Winslow Lewis, who in addition to supplying the Light-House 
Establishment with his patented lamp and reflector system also held a very lucrative 
contract ($35,000 per annum) for delivering spermaceti oil to the lighthouses, suggested 
that Melville could make a larger profit if his experiment failed. Lewis recommended 
Melville “make the best bargain he can with the Nantucket people” believing Melville 
could “no doubt…obtain ten thousand dollars from them.”94 Melville refused. 
Others, however were more successful in their tinkering. Winslow Lewis, for 
instance, sold the rights to his patent lighthouse lamp and reflector system to the United 
States government for $24,000. Lewis agreed to fit up all of the lighthouses with his 
system and maintain the system in each lighthouse for a period of seven years. The 
government extended Lewis a contract for $600 per annum for maintaining the lights. As 
new lighthouses were built, Lewis’s contract for fitting up the lighthouses and 
maintaining the lights became a long-term renewable contract that provided Lewis with a 
source of income for more than three decades. As Lewis was now responsible for 
maintaining the lights and therefore had to make routine visits to each lighthouse, the 
government awarded Lewis another contract for delivering the spermaceti oil to each 
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beacon. As previously noted, Lewis’ oil contract was worth $35,000 annually.95 Lewis 
later turned his commercial opportunity into a contract for building coastal beacons.  
Similarly, James Elford of Charleston, South Carolina used science and the 
practical arts to create a commercial opportunity for himself. In 1823, Elford patented a 
universal code of signals for his marine telegraph in the copula of the Charleston 
Merchant’s Exchange Building. Unlike existing signaling systems of the time which were 
often unique to a specific port, Elford’s system was universal. It could be used in any 
port, foreign or domestic, that adopted his system.   
Elford profited from his efforts by licensing his system to an agent in Boston 
Massachusetts. John Rowe Parker, the proprietor of the Central Wharf marine telegraph 
in Boston, paid “one hundred dollars” per annum payable in two installments of fifty 
dollars every six months for the right to sell Elford’s system throughout New England. 
Elford also offered to let Parker “have the State of New York at $100,” and allowed 
Parker to “Supply Vessels with Flags & books belonging to New Hampshire State” 
without further compensation, as “it may add a little to [the] profits.” 96 In turn, Elford 
supplied Parker with signal flags and signal books, which Parker resold to shipmasters 
and merchants subscribing to the telegraph service. Elford sold these items to Parker at a 
25 per cent discount, believing “a handsome profit [could] be made” if the telegraph were 
“properly managed.”97 
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Indeed, proprietors of marine observatories could make a “handsome profit.” 
Parker, for instance, grossed at least  $4,400 in 1834 in annual subscriptions to the marine 
telegraph alone, not counting the profits made from the sale of flags and signal books.98 
Samuel Topliff, the city’s primary news broker from 1814 to 1842, paid Parker $200 
annually for shipping information.99 The Merchant’s Exchange paid $150 per year, while 
insurance companies were charged $50 per annum. Individual merchants paid Parker $10 
annually for their subscriptions to the service.100 In other ports, such as Baltimore and 
Portland, proprietors of the marine telegraph charged subscribers between $2.50 and 
$3.00 annually.101  
Once the subscription was paid, the proprietor of the marine observatory outfitted 
each vessel with a set of signal flags and a codebook. Subscriber’s purchased a set of six 
flags in ports utilizing Elford’s system. If the subscriber owned more than one ship, they 
purchased a set of flags for each vessel. According to the Salem Gazette, “The cost of a 
suit of signal flags with the dictionary is $15.” Since Elford sold the signal flags and 
codebook to Parker at a 25 per cent discount, Parker netted $3.75 for every set he sold.102 
Captain Porter’s telegraph in Baltimore required five signal flags and an unnamed 
number of basketwork balls.103 Moody’s system in Portland utilized five flags and three 
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balls when it first began operation in 1807.104  Porter’s telegraph in Baltimore required 
four flags.105  
Elford’s dictionary of codes included a list of subscribed ships and their 
corresponding signals. The South Carolinian updated the codebooks as more ports 
adopted the system and as more ships subscribed to its universality. At times, the system 
expanded so rapidly Elford was forced to update the signal book several times a year. 
These updates, in turn, forced shipmasters to purchase the latest edition of the codebook 
in order to identify and communicate with other ships. This process of was not so 
different from purchasing software updates in today’s digital electronic age. The constant 
updates provided a regular demand for the codebook, thus keeping the proprietor of the 
marine telegraph with a steady flow of income.  
The marine telegraph provided an additional commercial opportunity for 
manufacturing and selling flags. Each subscribing vessel needed a set of signal flags. The 
task of manufacturing flags varied from one port to another. In Baltimore, for instance, 
David Porter caused “suitable signal flags [to be] prepared,” indicating he contracted with 
a local flag maker for their manufacture.106 In Portland, the proprietor of the telegraph, 
Lemuel Moody, appears to have manufactured the flags himself, but “sent [the cloth] to 
be coloured” by someone else.107 Moody contradicted Elford’s claim that one could make 
a handsome profit selling signal flags when the former complained, “I get but little for 
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my trouble, the flags cost me but little short of the amount I receive” and that “it was with 
great difficulty, I could obtain in the small sum of 50 dollars per year…finding my own 
flags.”108 In Boston, John Rowe Parker original purchased his flags from Elford, but 
when Elford was unable to supply the signal flags, Parker delegated the task of making 
the flags to his signaling agents on Little Brewster Island and Long Island.109 Parker’s 
agents were responsible for all aspects of manufacturing the flag including dyeing the 
cloth.110 Regardless of who manufactured the flags, the marine telegraph offered an 
opportunity for commercial gain. 
Additionally, vessels usually carried a private signal flag, also referred to as a 
house flag, that identified the merchant, his port, and sometimes a specific ship. These 
flags were unique in design within the maritime community of the merchant’s home port 
(although a study of more than a thousand house flags from nineteen different nineteenth-
century United States ports indicates many designs were duplicated in other ports).111 The 
flags represented a shipping family in much the same way a coat of arms represented a 
clan of nobility and often had been passed down through many generations of the family. 
Each local marine telegraph allowed merchants to deposit their flag with the observatory 
so that the vessel could be identified and signaled more easily with a single flag than with 
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a series. By having a copy of their flag deposited at the marine telegraph station, at least 
two private signal flags were needed for every merchant or shipmaster.  
Elford’s system appears to be the only one adopted for use in multiple ports, but 
not all ports utilized the universal system. As each port originally had its own unique 
system of signals, merchants and shipmasters outfitted their vessels with the various 
signals used in each port of call. According to an 1838 inventory of the Charles W. 
Morgan, the whaling ship carried as many as 500 signal flags on board.112 If the Chares 
W. Morgan’s flag inventory is typical of ships for this period, the telegraph created a vast 
commercial opportunity for the textiles and dyes needed to make the flags, the flag 
makers, and those merchants selling the flags. 
Similar to the marine telegraph, science and the practical arts provided 
opportunities for enterprising merchants and skilled cartographers to profit from making 
charts and maps of America’s harbors, shipping lanes, and surrounding coastline. 
Although the Coast Survey was authorized in 1807, it did not publish its first map until 
the 1830s.113 Prior to the establishment of the Coast Survey and in the years leading up to 
the Survey’s first map after its establishment, individuals with a knowledge of science 
created maps of their local ports and sold them to shipmasters, merchants, and public 
officials.  Moody saw “the great necessity of a correct Chart of Portland Harbour and the 
dangerous Rocks near Cape Elizabeth, also of Winter Harbour and the numerous islands 
in Casco Bay” and took it upon himself to create a new map of Portland’s coastal region 
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in 1825.114 Moody sold his map by subscription. Subscribers bought more than 100 
copies of Moody’s Chart of Portland Harbor at $3.00 each, generating at least $300 
income for the mapmaker.115 Moody used his mapmaking as a supplement to his main 
source of income as proprietor of the marine telegraph at Portland and instructor of 
navigation. 
James Elford, Lemuel Moody, David Porter, and Winslow Lewis were all retired 
mariners. When mariners retired from the sea, they could turn to science and the arts to 
carve out new lives for themselves. Most mariners were exposed to science and the 
practical arts through navigation and onboard ship repairs.116 Their engagement in 
science and the practical arts for a new sense of livelihood complicates the narratives of 
maritime and labor historians W. Jeffrey Bolster, Paul Gijle, Marcus Rediker, and Daniel 
Vickers. Each of these historians have argued sailors had few employment opportunities 
off the ship and that many were forced to return to the sea for their livelihood as a 
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result.117 These arguments overlook the fact that mariners received training in science and 
the practical arts through their everyday sailing experiences. In nearly every seaport, 
mariners translated their skills of repairing ships to building construction. As Portland 
historian Moulton points out, many of the homes in that seaport were built by mariners 
waiting for their next voyage. Although the individuals discussed here, (Elford, Moody, 
Porter, and Lewis) were all shipmasters, they were not exceptional. They engaged in the 
same sciences of navigation and the practical arts as other mariners. The biggest 
difference between Elford, Moody, Porter, Lewis and other mariners was not their higher 
status as ship captains, which undoubtedly taught them skills of management, but their 
self-motivation to accede to a higher position in life. Elford, Moody, Porter, and Lewis’ 
self-motivation allowed them to use science and the arts to create lasting careers as 
landlubbers.118 
Not all commercial opportunities were positive. As Winslow Lewis noted in his 
dinner conversation with David Melville, Captain George Shearman, and William 
Simons, “patents [are] useless under the present patent law, as they [are] so easily 
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evaded.”119 As previously noted, Lewis’ patented lamp and reflector system was hardly 
his own invention. Many of Lewis’ contemporaries considered Lewis somewhat of a 
charlatan when it came to his inventions and patents. Several, including Lewis’ nephew 
Lieutenant I.W.P. Lewis, claimed the elder Lewis had stolen the concept of the lamp and 
reflector system from the lighthouse at Holyhead in Great Britain, thus invalidating his 
patent.120 All evidence indicates, Britain’s Trinity House and Northern Lighthouse Board 
had implemented lenses with their reflectors for several years ahead of Lewis’ invention. 
Lewis’ patented lamp and reflector system is not the only instance of Lewis 
committing commercial fraud. In 1819, Lewis became embroiled in a patent lawsuit with 
his friend David Melville. Three years earlier in 1816 in the same conversation that 
Lewis stated the uselessness of patents, Melville described a principle improvement to 
the argand oil lamp that would prevent the spermaceti oil from congealing and thus 
causing the light to extinguish itself. Melville made a rough sketch of the plan and gave it 
to Lewis. Melville later registered the idea and sketch with a local notary, but did not 
have the means to pursue a costly patent of the apparatus at the time. Lewis took out a 
patent in January 1817 for an oil heater based on Melville’s description and sketch. In 
fact, Melville claimed, “on examining the drawing and specification of yours [Lewis’], I 
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find it exactly similar to mine.”121 Melville sued Lewis for the infringement and 
eventually forced Lewis to vacate the patent. 
Others also engaged in commercial fraud using science and the practical arts. In 
1824, an unscrupulous Mr. Lawrence sought to profit from the marine telegraph in 
Boston without just cause. According to Jonathan Bruce, the telegraph agent stationed at 
Boston Lighthouse on Little Brewster Island, Mr. Lawrence “made a seemingly generous 
offer” for Bruce to concede his proposition as the telegraph agent. Mr. Lawrence’s offer 
was to collect “2 thirds of the money,” while Bruce continued to do “two thirds of the 
work.”122 Mr. Lawrence, however, was not entitled to collect any profits from the 
telegraph. John Rowe Parker was the legal proprietor of the telegraph in Boston and held 
the exclusive rights to profit from Elford’s universal signal code in that harbor. 
Additionally, Charles Beck, the signal agent on Long Island in Boston Harbor, noted an 
S. Winson made signals “Which only Answer to Destroye [sic] the Conector [sic] of your 
Telegraph & mak [sic] Sport for Spectators.”123 Beck and Bruce both claimed men like 
Lawrence and Winson were “no friends to the Telegraph establishment” and that such 
men were “Woolves [sic] in Sheep Clothings [sic]” who did not “wish for the Telegraph 
to succeed” with the “perpos [sic] to Destroye [sic] the credit of the telegraph.”124 
Building contractors often tried to profit fraudulently from their engagement in 
engineering and the mechanical arts for the purposes of advancing commerce. In 1825, 
for instance, the Grand River Harbour Company in Ohio and its contractors saw a 
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commercial opportunity for profit and attempted to bilk the state out of thousands of 
dollars for the completion of a public pier. Congress appropriated “one thousand dollars 
for completing it.” The pier was owned by the Grand River Harbour Company, which 
contracted with Abraham Skinner for the repairs. The intent was that once the pier was 
complete, the Treasury Department would pay the money to the Grand River Harbour 
Company. Skinner, however, sought payment directly from the federal government. He 
also attempted to collect the payment in advance of completing the work. The Grand 
River Harbor Company in turn expected to sell the pier to the United States government, 
thus fraudulently getting the state to pay twice for the same pier. Fortunately for the 
United States, Stephen Pleasonton, the Fifth Auditor of the Treasury, recognized the 
unscrupulous scheme and refused to pay for anything other than the original 
construction.125 
CONCLUSION 
Although the nation had already begun expanding westward by the time the 
Constitution was ratified, eastern seaports remained the nation’s economic centers. As 
commercial interests increased, so did the problems facing commerce. With seaports 
anchoring the nation’s economic activity, commercial problems were shipping problems. 
British impressment of American sailors, safe passage for cargos and crew, and the loss 
of income from idled ships were just a few of the commercial problems facing early 
Americans. Merchants, public officials, ship owners, and others concerned with the 
economic livelihood and commercial advancement of their city and nation turned to 
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science and the practical arts to solve these commercial problems as “a matter of serious 
importance.”126  
Protecting the lives of mariners, valuable cargos and even the ship itself were the 
most important issues for American commercial interests. The loss of life was a personal 
tragedy, but it also impacted the economy by reducing the labor pool needed work the 
commercial ships. The loss of cargo had a more direct impact on the economy in that the 
lost goods would not generate the profits, taxes, or wages necessary for churning the 
economy. A lost ship often had the larger impact of losing both lives and cargo and the 
potential of financial ruin for local merchants and ship owners. For these reasons, many 
believed “commerce should receive all the protection possible” and “for this purpose, a 
safe harbor…is all-important.”127 
Science and the arts were necessary components to providing safe harbors and 
protecting commerce. In the early years, individuals who had an interest in protecting and 
advancing commerce took up this task. Men, such as Winslow Lewis and David Melville, 
invented new apparatuses or made improvements to existing technologies with the intent 
of advancing commerce. Government entities, such as the Treasury Department, utilized 
the practical expertise of such individuals. By mid-century, however, science and the 
practical arts in the United States had begun to mature. The Light-House Establishment 
began relying more heavily on the science of the Coast Survey for selecting lighthouse 
sites rather than petitions from locals as they had in the past. They began relying on the 
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technical expertise of the Corps of Engineers for constructing breakwaters, lighthouses, 
piers, and wharves rather than the practical expertise of men such as Lewis.  
To build this infrastructure, the Corps of Engineers needed to understand the 
various elements of the natural world, including tides, currents, winds, and the makeup of 
the ocean floor in order to properly protect commercial interests. The Coast Survey 
provided much of this information with its scientific studies of the harbors and inlets 
along the coast and its mathematical calculations charting the precise location of the 
coastline. Some of the information came from the Corps of Engineers’ own work as they 
built the infrastructure of the ports and learned from their practical experience. 
In the private sector, entrepreneurs participated in science and the arts to advance 
their commercial interests through the improvement of port efficiencies. Through the 
advanced reporting of ship arrivals, the marine telegraph made it possible for merchants 
and ship owners to pre-arrange unlading of cargoes, the sale of imported goods and 
merchandise, and identify outbound freights. This allowed for a faster turnaround in 
shipping and reduced the amount of time ships sat idle in port by as much as two weeks. 
The reduction in port idle time meant more voyages and more profit as ships and crews 




“They are insensible to the wonders of inanimate nature and they may be said not 
to perceive the mighty forests that surround them till they fall beneath the hatchet,” wrote 
Alexis de Tocqueville of the American public in his 1835 study of American society, On 
Democracy in America.1 “Their eyes are fixed upon another sight: the American people 
views its own march across the wilds, draining swamps, turning the course of rivers, 
peopling solitudes, and subduing nature,” the Frenchman continued.2 De Tocqueville was 
right. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, most Americans were hostile 
towards the environment.3 They showed little concern for the natural world.  
Several historians of science and technology, including Leo Marx, David E. Nye, John F. 
Kasson, and Judith McGraw, confirm de Tocqueville’s sentiments.4 Leo Marx’s The 
Machine in the Garden (1964, 2000), for instance, argues evidence of de Tocqueville’s 
concerns could be found much earlier in Tench Coxe’s ambitions for American 
manufacturing. Coxe overlooked the wonders of nature when he promoted harnessing the 
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environment for manufacturing. “By wind and water machines we can make pig and bar 
iron, nail rods, tire, sheet-iron, sheet-copper, sheet-brass, anchors, meal of all kinds, 
gunpowder…”5 Coxe believed factories were necessary else the “great natural powers of 
the country will remain inactive and useless.”6 It is true manufacturing could highlight 
the wonders of nature, but Coxe saw the environment in terms of economic development, 
not with the awe and wonder of someone sensitive to the natural world.  
Similarly, Marx’s protégé, David E. Nye argues eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century Americans sought to “subdue the land.” Nye contends that the majority of 
Americans held the environment as an obstacle “to be overcome” by the industrious.7 
According to Nye, hostility toward the environment was the dominant view held by 
Americans throughout the early republic and well in to the Jacksonian era of the 1830s.8 
Nye’s interpretation, however, cuts short the timeline along which Americans held a 
hostile viewpoint towards the environment. Although romantic era literarists, such as 
Henry David Thoreau, began sympathizing with the environment by mid-century, the 
establishment of the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse in the early 1850s, discussed in the final 
chapter, indicates the idea of mastering nature continued to be a factor in Americans’ 
relationship with the natural world for at least another twenty years beyond Nye’s 
estimation.9 
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Lastly, John F. Kasson and Judith A. McGaw argue early American industrialists, 
such as Francis Cabot Lowell, Nathan Appleton, and Zenas Crane, sought to “exercise 
exclusive control over the environment,” as they advanced their industry.10 The 
environment played a central role in America’s industrial revolution as industrialists built 
mills near waterfalls or river rapids and dams to harness the water’s power.11 
Political historian Drew R. McCoy substantiates these claims. McCoy’s study of 
the political economy in the early American republic argues the Jeffersonian republican 
idea of a peaceful agrarian republic was never a real possibility. America had already 
achieved a “relatively advanced commercial society” by the outbreak of the American 
Revolution.12 Many of the nation’s founding fathers, including John Adams and 
Benjamin Franklin were well aware of this fact.13 McCoy argues the republican vision 
was not one of Sparta, but rather one that was closely integrated with larger global 
commercial society.14 A greater discussion of republican values and practical science in 
the early United States follows in Chapter 5. 
If solving commercial problems served as the foundation for Americans venturing 
into practical science and the mechanical arts, the environment played a similarly 
important role. The environment created many of the commercial problems for which 
Americans sought solutions and thus created a need for science and the arts. This chapter 
examines the environment’s impact on the development of American science, illustrating 
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how the environment mandated the involvement of the state, shaped innovation and 
created a need for science and the arts.  
To solve the commercial problems created by the environment, many Individuals 
tapped into the natural properties of the landscape’s resources and exploited those 
properties and resources to give themselves an advantage over their surroundings. 
Additionally, Americans adapted, innovated, and used their knowledge of natural 
philosophy and the arts to solve problems in nature. These innovations targeted specific 
elements of the environment that allowed man to co-exist with the natural world. Lastly, 
many individuals went so far as to alter the environment to best suit their own needs. 
Altering the environment, however, also presented the greatest opportunity for the 
environment to fight back against man’s encroachment. This constant struggle between 
man and the environment necessitated the involvement of the state.  
EXPLOITING THE LANDSCAPE’S RESOURCES 
As individuals sought to solve the various commercial problems outlined in 
Chapter 2, natural forces presented their own set of problems. Forces of nature, such as 
winds, storm surges, and erosion, created a need for a scientific understanding of the 
world. Americans had to keep this in mind as they worked to solve commercial issues. 
Sometimes this required using the landscape’s natural resources to tame nature’s forces, 
keep the forces of nature in check, or at the very least, prevent those forces from 
becoming bigger issues. Captain Lemuel Moody and the Portland Observatory are a case 
in point. In the spring and summer of 1807, Moody took charge of building a marine 
telegraph station. The station, then known as the Portland Monument Ground, provided 
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the seaport with advanced notice of ship arrivals.15 Building the tower proved quite a 
challenge for Moody. Moody was not an engineer. He was a retired shipmaster. 
Presumably, Moody learned the art of construction during his twenty-plus years plying 
the oceans, rising from a lowly waterboy in the American Revolution to a sea captain 
before the turn of the century. As a mariner, Moody undoubtedly had to make repairs to 
his ship at some point in that career. Although few records exist documenting Moody’s 
career at sea, it is unrealistic to think his ships escaped the ravages of storms and the sea. 
If Moody’s did not encounter such concerns in a career spanning more than twenty years, 
Moody would have had one of the most remarkable seafaring careers of any mariner in 
the history of sailing.  
Storms and the ravages of the sea caused a great deal of damage to ships on the 
water. Often times repairing damages at sea could not wait until the ship reached the next 
port, but rather the repairs had to be completed while the ship was en route. This 
necessitated that mariners learned the art of construction. Through this learning, sailors 
gained knowledge of construction techniques, strength of materials, and practical 
engineering experience. They also learned to take their environment into consideration 
and they applied their knowledge to combating the effects of the environment. This 
practical experience is evident in Moody’s construction of the Portland Observatory and 
the tower’s longevity. The observatory has lasted 210 years and still remains standing in 
its original location today. 
  Moody not only considered the tower’s purpose, he also thought intently about 
the coastal environment and the forces of nature affecting the observatory. Although 
																																								 																				
15 Lemuel Moody, “Meeting Notice, April 24, 1807” (Portland, ME), Ms. Coll. 1931, 
Lemuel Moody Collection, Folder 6, MeHS. 
 77 
Portland’s harbor is protected by Cape Elizabeth to the south and the barrier islands of 
the Casco Bay to the east, the city of Portland sits on an inclined peninsula that leaves it 
exposed to the harsh coastal elements. For this reason, Moody decided to build his marine 
lookout “in the form of a lighthouse.”16 Tapered lighthouse towers, such as those at 
Portland Head and Cape Henry, had proven effective against coastal elements regardless 
of the locale. Moody understood the task at hand and proceeded with the knowledge that 
“the form of a lighthouse,” provided the best option for the tower’s long term survival. 
The fields of architecture and engineering were just beginning to emerge in the 
United States when Moody built his marine observatory.17 Moody was not formally 
trained in either field and his only knowledge of architecture and engineering was what 
he knew about ship design and repair from his days of sailing. Moody also lacked the 
knowledge of the strength of materials. Ann Johnson notes that strength of materials 
testing was also emerging in the United States alongside the field of engineering.18 
Similar to his knowledge of architecture and engineering, Moody’s knowledge of 
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strength of materials was limited to what he may have gained from working on seafaring 
vessels and making any necessary repairs while the ship remained at sea.19 
What Moody did possess was an intimate knowledge of Portland’s physical 
geography. Moody understood his lookout tower needed to withstand the violent 
hurricanes and ravaging nor’easters that constantly plagued Portland’s coastal 
community. He understood the benefits the local environment provided as well as the 
challenges it posed to the success of his operation. This double-edged sword pushed 
Moody to consider every aspect of the environment in building his signaling station. 
Portland’s physical environment was both friend and foe. 
Portland’s physical environment provided two major benefits for Moody’s tower. 
First, the natural resources in and around the seaport provided Moody with an abundance 
of strong building materials that proved ideal for standing up against the harsh conditions 
of the coast. For instance, Moody ballasted the foundation of the signal tower with 122 
tons of granite rubblestone quarried from the coast and the fields surrounding the port.20 
Moody knew from his seafaring days that a strong, heavy ballast helped stabilize a ship 
and kept it upright against rolling waves and violent storms. Because Moody had no 
formal training in architecture or engineering, he drew on his experience and practical 
knowledge of shipping in building his marine telegraph. He surmised that a heavy ballast 
of granite rubblestone would keep the observatory tower upright against the constant 
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punishment of the coastal winds similar to the way a ship’s ballast keeps the vessel from 
rolling.21 
Moody chose the granite rubblestone not only for its prevalence around Portland, 
but also its weight. Aside from basalt, granite is the heaviest stone common to Portland. 
Given a sample of equal dimensions, granite is five times heavier than pinewood, 
Portland’s other abundant natural resource.22 Once completed, the observatory eclipsed 
seven stories and stands more than 85 feet tall.23 It needed a heavy ballast to provide a 
sufficient counterweight to the prevailing winds. Moody’s decision proved an admirable 
choice. 
Contractors harvested the wood for the tower, including the “eight sticks of prime 
timber of sixty-five feet in length, fourteen inches square at the butt and ten inches at the 
top” used for the corner support posts, from the forests near Sebago Lake and Windham, 
both just to the northwest of Portland.24 Here again, the abundance of white pine in and 
around the port made it the obvious choice, but Moody was also aware of pine’s strength 
from his sailing days. White pine was the same material used for ships’ masts. Moody 
knew that pine was strong enough to endure the hurricanes and harsh nor’easters that 
																																								 																				
21 Risk, “Lemuel Moody and the Portland Observatory.” 
22 Amlink Marble, “Amlink Material Weight Calculator,” 
http://www.amlinkmarble.com/weigtcalculator/weightcalculator.htm (accessed 
September 17, 2013). 
23 “HABS ME, 3-Port, 7- (sheet 4 of 4) – Portland Observatory, 138 Congress Street, 
Portland, Cumberland County, ME,” LOC Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, 
DC http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/me0024.sheet.00004a/ (accessed November 8, 
2015). 
24 Lemuel Moody, “Notes related to the construction of the Portland Observatory,” 
(Portland, ME, 1807), Ms. Coll. 1931, Lemuel Moody Collection, Folder 11, MS 173, 
MeHS. Moulton, 22. 
 80 
were common to Portland, but also light enough to allow for relative ease in raising the 
tower’s eight 65-foot tall corner support posts. 
Second, the physical geography of the port provided Moody with an ideal 
location. As previously mentioned, the city of Portland sits on a hill sloping towards a 
sheltered harbor while the Casco Bay is full of islands. The coastline extending from 
Portland to the Portland Head Lighthouse at Cape Elizabeth is lined with rocky cliffs. In 
thinking about the intended purpose of the marine observatory, Moody knew the tower 
needed to be elevated in order to have an unobstructed view of the harbor, bay, and cape. 
He chose the highest elevation in the city, an “elivated [sic] part of Mountjoy’s Neck.” 
Mountjoy Hill was a windswept barren wasteland used primarily for grazing cattle.25 
Moody chose the hill not only because of its excellent 360-degree views, but also because 
it had a clear line of sight with the city’s wharves.26 Merchants and dock workers easily 
saw the observatory and its signals and knew what was going on with shipping beyond 
their limited view of the bay. 
Moody also considered the environment in his design of the tower. Moody 
designed the observatory on a compass rose with each of the eight sides aligning directly 
with a point on a compass – N-S-E-W and NE-SE-SW-NW. He then tapered the 
observatory near the top to provide the least wind resistance. Designing the lookout was 
an important task. Moody knew that designing the observatory “in the form of a 
lighthouse” gave it the best chance of surviving the coastal elements.27 
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Others were not so sure. For many, the observatory was the tallest building they 
had ever seen. Moody’s tower bested the Portland Head light by a full story.28 Calvin 
Day and Nathaniel Willis, editors of Portland’s Eastern Argus newspaper, were two such 
skeptics. In the month after the observatory was completed, Day and Willis questioned 
the stability of Moody’s tower claiming, “at some period hence forward the tower will 
blow over like a summer cloud.”29 Moody proved the editors wrong. As previously noted, 
Moody’s observatory continues to tower over the city today, some 210 years after its 
construction, despite Portland’s harsh coastal environment. The Portland Observatory is 
the only remaining nineteenth-century marine telegraph station in the United States. Two 
reasons the observatory remains are because of its excellent design and Moody’s choice 
of materials.30 
The Portland Monument Ground invoked a sublimity among residents and visitors 
alike. The awe and wonder experienced by the tower’s visitors were not so much because 
of the technology itself, but rather because of what the structure represented. The 
observatory illustrated both man’s conquest of nature and man’s place within it. Moody 
conquered the environment by utilizing the environment’s own natural resources against 
its climatic elements. He invited spectators to climb to the top of his tower where they 
were taken abreath by the vast panoramic views of the expansive oceanic scene. Nowhere 
else on earth could one take in the vastness of the ocean except at sea. 
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SOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES THROUGH ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION 
If men like Captain Moody used the environment against itself, they also invented 
technologies to solve specific problems created by the landscape. In this, some might see 
the environment as advancing science and the arts in the early United States, while others 
might argue the natural world dictated the science performed and the technologies used 
by America’s scientific minds. The power of the natural world dictating outcomes is 
well-argued by environmental historians.  Mark Fiege’s Irrigated Eden, for instance, 
argues the environment of Idaho’s Snake River Valley compromised any chance of 
engineers controlling the natural world and their plans for an ordered agricultural 
landscape. These engineers sought to bring water to the valley’s desert and turn it into an 
agricultural mecca. As engineers altered the natural world, the environment pushed back 
with its own change.31 William Cronon asserts Chicago’s rapid growth was directly 
influenced by its position within nature. Cronon begins his argument showing how 
Chicago’s location was a desolate wasteland unworthy of such a great city, yet the natural 
world provided the city with access to farmland, forests, and water that fueled the city’s 
economy. The location of these natural resources naturally dictated the location of 
Chicago’s granaries, meat packing plants, stockyards, and other amenities that turned 
Chicago into the gateway to the west more than the Mississippi River cities of St. Louis 
and New Orleans.32 Ari Kelman’s A River and Its City and Matthew Klingle’s Emerald 
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City make similar arguments about the environment’s ability to influence development in 
New Orleans and Seattle respectively.33 
Arthur McEvoy’s The Fisherman’s Problem illustrates how the environment 
dictated government policy in California. By arguing the environment was as much of a 
factor in the degradation of natural resources as human interaction, McEvoy demonstrates 
how natural world phenomenon, such as El Nino, contributed to policymakers’ 
misunderstanding of the environment and therefore negatively influenced legislation 
aimed at reversing landscape degradation.34 Richard White extends this argument by 
illustrating how the Columbia river dictated the development of electrical, nuclear, and 
steam power technologies.35 
The development of the mud machine, the marine telegraph, the diskpile 
foundation and oil heaters and lens defrosters for America’s New England lighthouses are 
good examples of the environment’s interaction with science and the arts. The mud 
machine, for instance, was developed to dredge harbors and deepen shipping lanes so that 
shipping could move in and out of port unimpeded by the natural world. The marine 
telegraph provided advance notification of ship arrivals in ports where the view from the 
wharf was obstructed by barrier islands, rocky cliffs, and other geographical features. The 
diskpile foundation allowed engineers to secure offshore structures to hollow reefs on the 
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ocean floor. Cold northern winters necessitated the development of oil heaters and lens 
defrosters in coastal beacons. 
     Mud Machines 
One technology influenced by the environment was the development of the steam 
powered dredger, often referred to as the “mud machine.” John and Andrew Ellicott, first 
introduced the horse powered mud machine when they opened their wharf in Baltimore’s 
harbor to export flour in 1783.36 Before they could build their wharf, the Ellicott brothers 
needed to dredge the harbor at the construction site so they could accommodate larger 
vessels. To achieve this, John and Andrew constructed a horse-drawn bucket scoop and 
placed it on a barge. The bucket scoop consisted a horse-powered treadwheel attached to 
a chain-driven winch. As the treadwheel turned, the winch coiled the chain and raised the 
bucket scoop of dredge from the depths of the harbor. The operator then dumped the spoil 
on a large scow positioned next to the barge. When the scow was full, it sailed down the 
Patapsco River where it would dump the dredge back into the water.37 
The Ellicotts’ venture with the mud machine was a private one. They used it 
specifically to clear the harbor for the construction of their wharf. Other merchants, 
however, quickly realized the utility of the machine and pushed the city of Baltimore to 
invest in its own mud machine. The city’s board of Port Wardens levied a one cent tax on 
every ton of cargo moving through the harbor. Five years later, the Port Wardens doubled 
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the tax. By the turn of the decade, the Port Wardens had raised enough money to order 
the construction of the Ellicotts’ mud machine for general use in the harbor.38 
The horse-drawn mud machine was a slow process. According to Seth Rockman, 
a labor historian of early Baltimore, workers standing in shallow water guided the mud 
machine’s bucket scoop and “emptied the foul-smelling muck into waiting scows.” This 
operation required as many as 60 laborers a day.39 Emptying the scow was equally 
difficult. The entire process was inefficient.40 Adding to that was the continual need for 
keeping the harbor and shipping lanes clear of dredge buildup. Baltimore’s harbor is fed 
by the Jones Falls. As the Falls flowed through the city, it brought dirt and debris with it, 
which were deposited on the floor of the harbor at the end of the Falls’ run. The velocity 
of the Jones Falls meant the harbor filled up very quickly. Floods, such as the one in 
1796, caused the harbor to fill up faster than the mud machine could remove the debris. 
Overdevelopment of Jones Falls in the early nineteenth century exacerbated the problem 
by reducing the paths for runoff and drainage, thus channeling it into the Falls and 
increasing the velocity of the river.41 Something better was needed. 
In 1824, the city of Baltimore contracted with Watchman and Bratt to build a 
steam engine, which was placed on the dredging machine.42 The steam-powered dredging 
machine proved more efficient than its horse drawn predecessor. It was not only faster, 
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but also more powerful. Unfortunately, the steam engine required a great deal of 
maintenance to keep it running. The Port Wardens originally paid Watchman and Bratt 
$2,500 for the steam engine, but within a few years the Wardens had to replace the steam 
power dredging machine with a new one. The estimated repairs nearly exceeded the cost 
of a new machine.43 
The conflict between nature and technology is a contentious one and the mud 
machine was no different. As the mud machine removed debris and opened the shipping 
lanes, it also cleared the path available for the silt and debris to run off. By reducing the 
the barriers to runoff and erosion, the mud machine made it easier for silt and debris to 
build back up. The mud machine demonstrates that nature necessitates the development 
of newer, more advanced technologies, but those technologies in turn also interfere with 
nature. The cycle of conflict between nature and technology is infinite. Man will never 
win the ultimate battle against the environment and the forces of nature. 
     Telegraphic Science 
 Although telegraphic science had been around for several centuries in the old 
world, it was still in its infancy in the United States at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
David Porter established the first telegraph station in the United States in 1797 on 
Baltimore’s Federal Hill.44 Other seaports soon followed. Around the turn of the 
nineteenth century, a semaphoric telegraph existed between The Vineyard and mainland 
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Massachusetts, although the name of the proprietor is unclear.45 Lemuel Moody built the 
Portland observatory in 1807.46 Most east coast telegraph stations in the United States, 
however, were established between the 1810s and 1830s.47  
The environment played a significant role in furthering telegraphic science in the 
United States. In most cases, proprietors like David Porter and Lemuel Moody 
established telegraph stations to compensate for the lack of a visual line of sight.48 Many 
American ports were established because the physical geography of the landscape 
provided a shelter from violent ocean storms and sea surges that resulted from those 
storms. Yet, the protective nature of the landscape also created challenges for merchants 
and port officials. In many ports, the sheltering nature made it impossible for the port to 
see approaching ships and vice versa. The port environment provided the opportunity to 
develop and expand telegraphic science. The natural world dictated a need for marine 
observatories to spot incoming ships and telegraph their arrival to the merchants, 
stevedores, and other interested parties. In Baltimore for instance, the approach to the 
inner harbor runs the length of the Patapsco River, however the towering height of 
Federal Hill blocks the view of the Patapsco from the docks. Merchants, public officials, 
and dock workers were unable to see ships approaching the harbor until those ships had 
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almost reached the docks. This late notice impacted every aspect of the ships’ unlading 
from the hiring of stevedores to the selling and storage of the imported merchandise.49 
If the natural landscape dictated the need for marine telegraphs, the physical 
environment also determined how the telegraph stations were built and where they were 
located. David Porter, for instance, built his his marine telegraph on top of Federal Hill. 
By placing the signal station on such a high vantage point, Porter was able to see both the 
inner and outer harbors of Baltimore and several miles of the Patapsco River leading into 
the port. Federal Hill’s height above the surrounding area, however, allowed Porter to 
build a modest tower of approximately two stories. In contrast, Moody’s observatory in 
Portland eclipsed six stories despite being situated on the highest elevation in the city. 
The high rocky cliffs and Casco Bay islands mandated the height of Moody’s tower. In 
Boston, the lay of the land and the various islands of the harbor mandated a network of 
signal stations.50  
Additionally, the natural world limited the colors, shapes, and designs that could 
be used on signal flags due to the principles of atmospheric refraction.51 The concept of 
atmospheric refraction can be traced back to Claudius Ptolemy of the ancient Greco-
Egyptian civilization. In its simplest terms, atmospheric refraction is the aberration of 
light and other electromagnetic waves passing through the earth’s atmosphere. The 
effects of atmospheric refraction, however, are much more complicated. For instance, as 
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astronomer Andrew T. Young notes, refraction “lets us see a little further, if the ray is 
concave toward the earth,” but that air quality, the curvature of the earth, and 
temperatures can all affect atmospheric refraction.52 This says nothing of adverse weather 
conditions, which in themselves could cause problems with the identification of colors, 
shapes, and designs. Young also notes, refraction is “particularly variable over water, 
because of the high heat capacity of water” and that “temperature contrasts are 
particularly marked near the shore.”53 Observations from the maritime signal towers 
would have been directly impacted by weather conditions and the laws of atmospheric 
refraction. 
Red, white, and royal or navy blue were the most common colors used on 
maritime signal flags throughout the nineteenth century. A survey of over 1,000 signal 
flags and private merchant house flags from 19 different American ports show more than 
90% of the flags used by the marine telegraphs limited their colors to some combination 
of red, white, and blue.54 Although dyes of the early nineteenth century may not have 
contrasted as much as they do today, the limited use of colors resulted from the distance 
at which the colors could be seen and discerned from one another rather than from the 
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inability to manufacture dyes of other colors.55 Black and yellow appeared less frequently 
on American signal flags than on European signals. Green was found on fewer than five 
flags from the previously mentioned survey of 19 American port cities.56  
Although yellow was found on a few flags, the hue was one of those colors that 
observers found hard to distinguish. In 1824, Charles Beck, the signaling agent stationed 
at Long Island in Boston Harbor, informed John Rowe Parker, the proprietor of Boston’s 
marine telegraph, that he was replacing the yellow flags with “Some thing Bather [sic].”57 
Jonathan Bruce, another Boston signaling agent stationed at the Boston lighthouse, wrote 
to Parker asking for cloth of red, white, and blue, stating that he could make the flags “so 
plain that you will not mistake them in whether [sic].”58 Barnard Lindsay Watson’s 
signals from Holyhead to Liverpool between 1827 and 1839 and Frederick Marryat’s 
signals for British merchants first published in 1817 were similarly colored. One-third of 
Marryat’s signals also incorporated yellow. 
Atmospheric refraction and the inability to distinguish colors at great distances 
also impacted the designs that were used on signals. In 1780, Captain Walter Young of 
the HMS Sandwich noted, “Chequed flags should be abolished. Quartered, halved, three-
striped, striped corner ways, half up and down, and pierced are the only ones that are 
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properly distinguished at a distance.”59 This sentiment was shared by Rear Admiral 
Richard Kempenfelt. Kempenfelt believed tri-colored flags of vertical stripes were the 
easiest to distinguish and noted that red-yellow combinations on flags resulted in poor 
identifications.60 According to Andries Burgers, “Simple signal flag design is an 
imperative at sea and it is the practical seamanlike requirement to be able to identify 
signal flags at the longest possible distance.”61 
Similarly, the natural world limited the shapes that could be used on signal flags. 
Kempenfelt, for instance, wrote that pendants should not have swallowtails. In 1814, 
Vice-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood wrote Sir Home Popham, “The Broad Pendants give 
great relief to the observer, the flag wafting out with every change of view, the colours 
are more perfectly distinguished. There certainly is not that advantage in triangular flags; 
they are in general difficult to discern.”62 
While these examples pertain to European signal codes, they can be easily applied 
to the American systems. When Porter and Moody established their signaling stations in 
Baltimore and Portland, they drew on their knowledge of the European systems they 
encountered in the Caribbean.63 John Rowe Parker claimed, Samuel C. Reid’s New York 
telegraph was “nearly similar” to Watson’s signals at Holyhead.64 Through their 
knowledge of the European signal systems, proprietors of the marine telegraph already 
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In order to give the observer the best advantage at discerning colors, shapes, and 
designs, the observatories used the most advanced telescopes of the day. Porter and 
Moody both utilized telescopes made by Peter and John Dollond of London65 Minutes of 
the organizational meeting for the Portland Monument Ground indicate Moody spent 
$500 on the Dollond and Son telescope used at the observatory on Munjoy Hill.66 The 
environment thus not only dictated the colors, shapes, and designs used on flags, but also 
the equipment needed to identify those characteristics. 
One might wonder why Moody and Porter sent away to London to procure their 
telescopes rather than purchase them domestically. The answer is simple. Although glass 
manufacturing was one of America’s first industries, the United States simply did not 
have the capability of producing high quality optical glass. The state of science and the 
arts in the United States limited American access to knowledge and American glass 
manufacturers lagged behind their European counterparts. In fact, few Americans knew 
the art of glassmaking. According to Pamela O. Long, “Glassmaking involved much tacit 
knowledge especially as it related to firing in the furnaces.”67 This limited American 
production and quality. Most gaffers, skilled master artisans who oversaw a teams of 
glassmaking laborers, had to be brought over from Europe. Enticing Europeans to 
immigrate to the United States and paying for their passage made glass production in the 
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United States more expensive.68 The Dollond’s of London, on the other hand, were 
producing top quality optical glass. Their telescopes were considered among the best in 
the world at the time. 
Although certain colors, shapes and designs were indistinguishable at sea or 
between the land and the sea, there were fewer issues with discerning colors, shapes, and 
designs between the observatory and the port. In Baltimore, for instance, the observatory 
agent flew a triangular pendant to signal the arrival of an unknown brig.69 In Portland, a 
yellow triangular pendant signified an approaching sloop.70 One reason for there being 
fewer issues was the distance. At sea and between the land and the sea, the distance 
between the signal and the observer was greater than it was between the observatory and 
the port. Greater distances allowed for atmospheric refraction to distort images, colors, 
and shapes. 
Issues surrounding the colors, shapes, and visibility of signal flags illustrates how 
the environment impacted even the littlest things. To the uninformed observer, the color 
or shape of a flag might seem inconsequential. Individuals participating in the mechanical 
arts and practical science, however, understood that they had to consider the environment 
in nearly every aspect of the scientific and mechanical work. 
     Stansbury’s Diskpile Foundation 
 If the environment played a significant role in the marine telegraph, it played a 
similar role in the construction of the lighthouse at Carysfort Reef in Florida. On the 
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recommendation of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Lighthouse Service intended to 
build a screwpile style structure at Carysfort. A screwpile foundation is a tubular cast or 
wrought iron skeletal frame. It is an adaption of the standard straightpile construction. 
The screwpile foundation was first used by Alexander Mitchell, a blind Irish architect and 
engineer, in 1838. Mitchell added threads to the end of the wrought iron tubes allowing 
them to be screwed into the ground for greater rigidity and stronger structural support. 
Although the straightpile construction had been used in both onshore and offshore 
structures, the screwpile proved especially ideal for muddy, sandy, or swampy soft-
bottomed floors. The design was also highly touted in exposed and wave-swept areas 
because it allowed the wind and waves to sweep through the foundation almost 
unobstructed. 
The lighthouse at Carysfort Reef proved more challenging than the screwpile light 
built by Major Hartman Bache and Lt. George Gordon Meade at Brandywine Shoal in the 
Delaware Bay. While it was intended that the Army Corps of Engineers would build a 
screwpile structure for the Light-House Service at Carysfort, the environment made that 
task impossible. Engineers originally believed Carysfort Reef was solid and would 
provide a suitable base for the screwpile foundation. Upon closer inspection, however, 
Captain Howard Stansbury found the reef hollow. The engineers had nothing to which 
they could anchor the screwpiles.  
Stansbury went to the drawing board. He determined that by driving the piles 
through steel disks he could anchor the piles in the hollow reef. By adding disks to the 
piles, Stansbury extended the reach of the screwpile threads and ensured the piles bored 
into the solid portions of the reef when they were screwed into the sea floor. 
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Additionally, the disk helped distribute the weight of the structure giving it stability and 
making it more secure in the face of hurricanes and other environmental elements. 
Stansbury’s diskpile innovation shows the impossibility of a one-size-fits-all technology 
suitable for every environment. The screwpile foundation proved successful in many 
other applications, but the innovation did not work for the Carysfort Reef because the 
shoal was hollow at its core. The same can be said for other innovations. Technology 
must be adapted to each unique landscape. Engineers, inventors, and others responsible 
for designing mechanical apparatuses cannot account for every geographic feature or 
variance between two different physical environments. It is an unreasonable expectation 
to believe that man can, or will someday, accomplish this impossible task. 
     Oil Heaters and Lens Defrosters 
 Stansbury’s diskpile construction is not the only instance when the environment 
dictated the development of new technologies. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4, several 
individuals tinkered with inventing an oil heater for lighthouse lamps in the mid to late 
1810s. Chapter 2 looks at the oil heater as a commercial opportunity for the inventors, 
whereas Chapter 4 looks at the innovation in terms of mechanical arts in the Light-House 
Establishment. Here, the oil heater is discussed as a product deriving out of 
environmental factors.  
Tinkering in the mechanical arts was directly influenced by the environment. 
Unlike other countries, specifically France, that used colza oil to fuel their lighthouse 
lamps, the United States primarily used spermaceti oil. Spermaceti oil is a waxy 
substance derived from the head of sperm whales that is much denser, and in the early 
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nineteenth century much cheaper, than colza.71 Colza, also known as rapeseed, is 
extracted from cabbage, mustard, turnips, and other vegetables of the Brassicaceae 
family. During the cold winter months northern United States lighthouse keepers 
struggled to keep the oil from congealing. Once the spermaceti oil congealed, the 
lighthouse lamp’s flame is greatly reduced and often extinguished altogether. Mechanics, 
such as Alexander Black, Winslow Lewis, and David Melville, attempted to solve this 
problem of congealing oil, which was created by their local environment. Melville, for 
instance, devised a small tube to direct the heat of the lamp’s flame to the oil. The heat 
from the flame was just enough to keep the oil warm and prevent its congealing. Lewis 
and Black attempted to copy Melville’s invention, but ultimately, Melville innovation 
was installed on all of the northern lighthouses. 
The environment also influenced Melville in developing a method for defrosting 
and dehumidifying the lighthouse lens. Moisture from the humid summer and cold winter 
airs caused condensation and frost to accumulate on the lighthouse lantern, which 
reduced the visibility of the light at sea. Melville installed a small scuttle door on the 
lamp that could be opened or closed to admit or exclude the vapors of the external air and 
thus prevent the accumulation of humidity and frost “from collecting on the windows at 
all seasons and in all states and temperatures of the atmosphere.” This small adaptation 
could even dislodge frost after it had already accumulated.72 
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As Baltimore’s mud machine, the colors of the telegraphic flags, Captain Howard 
Stansbury’s diskpile foundation, and David Melville’s inventions illustrate, American’s 
used science and the arts to overcome environmental challenges. These examples also 
demonstrate how the natural world dictated the need for specific technologies to solve 
everyday problems in the landscape. The interaction between the environment and early 
republic science and the arts was a give and take relationship. 
ALTERING THE ENVIRONMENT AND INVOLVING THE STATE 
 If Americans used science and the arts to overcome environmental challenges, 
they also altered the environment to solve problems created by the natural world in an 
attempt to realize their vision for America. The dredging of Baltimore’s harbors is a case 
in point. As previously mentioned, debris and silt from the Jones Falls continuously filled 
the harbor basin making it difficult for shipping to navigate in and out of the port. Port 
officials, contractors, and even the Army Corps of Engineers removed dredge buildup 
from the harbor using steam powered mud machines. These spoils were then dumped 
along the Patapsco River reshaping the river’s geography and altering the area’s 
ecosystem. Harbor officials, however, showed little concern with their impact on the 
environment. They only had their long-term vision for the port in mind.73 Similar 
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situations could be found in other American ports from Portland, Maine to Savannah, 
Georgia.74 
Dealing with the environment necessitated the involvement of the state, whether 
federal or local. Overcoming challenges presented by the natural world was a 
monumental task. As nature fought back against the encroaching advances of man, the 
struggle became too great for many individuals. Where private enterprise had once 
conducted surveys of local harbors, built port infrastructure, and removed debris buildup 
from the floor of the harbor, they increasingly lacked the financial resources to conduct 
these projects on an ongoing basis. Private individuals could only do so much. 
Industrious entrepreneurs, such as Lemuel Moody, may have conquered their local 
environment to establish marine telegraphs or chart the depth of local ports, but most 
lacked the expertise, finances, and material resources to carry out larger projects or to 
fight what became the endless struggle against nature. Moody, in fact, had to finance his 
marine observatory and charts of Portland’s harbor through subscriptions of local 
merchants. (Moody would eventually payback all of the original subscribers, but it took 
him almost 40 years to do so.)75 Projects that were intensively integrated with the 
environment, such as canal building, harbor dredging, or a broader survey of the coast, 
were simply unattainable by private means. For these projects, private enterprise divested 
themselves of responsibility for subduing nature and came to rely on the state. The 
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government was the only entity, public or private, that either possessed the necessary 
resources or had the political clout to commandeer them.76  
In Baltimore, for instance, the Port Wardens notified the City Council on August 
13, 1849, “That it required the expenditure of the amount appropriated $2,500.00 to 
remove the large amount of dirt at the mouth of the falls, to enable the machine to operate 
in cleaning out the falls.”77 In a second letter dated the next day, the Port Wardens 
requested an additional $17,000.00 “for the removal of dirt from the bed of Jones Falls 
from its mouth” to the Madison Street Bridge.78 It was not uncommon for the Port 
Wardens to request appropriations to the tune of $2,500.00 to $5,000.00 on a regular 
basis.79 These expenditures proved too much for private enterprise as evidenced by the 
Baltimore City Council 1828 resolution authorizing the Port Wardens to “deepen and 
clean the Navigation at any wharves or docks” when “they shall be called on by the 
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occupiers, occupancy owners or owners.”80 In fact, numerous private owners, such as 
George Westman and Alexander Brown, petitioned the Baltimore City Council to have 
the debris removed from their wharves.81 
The direct costs of overcoming natural world challenges were exacerbated by the 
indirect costs of purchasing and maintaining the necessary equipment. As previously 
noted, the city of Baltimore originally paid the company of Watchman and Bratt $2,500 
for a steam engine dredging machine in 1824.82 Two years later, the city accepted bids 
“for the making of two good & sufficient steam Engines, one of not less than six horse 
power - and the other not less than Twelve horse power with the necessary apparatus for 
the purpose of deepening the Harbor.”83 By1833, Baltimore’s dredging operations 
required four discharging machines, three digging machines, 12 horses, 19 large scows, 3 
small scows, 8 small skiffs, a small boat, several dozen shovels, picks, wheel barrows, 
carts, and oars, and a single steam dredging machine.84  
The city owned all of this equipment and held the responsibility of maintaining 
and repairing it. Daily engagement with the environment took its toll on the machines. 
Maintenance and repair costs alone sometimes amounted as much as the cost of new 
equipment or the cost of performing the work. In 1831, repairs to the steam dredging 
machine were so considerable, the Port Wardens found the dredging machine “entirely 
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unworthy of repairs” and sought authorization from the city to purchase a new machine. 
The repairs to the old machine “would amount to within a few dollars of what a new iron 
boiler would” cost.85  After making their case for a new steam dredging machine, the Port 
Wardens then argued for a new machine with a copper boiler. “Taking into consideration 
the great difference of the durability of copper over that of iron boilers, and the relative 
values when unfit for use; the copper being worth, say one half its present cost, [and] the 
iron little or nothing,”86 The City Council agreed with the Port Wardens and passed a 
resolution on February 8, 1831 authorizing the Port Wardens to contract with Watchman 
and Bratt for the copper boiler.87 Yet, the copper boiler fared little better against a 
demanding environment. In the 1833 inventory, just two years after its purchase, the 
copper boiler steam dredging machine is listed as needing “some repairs.” Additionally, 
two of the four discharging machines in the city inventory “required considerable 
repairs,” while one digging machine needed “thorough repairs,”88 The cost of these 
repairs added up quickly. They often exceeded the financial resources of private 
enterprise, meaning only the government could muster the financial clout to battle the 
environment continuously. 
Even when private enterprise could afford the expense of combating the 
environment, they still deferred to the government. William Patterson, and later his heirs, 
continued to have his private dock dredged by the City of Baltimore even though the 
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Pattersons had amassed the second largest fortune in Maryland behind Charles Carroll.89 
Other private enterprises such as John S. Brown & Company and the Canton Company 
also requested the City dredge their wharves.90 William A. Dunnington went so far as to 
request “about Twenty five scow loads taken up” at his dock.91 Throughout the 1830s and 
1840s the Port Wardens and Baltimore City Council were regularly leasing the dredging 
machine and its services for as much as $15.00 a day.92  
While many individuals saw port improvements as a function of the state, the 
private sector also deferred on issues dealing with the natural world because they lacked 
the technical expertise for environmental concerns. The gvoernment, on the other hand, 
possessed the scientific knowledge for interacting with the environment, or at the least, 
possessed the ability to obtain the expertise.   
From its inception as a federal republic on March 4, 1789, the government 
worked to build its scientific knowledge base through the Army Corps of Engineers, the 
Coast Survey, and the Light-House Establishment. As the Corps, Survey, and 
Establishment gained respect for the scientific knowledge they obtained, their value to 
the general welfare of the nation increased exponentially and the demand for their 
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expertise grew. exponentially. Many individuals petitioned the federal government for 
assistance in building port infrastructure, surveying the coast, or deepening harbors 
because of the government’s expertise. When Philadelphia merchants petitioned the 
federal government in 1826 for a breakwater on the Delaware River, they acknowledged 
the Corps of engineers as “most distinguished and experienced.” Philadelphians noted the 
Corps’ expertise when they detailed the Corps’ “full conviction of the insufficiency of the 
plan contemplated by the appropriation” while suggesting a revised plan that “would 
completely answer the intended purpose” and serve as “a lasting monument of the 
[state’s] provident wisdom.”93  
Other seaports similarly acknowledged the federal government’s expertise when 
they petitioned the government for assistance. In 1838, city officials in Bridgeport, 
Connecticut praised the harbor improvement plans made the previous year by Colonel 
Joseph Totten when they petitioned for more appropriations to expand the work.94 Two 
years later in an obvious recognition of the government’s growing expertise, the 
Baltimore City Council petitioned Congress for assistance in deepening the port’s 
harbor.95 Baltimore dredged the port annually for nearly twenty years on its own before 
requesting assistance from the federal government.96 And in 1854, when Portland 
merchants applied to the city for an ordinance on private wharves extending too far into 
the harbor, the municipal government saw fit to commission the federal government for 
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its expertise. The federal government dispatched its three most distinguished experts - 
Professor Alexander Dallas Bache of the Coast Survey, then Commander Charles Henry 
Davis of the United States Navy, and now General Joseph Totten of the Army Corps of 
Engineers. The government’s report detailed “the method for increasing [the port’s] 
accommodations, and at the same time maintaining its depth and capacity.”97 The city 
recognized the federal government’s expertise in petitioning the Maryland legislature for 
an act implementing the federal government’s recommendations.98 
The involvement of the government in concerns of the environment in the early 
nineteenth century might be thought of as “big science.” Generally, the term ‘big 
science” is used to refer to the large scale scientific enterprises of the post-World War II 
era originating out of the Manhattan Project. However, if we define “big science” as 
scientific research on so large a scale that it exceeds the abilities of private enterprise and 
requires the government’s involvement for financial, labor, and natural resource support 
“big science” existed well before the dawn of the twentieth century. One only has to look 
at the scientific institution of the United States Coast Survey to find “big science” in 
nineteenth century America. The Coast Survey required a very sophisticated scientific 
expertise unavailable amongst the general public and large scale financial and material 
support from the federal government. The Survey may well be considered the first “big 
science” project in the United States. 
As the government gained its technical expertise in dealing with environmental 
concerns, it often meant trying to simplify nature. The government approached its task of 
overcoming environmental challenges with a blind eye toward the varied landscape. 
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Despite the vast amount of scientific research conducted by the Coast Survey, Corps of 
Engineers, and the Light-House Establishment, the government failed to acknowledge the 
geographical differences of individual locales. Shoals in Boston Harbor were treated the 
same as shoals off the coast of southern Florida, even though Boston Harbor experiences 
somewhat fewer hurricanes and Florida’s coast sees no ice floes. Republican values of 
expediency and frugality took precedent as time and money became the primary factors 
for the government in all concerns.99 The government standardized on materials, 
scientific methods and technological designs based on costs estimates that disregarded 
local environmental conditions. The rocky cliffs and island-filled bays of the New 
England ports were dramatically different from the low-lying, wind-swept, sea-level 
coast of southern seaports. 
Throughout the 1850s, the Light-House Board collaborated with the Army Corps 
of Engineers to create a set of standards for lighthouse construction which they published 
in the early 1860s. They classified coastal beacons on characteristics of design rather than 
on environmental concerns. They published pamphlets with construction specifications 
that gave little regard to the local variances of the natural world. First order brick tower 
lighthouses, for instance, were expected to be 150 feet “from the level of ground to the 
focal plane of [the] lantern.”100 Offshore structures utilizing the screwpile technology 
were to “rest on and be secured to five wrought iron piles screwed vertically in the 
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shoal…arranged in the form of a square.”101 Additionally, the specifications required “the 
four struts radiating from the center pile to be rolled iron, 4 ½ inches in diameter.”102 
These specifications failed to take into consideration the various environmental 
differences of the localities. A 150-foot tall brick tower lighthouse may have sufficed for 
the low-lying coasts of the south, but it would be too tall for the ships to see in the fog 
when placed on the rocky cliffs of New England. Similarly, offshore screwpile 
lighthouses were common in both the northern bays and the open ocean of the southern 
coasts, but they were effected by different elements. Ice floes proved catastrophic to the 
design of screwpile foundation in northern environments. Southern screwpile beacons 
faced no such adversary. The 4 ½ inch struts radiating form the center pile may have been 
sufficient for the hurricane-prone south, but it was no match for the heavy ice floes of the 
north. In 1873, an inspection of the Brandywine-Shoals Lighthouse in the Delaware Bay 
showed “the lower horizontal system of braces, at about the plane of low water have in 
many localities dropped to the bottom; the cast-iron collars which held them having been 
broken apparently by the weight of superincumbent ice, and the momentum of masses of 
such ice acted on by waves. In this way, the lower system of braces is almost completely 
gone on the northern side to an east and west line, just south of the north pile of the main 
structure (of 1848).”103 In fact, many northern screwpile lights failed to survive ice floes. 
Beginning in the early 1870s, these beacons were replaced with lights built on concrete 
filled caissons. Caisson foundations were much more expensive to build, but proved more 
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durable in northern environments.104 Public officials, however, did not initially see the 
varied environment as an issue. They determined the screwpile design was the best 
foundation for all offshore locations because it allowed for destructive waves to pass 
through the foundation almost unobstructed during violent storms. Government officials 
failed to consider the environmental differences of individual localities. In standardizing 
on construction design and methods, the government tried to simplify nature. 
The government did not always hold a universal view of nature. In 1801, William 
Miller, the Commissioner of the Revenue, wrote to Henry Dearborn, Benjamin H. 
Latrobe, and John McComb regarding the construction of lighthouses at Smith’s Point, 
Old Point Comfort, and New Point Comfort in the Chesapeake Bay. Miller acknowledged 
the three beacons were “adjacent to each other and connected by the same waters,” but he 
also recognized the construction of the lighthouses “must depend upon circumstances” of 
each locale. He left the final decision on building materials to Dearborn, Latrobe, and 
McComb who had surveyed the sites and knew the variances of the local environment.105 
Throughout the 1820s and 1830s, the Light-House Establishment under Stephen 
Pleasanton repeatedly acknowledged the environmental differences of the various 
seaports. Yet, by the late 1840s when Congress appropriated funds for the Carysfort Reef 
Lighthouse, the government’s view of the natural world had changed. The federal 
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government had standardized the screwpile design using interchangeable parts.106 It 
expected the engineers and contractors to build the Carysfort Reef beacon along the same 
premise as the Brandywine Shoals Lighthouse in Delaware despite the uniqueness of the 
two environments. 
The circumstances of the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse should have factored into the 
government’s specifications, yet when the Light-House Board wrote the specs for 
navigational aids, it used a universal language and did not take local variances into 
consideration. The specifications contained no allowances for contractors to use their 
expert judgment or make adjustments based on surveys of the local environment.107 Any 
deviations from the specifications required contractors to notify the Light-House Board in 
writing and await approval before proceeding. If the contractor’s proposed changes were 
significant, the whole project could be put on hold while waiting for Congress to pass a 
new appropriation. Rather than publish rigid specifications, the Light-House Board 
should have created guidelines that left important decisions regarding the local 
environment to the individual contractors building the navigational aids. The Light-
House Board opted for the rigid specifications to prevent corruption among dishonest 
contractors, which the Board believed created many of the problems that plagued 
Pleasonton’s administration and resulted in the establishment of the Board. To the Light-
House Board, the rigid standards were simply an extension of republican values. 
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THE ENVIRONMENT FIGHTS BACK 
The changing landscape proved to be one of the biggest challenges for both 
private enterprise and the government. Between the man-made alterations and the natural 
world phenomenon, the environment of the United States’ seaports was in constant 
influx. Wharves blocked or slowed the natural flow of the water resulting in buildup of 
sediment against the man-made structures. This build up reduced the depth of the harbor 
and necessitated additional dredging. Harbor dredging, in turn, reshaped both the physical 
geography of the port and the environments where contractors dumped their spoil. 
Additionally, natural world processes, such as erosion constantly shifted the environment. 
Charts and maps had to be updated more frequently than possible under auspices of 
individual cartographers to ensure the safety of commerce and navigation more generally. 
As Coast Survey Lieutenant Charles Henry Davis remarked of Boston Harbor, “Some 
changes must necessarily have followed from the great diminution of the water receptacle 
above the channel, from the construction of wharves and piers, from neglect, and from 
the constant operation of those laws of tidal deposit.” Davis admitted that the “gradual 
deterioration of Boston Harbor” was now well known “and apprehensions are felt that the 
consequences of this deterioration may be, if it is suffered to continue, seriously injurious 
to the future prosperity of the city.”108 
Apprehensions of the constantly changing environment gave reason for local 
communities to consult with the federal government, which was better equipped to deal 
with shifting landscapes. Davis acknowledged throughout his survey of Boston Harbor, 
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he had “been occasionally consulted as to certain proposed changes in the upper part of 
the harbor.”109 To these inquiries, Davis recommended “lay[ing] down those principles of 
hydraulic engineering which must be consulted in order that any future constructions, 
demanded either by the business of the city or the preservation of the channels, may 
prove beneficial, and answer the purposes for which they are designed.”110 According to 
engineering historian Terry S. Reynolds, attempts to integrate engineering into the 
curriculum of mainstream colleges faltered until at least the 1850s.111 Most civil 
engineers learned through practical hands on training.112  Thus, many communities, even 
large ones such as Boston, lacked the expertise to oversee projects such as the one 
suggested by Davis. The federal government, however, offered engineering curriculum 
through its military academies since 1802, giving the state the technical expertise needed 
to make such recommendations.113 In fact, in making his recommendations, Davis noted, 
“in the preparation of this Memoir, I have only consulted my associates in the Academy” 
and that he had “no other responsibility than that which appertains to me as a member of 
this Academy.” Davis claimed his responsibility, “demands I should make no statement 
of facts that do not appear to be well authenticated” nor “advance [any] principles that are 
not admitted or easily proved.”114 Such high standards helped convince local 
communities of the federal government’s expertise. 
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Man-made alterations created some of the environmental issues. As previously 
noted in Portland, private wharves extended too far into the harbor. Portland historian and 
former mayor of that city, William Willis, claims Portland Harbor contained “about one 
million” superficial feet of wharves, which “was seriously affecting its capacity and 
shoaling its water.”115 Indeed, the development of Portland’s wharves in the 1830s and 
1840s created a narrow shipping lane through which increasingly larger vessels had to 
pass while at the same time causing greater accumulation of silt and debris that reduced 
the depth of the harbor. The federal government’s survey conducted by Bache, Davis, and 
Totten in 1854 noted, “the creation of a sort of bar reaching across from Fish Point to the 
middle ground, making it much shoaler in this spot now than it was in 1820.”116 Willis 
noted that a “system of dredging” commenced and ordinances were passed prohibiting 
the throwing of “ballast or dirt of any kind into the harbor.”117 
Natural phenomenon, such as the “constant operation of those laws of tidal 
deposit,” which Davis referred to in his report on Boston Harbor also proved to be of 
great concern for the government.118 Erosion not only threatened America’s seaports, it 
also threatened the navigational technologies that made the ports safe for commerce. 
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, correspondence between the Fifth 
Auditor of the Treasury and the Revenue Collectors in various Atlantic ports regularly 
spoke of the effects of erosion and how the government was dealing with the issue. In the 
port of Washington, North Carolina, for instance, the customs collector, Thomas Harvey 
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Blount, suggested stabilizing an aid to navigation by “placing 300 perches of stone 
around it.”119 Unfortunately, “those stone are not to be had in probably all of North 
Carolina” and the cost carry them “two or three hundred miles” form another location 
“would cost more than to remove” the aid.120 The Fifth Auditor of the Treasury, Stephen 
Pleasanton, who was responsible for the superintendence of the nation’s navigational 
aids, suggested placing piles around the beacon, “if piling the foundation will secure 
it.”121 Pleasanton made a similar suggestion for the beacon at Cape Henlopen ensuring 
safe navigation into the port of Lewes, Delaware.122 In other instances, the government 
recommended moving navigational aids away from the dangers of the encroaching 
waters.123  
Erosion has proved exceptionally important in the area of the Chesapeake Bay. As 
William B. Cronin notes, Poplar Island has lost more than 99 percent of its land mass due 
to erosion. In 1627, the island consisted almost 1,500 acres. By 2005, Poplar Island was a 
little more than 5 acres.124 The rapid disappearance of this island throughout the early 
1800s created a hazardous shoal for ships approaching the ports Annapolis, Baltimore, 
and St. Michaels. When erosion threatened federal property at Cove Point in the late 
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1830s and early 1840s, the government spent “several thousand dollars” erecting a stone 
breakwater between the land and the bay “to arrest its further progress.”125 Although 
erosion continues to threaten Cove Point to this day, the government’s efforts proved 
successful. Cove Point remains an active aid to navigation on the Chesapeake Bay. 
The constant changes in the environment of American ports necessitated surveys 
of the ports to ensure accurate navigational information. Although the Coast Survey was 
authorized in 1807, it did not publish its first map until the 1830s.126 Before that time, 
local seaside communities commissioned learned men, such as Lewis Brantz in 
Baltimore, to conduct surveys of their harbors. In some cases, industrious entrepreneurs 
with an interest in shipping, such as Lemuel Moody of Portland, took it upon themselves 
to survey their respective ports and the surrounding coastlines. In either instance, the 
surveyors not only mapped the docks, islands, and peninsulas of the ports, they also took 
depth soundings and charted the shipping lanes.  
The cost of charting the ports, however, proved quite expensive. Many 
communities and individuals had to settle for a single chart, despite the constantly 
changing environment. Lewis Brantz, for instance, only produced one chart for the port 
of Baltimore in 1819.127 Similarly, Lemuel Moody produced a single chart for Portland. 
Moody saw “the great necessity of a correct chart of Portland Harbor,” however, the cost 
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of producing the chart was so great, Moody had to advertise for subscriptions to pay the 
cost of engraving and printing his map of the port.128 In fact, Moody incurred great 
personal expense in publishing the map. According to Moody historian John K. Moulton, 
the advertisement resulted in $189 for 63 copies from 58 individual subscribers.129 The 
cost of engraving and printing the map, however, totaled $300.130 The subscriptions, 
however, did not take into account Moody’s time or personal expenses. Between May 
and October 1825, Moody personally spent more than $75 conducting the survey.131 
Moody continued to incur expenses after the publication of the chart and by 1836, his 
personal outlay totaled $681.31.132 As a result, Moody only completed one chart of 
Portland’s Harbor. It was the first chart of Portland’s harbor since the British Navy 
published their map in 1776. They had surveyed the area 16 years earlier.133  
Moody’s and Brantz’s single surveys highlight the importance of the government 
in dealing with an ever changing environment. Infrequent updates of charts could be 
detrimental to commerce. Mariners needed accurate information, but outdated charts and 
maps exposed ships to the hazards of the natural world. Nathaniel Bowditch’s The New 
American Practical Navigator and The American Coast Pilot published by Edmund 
March Blunt provided some recourse, but they were not enough. Both publications began 
in the late 1790s as a comprehensive handbook for mariners. They included sailing 
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directions into the most important ports and were updated every few years. However, the 
publishers were unable to conduct surveys of the various ports included in their book. 
Publication updates were at the mercy of local communities and individuals because they 
relied on second-hand information they gathered from men such as Brantz and Moody. 
Only the government could afford to finance the ongoing need for surveying the nation’s 
harbors. And even they struggled to meet the needs of the republic. 
CONCLUSION 
 The natural world interacted with early American science and technology in many 
ways. To begin with, individuals interested in advancing science and the arts recognized 
the environment as an adversary that needed to be tamed. They approached the 
environment antagonistically in an attempt to conquer it for their own good. Even as the 
attitudes of the romantics changed toward the environment near mid-century, those 
engaged in the practice of science and the arts continued to hold a hostile view of the 
environment. They remained steadfast in their attempts to subdue their physical 
surroundings. They carefully considered how their vision for the world interacted with 
their environment. 
These same individuals also recognized that the natural world could provide them 
with the means for overcoming challenges. The used the environment for its natural 
resources to solve everyday problems, many of which were caused by the natural world 
itself. In the process, they gained knowledge and advanced their understanding of science 
and the arts. 
Interacting with the environment, however, was a never ending process. The 
landscape constantly changed the nature of the seaports through the addition of man-
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made alterations and natural phenomenon. Because of this, the time, money, and energy 
expended in dealing with the natural world was often more than most individuals, or even 
communities, could bear. They necessarily turned to the government for assistance. The 
government not only possessed the expertise for subduing nature, it also had deeper 
pockets and the political means for taking on projects concerning the environment. This 
expertise was then shared with individuals and local communities in the form of building 
port infrastructure. Internal improvements became a responsibility of the federal 
government as a result of it expertise as much as it did for its ability to commandeer the 
necessary resources for combating the environment.  
As the government expanded its role in dealing with the environment, they 
necessarily sought to simplify nature. Republican values of frugality and expediency won 
out over best practices. This often resulted in the complications or failures for the 
government. Generally, the government tried to wash its hands of the responsibility, but 
in the end it paid for its failures. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES LIGHT-HOUSE 
ESTABLISHMENT 
In October 1851, Charles Babbage, the renowned English mathematician and 
inventor of the difference engine, wrote to Alexander Dallas Bache promoting one of the 
Englishman’s original mathematical theories. Babbage believed his theory would be 
useful in the United States for distinguishing navigational beacons and “night telegraphic 
communication between ships at sea.”1 Babbage chose Bache for his correspondence 
because the latter was the Superintendent of the Coast Survey, a member of the Light-
House Board, and one of the most prominent scientists in America at the time.2 
Babbage’s theory numbered the lighthouses irregularly and made each navigational aid 
“continually repeat its own number during the whole night by means of occultations.”3 
Babbage proposed eclipsing the beacon’s light in short pauses and long intervals equal to 
that lighthouses’ number, making it easier for mariners to identify the lighthouse and 
ascertain their navigational position. To further avoid mistakes, the renowned 
mathematician suggested, “Light-houses must not be numbered in the order of their 
position” and that adjacent lights “must have such a number assigned to it, that no digit 
occurring in the number denoting the several lighthouses nearest to it on 
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either side shall have the same digit in the same place of figures.”4 Babbage believed his 
theory was superior to the systems then in use by both Britain and the United States 
because the theory promised to make it “almost impossible” for mariners “to mistake any 
casual light, on shore or at sea, for a lighthouse,” and to ever “mistake one light-house for 
another.”5 The Englishman acknowledged his theory was, “crude in many respects and 
merely suggestive in others,” but noted, “a little inquiry might produce still a better 
arrangement.”6 
As a member of the newly formed Light-House Board, Bache forwarded 
Babbage’s proposal to the Board’s president, William Branford Shubrick. Shubrick 
promised to “use every endeavor to have a full trial made of the method.”7 Shubrick and 
the Board charged John Henry Alexander, an American engineer and physicist, with 
conducting the experiments. Alexander was to report back on “how far the alternation of 
light and darkness in the occultations…tends to increase or diminish the efficiency of a 
given light.”8 Congress appropriated $5,000 for the experiments.9 Alexander choose the 
“Merchants’ Observatory on Federal Hill” in Baltimore for his illumination experiments 
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because the signal tower allowed for a “wide extent of the harbor” to be viewed from a 
single vantage point.10  
In conducting his experiments, Alexander observed that the light from a fixed 
signal proved less intense than the light from a revolving signal. As Babbage’s proposal 
called for all of the lights to be fixed lights, altered only by the occultations, Alexander 
sought “to define what is the amount of this difference in general; and also to ascertain 
how far the actual or possible mechanical arrangements of the proposed plan tend to 
increase or diminish” the difference.11 
Babbage believed one minute would be sufficient for a light to signal its number, 
repeating once every minute following. After performing the experiment at the 
observatory on Federal Hill and calculating the duration of illumination and occultations, 
Alexander found that Babbage’s one-minute interval to have practical advantages and felt 
it “would be hardly advisable to increase” the intervals proposed by the English 
mathematician. Additionally, Alexander observed three seconds for the occultations “as 
affording the maximum of advantage.”12 Three seconds allowed an observer to clearly 
distinguish the number being signaled, but it limited the range of numbers that could be 
displayed in the given interval of one minute. Signaling a nine, for instance, required 27 
seconds of darkness from the occultations. If the observer first witnessed the signal in the 
middle of its revolution, Alexander surmised it would take four minutes and thirty-two 
seconds to convey the number 299. Alexander supposed the number 345 would be the 
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12 Ibid., 11. 
120 
highest number needed on the American coast, making 299 the longest number requiring 
conveyance.13 
Although Alexander could not answer whether or not signaling the number 299 
took too long, he did voice concerns that in certain circumstances “where the mariner 
cannot afford to be so long as five minutes without an identification of the light,” that an 
alternative might need to be considered. Alexander also expressed concern that an 
observer would have to simultaneously observe, “two phenomena, viz: the disappearance 
of the light, and the movement of the index of the time-keeper.” Under the present 
system, mariners only needed to observe the light.14 Alexander noted the Commissioners 
of the Northern (Scottish) Light-Houses of Great Britain advised against the system for 
similar reasons.15 Based on his scientific findings and despite his concerns, Alexander 
believed the system to be “advantageously applied at any and all points where the range 
demanded does not transcend the power of a first order Fresnel lens.”16 
The Fresnel lighthouse lens was an optical apparatus invented by a French civil 
engineer, Augustin Jean Fresnel, in 1821. Fresnel worked for the Corps des ponts et 
chaussées (bridges and roads) and conducted experiments in optical diffraction in his 
spare time. Three years before the invention of the lens, Fresnel confirmed that light 
traveled in waves. Fresnel used this knowledge to improve France’s coastal lighting for 
navigation. Fresnel’s lens worked in conjunction with an open flamed oil lamp and 
reflector. By placing several glass polyhedrons above and below a centrally positioned 
bullseye lens, Fresnel was able to capture more of the light from the lighthouse lamp as it 
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was reflected outward (Fig. 4.1). The polyhedrons bent the reflected light into a more 
concentrated beam, producing a brighter light that could be seen further out to sea. 
Fresnel developed the lens in three different orders (later expanded to six) which varied 
in size and weight depending the location of the lighthouse and its importance to 
commercial activity. A first order lens, the largest of the Fresnels, stood eight and a half 
feet tall and weighed more than six tons.17 The lens represented the very best scientific 
knowledge of the time in optical diffraction and illumination. 
Alexander’s experiments were fraught with problems. Two in particular stand out. 
First, Alexander conducted his experiments in ideal weather conditions. He 
acknowledged that he had, “no means of estimating” what allowance, “should be made 
for storm and darkness on ship-board,” and he made no reference to the role that fog may 
play in hindering the identification of lights using this method. This alone would have 
rendered Alexander’s experiments invalid, or at the very least inconclusive. Alexander, 
however, made no effort to redress the flaws in his methodology and he made no 
explanations for this oversight. 
Second, Alexander conducted his experiments with the help of an assistant. The 
assistant operated the machinery in the experiment while Alexander made his 
observations. Operating the machinery by hand would never work in reality due to the 
duration of the occultations and the necessity of the occultations occurring without 
interruption. Self-acting machinery was the only proper way to ensure the accuracy of 
Alexander’s findings. Alexander acknowledged this fact when he asked to conduct  
																																								 																				
17 “Fresnel Lens Orders, Sizes, Weights, Quantities, and Costs,” United States Lighthouse 
Society, http://uslhs.org/fresnel-lens-orders-sizes-weights-quantities-and-costs (accessed 
April 1, 2017). 
122 
	
            Figure 4.1 Fresnel Lens Diagram by Adolphe Ganot [Public Domain], 1872 via                       
Wikimedia Commons. 
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further experiments using self-acting machinery. Additionally, the use of an assistant 
limited the range by which Alexander was able to make his observations as the two 
needed to communicate with each other in the dark of night. With the self-acting 
machinery, Alexander proposed he could conduct the experiments over a “distance about 
15 miles across land and water, adequate to developing all the good and bad points of the 
system as cannot be predicated of the limited range I have been able to use hitherto.”1 
The Light-House Board followed the recommendations of the Scottish 
Commissioners and rejected Babbage’s plan for use in the United States. The Board’s 
decision resulted from the concerns raised by Alexander and the Scottish Commissioners 
as well as the incompleteness of Alexander’s experiments. The decision disappointed 
Babbage, who believed the system was “so simple that the only wonder seems to be that 
it has not been proposed and adopted long ago.”2 Babbage had hoped Britain and the 
United States would “unite in adopting the numerical system” and make it universal 
noting, “few things would give me more pleasure than that you should successfully carry 
into execution the principle I have pointed out.”3  
If the commercial problems discussed in Chapter 2 pushed Americans to engage 
in science and the mechanical arts, and if environmental concerns examined in the 
previous chapter created a need for scientific engagement, the solutions were explored in 
the homes, workshops, and ideas of the average American. These skilled artisan, laborers, 
merchants, and tinkerers innovated new mechanical apparatuses to solve the commercial 
and environmental problems facing the young nation. Nowhere is that more obvious than 
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in the United States Light-House Establishment, which was one of the nation’s leading 
scientific organizations in the early nineteenth century. 
In making the claim the United States Light-House Establishment was a scientific 
organization prior to the 1850s, it is important to understand what counted as science and 
by whom. Few individuals of the time would disagree that Alexander’s testing of 
Babbage’s theory was science. The experiments were authorized, overseen, and peer 
reviewed by some of America’s most prestigious scientific minds. Alexander was chosen 
by these men of science to perform the experiments because he himself was recognized 
as a man of science. But the testing of Babbage’s numerical theory of illumination does 
not count as science just because it was performed by educated men engaged in scientific 
practice. Alexander’s experiment counts as science because the test used an objective, 
repeatable method and the results were based on observable facts. Theoretically, anyone 
could have performed the experiments in place of Alexander and those experiments 
would still have been considered science. Some individuals however, disagreed on what 
counted as science. Men such as Edmund Blunt, Lieutenant Thornton Jenkins and 
Lieutenant I. W. P. Lewis believed science could only be conducted by those who were 
formally trained in such fields as engineering, surveying, and navigation. These men 
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claimed the the Light-House Establishment was unscientific.4 Historians of the Light-
House Establishment have tended to side with this assessment.5 Their assessment fails to 
consider Andrew J. Lewis’ argument of natural philosophy in the early American 
republic. According to Andrew J. Lewis, despite the naturalists’ claims to a “unique 
expertise to catalog and explain the natural world,” natural philosophy in the early United 
States was “founded on the convictions of Americans’ everyday engagements with 
nature.”6 Natural philosophy, thus, was as much the work of ordinary Americans as it 
was the educated and trained naturalists. If we accept Andrew J. Lewis’ argument that the 
collecting of natural world specimens by the average American counted as natural 
philosophy, then similarly we must accept the experiments in fuels, illumination, and air 
temperatures conducted by everyday American inventors and tinkerers as science. As 
noted in the previous chapter, Stephen Pleasonton, the Fifth Auditor of the Treasury and 
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Superintendent of the Light-House Establishment, promoted science within the 
Establishment. Pleasonton authorized, monitored, and even suggested scientific 
experiments and practical improvements. These included Winslow Lewis’ experiments 
with David Melville’s oil heater, the testing of various types of fuels, and Captain 
Howard Stansbury’s innovative diskpile foundation for off shore structures such as the 
Carysfort Reef lighthouse. Through these experiments and ground breaking construction 
techniques, the Light-House Establishment was a significant contributor to the fields of 
science and engineering in early nineteenth-century America. 
The Light-House Establishment was therefore one of the leading scientific 
institutions in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. This mirrors the 
arguments of Todd Shallat, Ann Johnson, and Hugh Richard Slotten regarding the Army 
Corps of Engineers and the United States Coast Survey. Shallat sees the Corps of 
Engineers as the premier American institution in the sciences of geology and hydrology. 
Johnson claims the Corps lead the nation in strength of materials testing.7 Slotten argues 
the Coast Survey was the premier institution for scientific practice in astronomy, 
cartography, and surveying.8 The primary difference between the Light-House 
Establishment and these other institutions was the nature of the scientific work. The 
Corps of Engineers and Coast Survey engaged in previously established scientific fields. 
The Light-House Establishment’s work, however, occurred in fields that were still 
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emerging, such as chemistry and what is known today as physics. The Establishment’s 
work in the mechanical arts paralleled that of the Franklin Institute. Bruce Sinclair argues 
the Franklin Institute was the leading enterprise for advancing mechanical arts in the 
United States, but the Institute’s work lay more in the evaluation of the mechanical arts.9 
The Light-House Establishment, on the other hand, provided an arena for the 
development of the practical arts.10 
SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS 
      Scientific experiments were the foundation for finding solutions to the 
commercial and environmental problems facing the United States. As one of the leading 
scientific institutions in the early nineteenth century, the Light-House Establishment 
conducted numerous experiments with lamps, lenses, fuels, and other apparatuses 
designed to keep the nation’s coastal navigation safe. These experiments gave the 
average American an outlet for bring science into the public realm and helped solidify the 
involvement of the state to scientific practice when these individuals promoted their 
solutions through government agencies like the Light-House Establishment. 
       Oil Burning Lamps 
Experiments with lamps and coastal lighting began as early as 1810 and possibly 
earlier, when on May 8, members of the Boston Marine Society conducted an experiment 
similar to Alexander’s, but without the occultations. Their experiment tested the 
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illumination of a new lamp and reflector system “invented” by Winslow Lewis.11 Chapter 
1 previously looked at Lewis’ lamp and reflector as a commercial opportunity for the 
retired shipmaster. Here, Lewis’ innovation is examined as part of the scientific 
experiments taking place in the Light-House Establishment prior to 1850. 
The Boston Marine Society’s three-member committee “proceeded about five 
leagues into the bay, bringing the Boston light to bear about W. S. W. and Baker’s Island 
light to bear about N. N. W. both nearly at the same distance.”12 Both lights were lit in 
their usual manner until about 10 PM, at which time, the Boston Light was extinguished. 
Lewis then set up his lamp and reflector system and relit the light. The difference was “as 
great as would appear between a well-trimmed Argand lamp and a common candle.”13 
The committee moved about the harbor and “saw no sensible diminution of the 
brilliancy.”14 The light was extinguished after an hour and relit in the usual manner. The 
committee found “The effect produced by this change from light to comparative darkness 
was more striking than the first.”15 At midnight Lewis’ Argand lamp and reflector system 
was relit with the usual light still burning. At two and a half leagues, the power of Lewis’ 
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new lamp and reflector “was so great as to throw a strong shadow upon the deck of the 
vessel.”16  
The committee found other advantages to Lewis’ system, including a reduction in 
emission of smoke. Smoke from the usual lamps diminished the light’s effectiveness by 
clouding the glass windows on the lantern room, thus reducing the distance the light 
could be seen at sea.17 The committee deemed the experiment a success and 
recommended the adoption of Lewis’ system to General Henry Dearborn, the Collector 
of Customs and Regional Lighthouse Superintendent in Boston. 
The success of Lewis’ experiment earned him the contract for fitting up all the 
lighthouses in the United States. Despite the exclusivity of this contract, Lewis was not 
the only mechanic to experiment with lamps and reflectors for the Light-House 
Establishment. Many complaints befell Lewis because of the poor quality of 
workmanship in his lamp and reflector system. These complaints compelled other 
mechanics, such as Edmund March Blunt of New York, Benjamin F. Greenough of 
Boston, and David Melville of Newport, Rhode Island to pursue their own experiments in 
the science of luminosity and the mechanical arts.18 
     Chemicals, Natural Gas, and Other Fuels 
In addition to experimenting with lamps, the Light-House establishment also 
experimented with various fuels to find which fuel produced the best light. In 1812, the 
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company of Ward, Wilson, and Waldron of New York petitioned David Gelston, the 
Customs Collector and Regional Lighthouse Superintendent for the Port of New York, to 
conduct an experiment with “inflammable gas.”19 Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the 
Treasury wrote Gelston, authorizing him to allow the experiment if “you think it 
advisable,” but warned “no obligation on our part will be given, whatever the success 
may be, to employ them for other Light Houses.”20   
Unfortunately, no other records exist regarding Ward, Wilson, and Waldron’s 
experiment. Five years later, however, David Melville of Newport, Rhode Island, 
similarly petitioned the Commissioner of Revenue to experiment with using natural gas 
in instead of spermaceti oil. Melville argued natural gas would eliminate many of the 
problems associated the illumination in American lighthouses such as the condensation of 
humid air, the high cost of oil, and the need to warm winter pressed oil to a liquid state 
for continuous burning. Melville believed an experiment would show the utility of natural 
gas and prove its worth. An apparatus designed to burn natural gas was installed in the 
Newport Lighthouse in October of that year and Melville recorded his daily observations, 
noting every kind of weather and its effect on the light. At the conclusion of the yearlong 
experiment Melville found natural gas afforded “mariners an increased and more certain 
light.”21 He also confirmed his beliefs that natural gas was cheaper than spermaceti oil 
and that natural gas lamps did not allow for the accumulation of frost or humidity on the 
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lens or lantern windows as it did with traditional Argand style oil lamps.22 In 1830, 
Charles W. Morgan, a New Bedford, Massachusetts whaling entrepreneur and spermaceti 
oil manufacturer, acknowledged the superiority of natural gas in a speech to the Lyceum, 
stating, “Carburetted Hydrogen Gas is now extensively used, and possesses advantages 
for fixed lights and when greater brilliancy or intensity is desirable.”23 Melville’s findings 
were confirmed more than three decades later when the United States Light-House Board 
commissioned John Henry Alexander to test Babbage’s theory on identifying lights. 
Alexander preferred to use natural gas in his experiment because “the gas light was the 
more brilliant” and it “preserved the normal volume of flame corresponding to the 
capacity of the lens.”24 
Despite Melville’s conclusions and the potential benefits of switching, the United 
States Light-House Establishment did not universally adopt natural gas for its coastal 
beacons. There are several reasons why Melville’s experiment received a disapproving 
nod from the Light-House Establishment. First the use of natural gas as a fuel was still in 
its infancy in 1817. As Mimi Sherman notes, gas “was very new in the second decade of 
the nineteenth century,” and that its use was “cutting-edge technology 1830.”25  Many 
feared natural gas was unsafe.26 Charles W. Morgan noted in his lecture to the lyceum the 
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“the liability to explosion is a great objection to its use.”27 Sherman notes “the flame 
could follow the receding gas, causing a flashback.”28 Second, early natural gas burners 
were “primitive and inefficient” and the distribution system was subject to leakage; a 
problem Daniel Mattausch notes plagued the gas industry “well into the 1870s.”29 In 
addition to leakage, Sherman notes that problems with delivery sometimes caused the 
flame to involuntarily extinguish itself “by a sudden drop in pressure.”30 Mariners’ relied 
on the light as a matter of life and death. A light extinguishing itself involuntarily because 
of “a sudden drop in pressure,” was not only problematic, it was potentially catastrophic.  
Although many feared the safety of natural gas, political reasons most likely 
caused the state’s inaction on adopting natural gas. Melville lacked the political clout of 
Lewis within the Light-House Establishment. The former had to rely on his friendship 
with the latter to promote interest natural gas. Melville’s interests, however, were in 
conflict with Lewis’. Lewis held an exclusive contract with the government to supply 
spermaceti oil to all of the nation’s lighthouses for $35,000 a year. Lewis worked against 
Melville and the superiority of natural gas to protect his own interests. According to 
Melville, Lewis expressed an “unfavorable opinion” of natural gas, vehemently 
“combatted the utility of introducing them in the light houses,” and declared “he would 
not relinquish his contract to furnish the light houses with oil.”31 Eventually, the state 
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approved the permanent use of natural gas for the lighthouse at Portland Harbor, New 
York on Lake Erie (present day Barcelona Light at Westfield, New York).32 
Acknowledging the possibility that the government might not adopt natural gas as 
the fuel of choice for lighthouses, Melville simultaneously conducted other experiments 
on oil. He analyzed the combustion of fuels and found “the intensity of light is not as has 
generally been supposed, in proportion to the quantity of oxygen consumed but in 
proportion to the carbon and caloric contained in the material used.”33 This experiment 
showed that summer strained oil produced a stronger light than winter pressed oil. 
Summer strained oil was not only cheaper than winter pressed oil, it also burned at a 
slower rate. Melville figured the Argand style lamps used by the Light-House 
Establishment consumed strained spermaceti at a ratio of 7:8 to the pressed oil.34 
In 1838, the Light-House Establishment conducted several tests using colza oil. 
Colza oil, alternatively known as carcel oil after the carcel lamps that burned it, is 
extracted from vegetables. Colza oil provides a superior light, but many contemporaries, 
including Stephen Pleasonton and Army Corps of Engineers Lieutenants. I. W. P. Lewis 
and Thornton A. Jenkins, noted colza oil was much harder to manufacture than other 
types of fuel. American farmers were also less inclined to grow vegetables for the oil 
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market because they were less profitable than growing other crops, such as wheat..35 
Pleasonton thought “very highly of the principle upon which the carcel lamp is made.”36 
In a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, Levi Woodbury, Pleasonton noted, 
“According to experiments already made with the improved carcel lamp…it affords 2 ½ 
times more light than the astral light, with the consumption of the same quantity of oil.” 
Pleasonton was convinced that when the carcel lamp and oil was combined with the 
parabolic reflector “it will not only afford a light to be seen sufficiently far, if not as far 
as any other light, but that it will be more to be relied on, and at the same time more 
economical than any other yet discovered.”37 Despite Pleasonton’s praise for the carcel 
lamp, he would wait until the trial was complete to ascertain whether or not the oil and 
lamp should be adopted universally within the Establishment. 
The following year, the Light-House Establishment allowed Benjamin F. 
Greenough to experiment with a “chemical oil.” Greenough’s “chemical oil” was a 
“chemical mixture or compositions of alcohol, spirits of turpentine, and such other 
matters or fluids as are generally substituted for common oil.”38 Greenough’s began his 
experiment at the Boston [Harbor] Lighthouse, but renovations to the light forced 
																																								 																				
35 Pleasonton to Thomas Corwin, March 8, 1852, in United States Congress, Light-
Houses: Letter From the Secretary of the Treasury…in Reply to a Report Made to 
Congress by the Light-House Board, by Thomas Corwin, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 1852, H. 
Doc. 88, 15. I. W. P. Lewis to H. L. Ellsworth, n.d., in United States Congress, Report of 
the Commissioner of Patents, by Edmund Burke, 29th Cong., 1st sess., 18, S. Doc. 307, 
402. Thornton A. Jenkins, Report, January 30, 1852, in United States Congress, Report of 
the Officers Constituting the Light-House Board, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 1852, S. Doc. 28, 
554. 
36 Pleasonton to Winslow Lewis, October 24, 1838, RG 26, Entry 18, Vol. 14, 8, NARA. 
Pleasonton to Woodbury, December 3, 1838, RG 26, Entry 18, Vol. 14, 61, NARA. 
37 Pleasonton to Woodbury, December 3, 1838. 
38 Benjamin F. Greenough, “United States Patent No. 2,039 – Lamp,” April 10, 1841, 1. 
135 
Greenough to transfer his research to the light on Long Island.39 While there is no solid 
evidence that Winslow Lewis interfered with Greenough’s experiment, Lewis was the 
individual who reported to Pleasonton which lighthouses were in need of repair. Given 
Lewis’ opposition to Melville’s natural gas experiments in Newport, Rhode Island, it 
seems plausible that Lewis might have fraudulently reported to the Boston Lighthouse as 
needing repairs in hopes of forcing Greenough to abandon his experiments and protecting 
his own oil contract. Sherman, however, notes chemical fuels had “very real drawback,” 
particularly the potential for the volatility of the fuel to lead to conflagrations.40  
Southerners also got involved with finding alternative oils for the Light-House 
Establishment. According to H. C. Nixon, planters in South Carolina began promoting 
cottonseed oil as early as 1815, with the major push coming from experiments in Virginia 
and the Carolinas 1820s and 1830s. Nixon notes when Professor Olmsted of the 
University of North Carolina tested cottonseed oil in lamps, he found “a fine illuminating 
gas” could be obtained from the seed. Southern planters they found the seed oil 
“decidedly” better than spermaceti oil.41 Many suggested that if New England mariners 
were risking their lives searching for oil on the seas, perhaps cottonseed oil could be used 
without so much danger.42 
In the time between Melville’s experiment with natural gas in the 1810s, the 
experiments with carcel oil, and Greenough’s “chemical oil” in the late 1830s, the United 
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States Light-House Establishment ran numerous experiments on the quality and viscosity 
of spermaceti oil to ensure consistency in the nation’s navigation aids.43 These 
experiments began with the oil manufacturers. Oil manufacturers experimented with 
blending spermaceti with other substances, including whale blubber and fish oil. Most of 
the time these experiments were designed to increase the manufacturer’s profit by 
combining the spermaceti with lower quality additives or by substituting for the 
spermaceti altogether. Upon arrival at the various lighthouses, local superintendents, 
naval officers, lighthouses keepers, and private citizens tested samples from each barrel. 
In their experiments, these individuals observed the consistency of the oil, noted how 
quickly it burned, and commented on how much smoke each sample of oil produced.44  
Others individuals conducted scientific experiments to see how the Establishment 
might make better use of its spermaceti oil. Whalers harvested the headmatter from 
Sperm whales in the fall. They then boiled the headmatter to remove any impurities and 
reduce the amount of water in the final product. Once this was done, the liquid was drawn 
off, producing the clearest sperm oil. This became known as winter pressed oil. Winter 
pressed spermaceti oil was considered the best of the spermaceti oils and therefore was 
also among the most expensive.45 Summer strained oil came from the third pressing. 
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Despite its purity, summer stained oil was considered by many to be inferior because it 
could not be burned during the winter months. Summer oil was too thin and congealed 
too quickly. For this reason, summer strained oil was much cheaper than the winter oil. 
David Melville, however, sought ways to use cheaper summer strained spermaceti oil 
during the winter months. Melville’s experiments with both summer and winter oil led to 
his discovery of a mechanical solution, but he did not discover a chemical method for 
using summer oil in the winter.  
The Light-House Establishment and private marine telegraph shared similar 
interests in shipping, and as such, some lighthouses keepers served double duty as agents 
signaling the arrival of ships for the telegraph. These included Jonathan Bruce and 
Charles Beck in Boston, and Michael Mabrity in Key West, Florida. By serving in the 
dual role of lighthouse keeper and signaling agent, the Light-House Establishment was 
able to extend its scientific experiments in illumination and the chemistry beyond the 
lighthouse service. In 1824, the lighthouse keeper at Boston’s Long Island, Charles Beck, 
conducted experiments on fabrics and dyes used in the making of the telegraph’s signal 
flags. Fabrics had to be strong enough to stand up to the strong winds blowing in from the 
ocean, while and dyes had to resist fading in sun. Beck tested a white cotton fabric and 
found it “very unfit” for its purpose.46 The fabric frayed too easily to be of any use to the 
telegraph. 
Worn and faded flags were difficult to distinguish, often resulting in 
communication errors. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, atmospheric refraction 
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affected the ability to see certain colors, shapes, and flag designs. Worn and faded flags 
exacerbated this problem. In 1831, Frederick W.A.L. Brown, the telegraphic agent on 
Georges Island in Boston, feared “my communications may in thick weather be 
misunderstood,” because of the “contraction and expansion” of the yarns “according to 
the state of the weather.”47 Brown, himself, had mis-communicated the arrival of the ship 
Triton as the ship Mercury just two weeks earlier.48 Using “every exertion in my power 
from eleven A.M. till two P.M,” Brown attempted to obtain accurate intelligence of the 
arriving ship. Unfortunately, “the wind was then blowing very fresh at west north west 
and the tide also being at ebb.” Brown “had little prospect of being able to announce the 
name of the ship before sunset,” due to his inability to read the ship’s worn flag. Brown 
took the intelligence from the Point Aderton Station. Regrettably, the Point Aderton 
Station mistook the Triton’s worn flag for the signal of the Mercury. As the Mercury was 
expected, neither station supposed the signal could be incorrect.49 
Beck, Bruce, and Mabrity also experimented with improvements to the signaling 
code. Beck and Bruce both suggested changing colors within Boston’s signal code to 
improve the visibility of the signal. In a letter to his superior, John Rowe Parker, Beck 
acknowledged he altered the numerals on the number 2 and number 3 flags so that they 
were easier to read.50 Presumably he did the same with the other numerals. Bruce, on the 
other hand, suggested changing the colors for each number “viz. No. 1 – Blue / No. 2 – 
Red / No. 3 White / No. 4 – blue & white / No. 5 – blue & red / No. 6 – black green or 
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yellow…”51 There is no indication that Parker accepted either of these changes, and 
perhaps did not because he was in negotiations with James Maud Elford of Charleston, 
South Carolina, to adopt a more universal system of signaling. 
Bruce also wrote to Parker, “I have thought upon a plan (which I offer, to you, for 
your consideration) which will save a great deal of time as well as trouble in spelling the 
names of vessells [sic].” Bruce suggested, “to get the names of all the merchant vessels 
which you wish to signalize & place numbers against their names.” Bruce’s plan was 
especially useful when “there are three or four vessells [sic] in the Light House Channel 
at the same time.” The speed of the vessels made it impossible to spell the name of all 
arriving ships when the telegraph agent had to signal multiple arrivals.52 Ultimately, 
Parker accepted the lighthouse keeper’s suggestion, but not because of Bruce. What 
Bruce did not know is that Elford had already patented a system of assigning numbers to 
ships and Parker was negotiating terms with Elford to adopt the system in Boston and the 
surrounding areas.53 
MECHANICAL INNOVATION 
 The Light-House Establishment offered engineers, entrepreneurs, and mechanics 
numerous opportunities to invent new apparatuses. Many of these mechanical devices 
were patented by their inventors and can be found among the various sources related to 
early United States patents. Several of the patents discussed here have been previously 
mentioned in Chapter 2 as they related to providing individuals with opportunities for 
commercial profit. Here those patents are used as examples supporting the argument that 
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the Light-House Establishment was one of the United States’ premier scientific 
organizations before the Civil War. 
One of the early patents under the United States Light-House Establishment was 
Winslow Lewis’ lamp and reflector system discussed earlier. Lewis’ patented his lamp in 
1810 after he witnessed a lamp in a barber shop projecting a light out into the dark street. 
Lewis noticed the barber had put a lens in front of the lamp and Lewis felt this idea 
would be useful in the Light-House Establishment. Lewis’ “discovery” convinced him to 
conduct experiments on “his” innovation at the Boston Lighthouse as discussed at the 
opening of this chapter. The scientific observations conducted at the Boston Lighthouse 
helped negotiate with the Treasury Department on adopting the patent throughout the 
Light-House Establishment.  
Lewis also experimented with “double glais[ing]” the lantern and “leaving a space 
between the panes of 3-8ths inch” in order to “prevent the humid air from condensing on 
the glass in Cold weather, or what the keepers Call the glass sweating.”54 Glass sweating, 
as Lewis called it, diminished the effect of the light as it passed through the lantern glass. 
Unfortunately, it does not appear that Lewis ever patented his “double glais-ed” 
windows. Modern sources trace the double glazed window to the late 19th or early 20th 
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century, indicating Lewis could have patented the concept and profited handsomely from 
it.55 
Others devised mechanical devices to solve the condensation problem. David 
Melville developed an improvement to the Argand lamp to eliminate condensation of 
humid air or the accumulation of frost. His improvement “consist[ed] in having a tight 
scuttle door to close at pleasure the communication with the lantern from the bay next 
below; and the lantern fitted with four or more air ports, under the windows fitted also, so 
as to be closed at pleasure; then by opening the air ports to admit the external air, and 
keeping the scuttle closed to exclude the vapor of the lower part of the Light House from 
the lantern, and both humidity and frost will be prevented from collecting on  the 
windows at all seasons and in all states and temperatures of the atmosphere, and the frost 
may even be dislodged after it has accumulated.”56  
Keeping the winter oil from congealing was another concern for the Light-House 
Establishment, especially in north where the winters were the coldest. As Stephen 
Pleasonton informed his superior, Levi Woodbury, Secretary of the Treasury, “the best 
Spermaceti from head matter, pressed in Winter, will congeal and and become hard 
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whenever the mercury in Fahrenheit’s Thermometer descends as low as 24 degrees.”57 
Several mechanics invented oil heaters that could be attached to the lighthouse lamps as a 
possible solution to the congealing problem. Captain Alexander Black, for instance, 
patented an improvement to Lewis’ Argand lamp in 1817. Black’s patent embraced “an 
improvement for trimming the lamps used in Light Houses, for heating the oil, for raising 
the wick, for snuffing the lamp.” The Light-House Establishment, however, found 
Captain Black’s improvement “does not answer” the purpose for which it was designed.58 
Luckily for Captain Black, his invention had many other uses outside the Light-House 
Establishment including “for keeping seaman’s hands and feet warm while at helm, for 
warming the feet of persons while traveling on horseback or in carriages, and lighting the 
road, and for gas lights.”59 
Lewis also took out a patent for a heating element designed “to obviate the 
difficulty of keeping the oil in a fluid state in the winter season.” Lewis’ design captured 
the heat rising from the flame via a “trumpet formed, or funnel mouth” metal tube 
positioned above the lamp and returned the heat to the bottom of the lamp where the heat 
was “communicated…to the oil in the fountain.”60 Lewis, however, obtained the patent 
illegally. David Melville had expressed the idea to Lewis a few years earlier and went so 
far as to draw a diagram of the idea. Melville claimed his mechanical solution could keep 
the oil in a fluid state “to such a degree that summer strained oil may be used in the 
winter season without difficulty.”61 Burning summer strained oil in “the coldest weather 
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without difficulty” would save the Establishment thousands of dollars annually because 
summer strained oil was cheaper than winter pressed oil.62 Lewis, of course, opposed the 
idea of burning summer strained oil in the winter because it directly impacted his 
government contract with the Treasury Department for supplying oil to the Light-House 
Establishment. If the Establishment choose to burn the cheaper summer oil in the 
wintertime, Lewis would lose money on the loss of the winter oil supply. This is perhaps 
the reason Lewis attempted to secure the oil heater patent for himself. Lewis recognized 
the need for the heater, but by utilizing it without Melville’s knowledge, Lewis could 
hide the fact that the heater allowed summer oil to be burned in the wintertime from 
Pleasonton and the Light-House Establishment. 
Melville had “practised [sic] for more than ten years,” keeping the oil in a fluid 
state in Argand lamps. He challenged Lewis on the latter patenting the improvement 
illegally. Lewis did everything in his power to undermine Melville and keep the patent 
for himself. Lewis claimed he had received nothing from the Light-House Establishment 
in exchange for installing the apparatus on lamps in northern lighthouses. He also argued 
the savings to the Establishment would be inconsequential. As the exclusive supplier of 
spermaceti oil to the Light-House Establishment, Lewis’ claims were obviously intended 
to protect his own interests. Despite Lewis attempts, Melville successfully defended his 
right to the invention and Lewis vacated the patent in 1819.63 
The United States Patent Office fire of 1836 destroyed many patents related to the 
Light-House Establishment prior to that date, yet the frequency with which the patents for 
improvements in lighthouses were taken out after 1837 provides some evidence of the 
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Establishment being a center for innovation. In 1841, Benjamin Hemmenway of 
Roxbury, Massachusetts, patented a separate oil reservoir for the Argand lamp that 
allowed for the replenishing of oil in the lamp without having to remove the oil chamber. 
Hemmenway noted the removal of the oil chamber was not only inconvenient, but had a 
“tendency to cause a derangement of the connecting parts from wear incident thereto, is 
generally attended with the accident of an overflow or dropping of oil on the exterior of 
the lamp.”64 Three years later the United States Patent Office granted Hemmenway and 
Winslow Lewis a shared patent for a lighthouse lamp.65 
The same year Hemmenway patented his improvement to the Argand lamp, 
Benjamin F. Greenough of Boston patented another improvement. Greenough’s 
improvement consisted in constructing the button of the lamp, that part “which serve to 
spread the flame of the wick,” out of platina and placing it atop a conical shoulder and 
adjusting rod so that the button is not destroyed by the light.66 Greenough noted “the heat 
caused by the current of air passing over both sides of the flame is so intense as to often 
melt down, or soon burn out, or destroy the button, if the same is made of brass, iron, or 
copper, in the usual manner.”67 Greenough also designed an adjustable air flow for the 
lamp. The adjustment mechanism not only facilitated the air flow to the flame, but also 
accommodated Greenough’s different fuel mixtures. Different fuels required a different 
ratio of fuel-to-air in order to achieve the brightest light and maximum burning 
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efficiency.68 Other lighthouse lamp improvements were patented by Charles Wheeler in 
1846 and Abraham Coates in 1856 and 1859.69 
Benjamin F. Coston of Washington “invented a new  “for generating, condensing, 
and burning gas from oil, resin or coal, and in applying the gas in light-houses”70 
Coston’s improvement obviated “the disadvantages arising from the collection of 
sediment in the ordinary siphon,” which allowed the resin or oil to be “introduced into the 
hottest part of the retort without any portion coming in contact with the sides.” Coston’s 
innovation provided for a “jacket around the pipe,” which kept the pipe “cool and 
prevent[ed] the tar from baking onto said pipe.” Coston also desired a Letters Patent for 
his particular method of construction which he claimed heated the gas “to a high 
temperature before burning.”71 Unfortunately, for Coston, the United States Light-House 
Establishment did not see the benefit of gas in lighting the coast. They chose not to adopt 
Coston’s innovative catoptric gas burner. 
Not all patented improvements for the Light-House Establishment related to the 
lamp. Alonza Farrar applied for a Letters Patent for an improvement he made to the 
construction of metallic reflectors.72 Winslow Lewis’ reflectors were known for their 
poor quality. Lewis added silver to his brass and copper reflectors to give them a greater 
reflecting power, but because Lewis only plated his reflectors with silver, the silver easily 
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rubbed off.73 Smoke and dust accumulated on these reflectors causing them to tarnish. 
The repeated cleansing and re-polishing of the lens diminished the reflector’s power and 
eventually destroyed the reflector altogether.74 Farrar’s improvement consisted in 
“applying a surface of flint glass, or what may in fact be termed a parabolic lens,” to the 
reflector.75 This improvement did not eliminate the accumulation of smoke and dust on 
the reflector, but it did provide for a more reflective surface and eliminated the 
diminishing of the reflective power due to the silver plating rubbing off. 
In 1839, Benjamin F. Willard, patented an improvement on his father’s, Simon 
Willard, clockwork mechanism.76 The younger Willard’s improvement “effected in the 
following manner: In addition to the ordinary clock-work heretofore used for imparting a 
regular rotary motion to the main or vertical shaft…there is arranged upon and secured to 
the frame of the clockwork in a horizontal position a circular rim or railway…of any 
required diameter.” The addition of this circular railway reduced the friction of turning 
the lamps, thus allowing for a smoother rotation of the light. Willard’s patented 
improvement also  “cause the lights to appear and disappear” in a quicker “succession of 
sudden flashes.”77 According to Willard, this quicker “succession of sudden flashes” 
would “render the light clearly distinguishable from all others.”78 Willard’s patent was 
successful enough that he continued to provide clockworks to the Light-House 
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Establishment until 1850 when Congress reorganized the institution under a five member 
Light-House Board.79 
Not all mechanical innovations in the Light-House Establishment went through 
the United States Patent Office. In 1838, Army Corps Engineer Lieutenant. I. W. P. 
Lewis invented an oil lamp for use in lighthouses. Lewis offered his lamp to the Light-
House Establishment for $500, but he did not apply for a Letters Patent.80 Ten years later, 
as noted in Chapter 3, Captain Howard Stansbury innovated an adaptation to Alexander 
Mitchell’s screwpile foundation because the environment would not support the use of 
Mitchell’s innovation without Stansbury’s adaptation. No known patent exists for 
Stansbury’s diskpile innovation. Similarly, Lieutenant George Gordon Meade invented a 
five wick hydraulic lighthouse lamp in 1852 while he waited for appropriations from 
Congress to finish lighthouse at Sand Key in Florida. Meade’s lamp raised the oil “to the 
level of the burner by being discharged from the reservoir in the dome of the lantern” 
rather than by “pumping up the oil by clockwork.” Meade demonstrated the lamp’s 
simplicity and claimed its “uniform working afforded great relief to the keepers.”81 The 
newly formed Light-House Board agreed with Meade’s assessment and universally 
adopted the lamp to replace those installed by Winslow Lewis over the past 40 years. 
Meade did not apply for a Letters Patent for his hydraulic lamp. 
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The reasons Lieutenant I. W. P. Lewis, Captain Howard Stansbury, and 
Lieutenant George Gordon Meade did not patent their inventions are not always clear. 
Lewis, Stansbury, and Meade all possessed a strong sense of civic duty, which may have 
influenced their decision not to apply for a Letters Patent. The cost of applying for a 
Letters Patent might also have been a factor. From 1793 to 1861, the fee to apply for a 
letters patent was $30.82 These fees remained the responsibility of the individual even 
though their inventions were part of the innovator’s government service. In Meade’s case, 
the fees were not affordable. As Elinor De Wire acknowledges, Meade’s financial 
problems were a driving force in his re-enlistment in the United States Army. Meade’s 
father lost large sums of money in a loan to the United States government that was never 
repaid and private survey work did not provide enough financial security for Meade to 
support his wife and children.83 For the others, the $30 fee probably was probably not 
worth the time and trouble of going through the patent process.  
SEAPORTS: SCIENTIFIC LABORATORIES AND MECHANCIAL WORKSHOPS 
The scientific experiments and mechanical innovations within the Light-House 
Establishment turned American ports into scientific laboratories and workshops for the 
practical arts. This is not a novel argument, yet it is an important one. Understanding 
American port cities as scientific spaces and centers of knowledge construction helps 
scholars move past the notion that ports were gateways of economic, social, and cultural 
exchange. It helps us see that ports were more than just end nodes on a global trade 
network and that they were more than just distribution centers. Port cities contributed 
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significantly to the advancement of the arts and sciences in the United States, especially 
in the first half of the nineteenth century.  Knowing this, and understanding how ports 
contributed to the construction of knowledge clarifies both our understanding of the role 
that ports played in history of the United States and the the advancement of science in 
this country in the early nineteenth century. 
Because of their urban nature, ports were better positioned to provide the 
necessary resources for performing science and constructing knowledge than rural 
villages and farms. As centers of population, ports cities contained more human and labor 
resources with a greater diversity of ideas. According to Economic historian Jacob Price, 
all towns in the United States with a population of 4,000 people or more in 1790 were 
port cities.84 Their coastal location and status as entrepôts, added to the ports’ diversity 
over other urban spaces. Immigrants who arrived in American ports with their different 
ideas did not always migrate out of the city. As commercial centers, ports had more 
financial resources and expendable wealth that could be devoted to science and the arts. 
Cities had huge financial resources, but the could be concentrated around a single good or 
industry. Lowell, Massachusetts, for instance was tied to the textile industry. While port 
cities may have specialized in certain commodities, they offered access to a diverse set of 
goods, thus increasing their capital resources over non-port cities. As political centers, 
America’s entrepôts had stronger channels for garnering state support than the 
hinterlands. From a political standpoint, it may be hard to differentiate the port from other 
urban centers.  
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The engagement in mechanical arts was essential to the construction of 
knowledge. Here too, it may be difficult to separate the port city from other urban areas, 
however, the ports’ coastal location made them ideal places for the Light-House 
Establishment to pursue the mechanical arts. Alexander’s use of mechanical occultations 
in testing Babbage’s mathematical theory for distinguishing lighthouses and the Boston 
Marine Society’s observations regarding Winslow Lewis’s lamp and reflector are just 
two examples illustrating the importance of ports to the Light-House Establishment’s 
engagement in the arts. These men of science, and others like them, used port cities to 
construct knowledge as much as they used the ports to transfer and disseminate existing 
knowledge from other parts of the globe. 
Although this chapter has focused on the United States Light-House 
Establishment as one of the nation’s premier scientific enterprises, other institutions also 
used early republic seaports as scientific laboratories. For instance, the Army Corps of 
Engineers also used ports as centers of research and as spaces to construct engineering 
knowledge. In 1826 near Lewistown, Delaware (present day Lewes, Delaware) Corps 
Engineer Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Totten conducted research at the request of 
Philadelphia merchants regarding the construction of a breakwater. Philadelphians 
wanted a breakwater to create a secure harbor at the mouth of the Delaware River as a 
safe haven for their ships against ice floes, storms, and winds. Totten’s research did not 
limit itself to engineering. Totten also studied elements of the natural world – the winds, 
the tides, and the even the marine life. This research led Totten to rule out the possibility 
of constructing a wooden pier. Totten noted a pier constructed of, or enveloped by, wood 
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was subject to “the ravages of the worm, in the lower part of the bay.” The worms, Totten 
claimed, “would soon destroy any wall, in which timber entered as an essential part.”85 
Scientific laboratories were uncommon in the early United States. Individuals 
engaging in the practice of science used a variety of spaces to conduct their research and 
construct knowledge. Seaports were no exception. Ports offered access to the natural 
world and the material resources needed for scientific practice. Seeing seaports as centers 
of knowledge construction rather than just centers of commerce and distribution not only 
opens a whole area of for studying seaports, it also creates a bridge between economic 
history, maritime history, urban history, and the history of science and technology. 
Studying seaports as scientific laboratories and mechanical workshops can help us 
integrate the history of science and technology into more mainstream history. Protecting 
commerce was the focus of the Light-House Establishment, thus America’s seaports were 
an integral part of making the Establishment one of the nation’s leading scientific 
enterprises. 
SCIENTISTS AND MECHANICS 
If the Light-House Establishment turned American seaports into scientific spaces 
and centers of knowledge construction, the experimenters, inventors, and mechanics 
engaging in science were a diverse lot. While elites such as John Henry Alexander, 
Alexander Dallas Bache, and Joseph Henry helped make a name for American science 
among Europeans near the middle of the nineteenth century, science in the early United 
States was practiced in a large part by commoners. Farmers, merchants, women, free and 
enslaved African Americans, and even children. 
																																								 																				
85 William Jones, Remarks on the Proposed Breakwater at Cape Henlopen, 
(Philadelphia: William Fry, 1826), 16. 
152 
The population diversity in the seaports equated to a democratic stage in the 
development of science. As many historians, including Thomas S. Kuhn, George H. 
Daniels, and Andrew J. Lewis, argue, the democratic stage was a necessary step in the 
development of science.86 This is true regardless of the geographic location of science. 
Jan Golinski, for instance, shows a similar scientific democracy in Great Britain with the 
sale of barometers and study of the weather in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.87 
Thus, the development of science and the arts in America were not exceptional. They 
followed a path similar to the development of science in other nations. 
Andrew J. Lewis argues natural history in the early American republic was 
largely observational and classificatory.88 The same cannot be said for science in the 
Light-House Establishment, where experimenters and mechanics performed science to 
gain new knowledge. Charles Beck, Winslow Lewis, and David Melville did more than 
observe and classify. Their experiments constructed knowledge in the fields of physics 
and chemistry. In genteel society, it was expected that new knowledge would be 
published for all, but few commoners had the connections to disseminate their findings 
and many probably did not see the need to publish their findings. As illustrated in the first 
two chapters, the men of the Light-House Establishment simply applied their findings to 
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solving practical everyday problems before carrying on.89 This lack of records makes it 
difficult for the historian. Evidence of the Light-House Establishment experiments were 
recorded in the correspondence between peers, between the Treasury Department and the 
mechanics, and between the Establishment and other society men. 
Aside from the engineers, such as Lieutenant I. W. P. Lewis, Lieutenant George 
Gordon Meade, and Captain Howard Stansbury, most of the individuals engaged in 
science and the mechanical arts for the Establishment did not consider themselves 
philosophers, scientists, engineers, or mechanics. Their writing lacks the scientific 
terminology and references found in the work of other scientists, such as Ferdinand R. 
Hassler and John Henry Alexander. David Melville, for instance, uses a common 
vernacular to describe his inventions and explain their workings.90 This challenges 
Andrew J. Lewis’ argument that men who engaged, even part-time, in the natural world 
of the early republic saw themselves as contributing to American philosophy and 
science.91 Rather, these men saw themselves as businessmen, inventors, and laborers. 
Winslow Lewis, for instance, ran a cordage shop and distributed oil for the Light-House 
Establishment in addition to his tinkering and lamp work for the Establishment.92 Lewis 
essentially had his hands in any prospect that presented an opportunity for his own profit.  
He employed other men whom he considered to be the real mechanics. Similarly, David 
Melville owned a hardware and stationary store, yet he promoted the use and expansion 
of gas lighting. The natural gas industry was still in its infancy in the 1810s/ The industry 
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did not become more viable until the second half of the century. Melville’s inventions 
were something he tinkered with on the side. He too saw it as an opportunity to advance 
his own financial interests. Melville also employed mechanics to assist him as he tinkered 
in the practical arts.93 
Additionally, both Lewis and Melville saw themselves as inventors. In a letter to 
Albert Gallatin dated March 10, 1812, Lewis stated, “I am confident that there never was 
a reflector made before my invention in any Optical principle.”94 Melville also saw 
himself as an inventor. In a letter to his friend John Boss, Melville claimed he could 
prove “myself to be the first inventor” of an improvement to the Argand oil lamp.95 In 
separate notarized affidavits, Melville again acknowledged “himself to be the original 
Inventor” of two improvements to the Argand lamp.96 
Charles Beck, Frederick W. A. L. Brown, and Jonathan Bruce, however, saw 
themselves as laborers. All three were engaged at various times in what Bruce referred to 
as simply, “tending the telegraph” at Boston between 1823 and 1837.97 In October 1824, 
Bruce complained of another agent offering for Bruce to do “two-thirds of the work,” 
while the other agent got “two-thirds of the money.” Bruce threatened, “I shall not tend 
the Telegraph any longer,” but apparently recanted later. In their correspondence with the 
proprietor of the Boston marine telegraph, Beck and Brown spoke frequently of their toils 
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with menial tasks including painting, repairing the telegraph’s ropes and chains, and 
replacing the telegraph’s connector arms.98 
Although men like Winslow Lewis and David Melville did not see themselves as 
engineers, mechanics, philosophers, or scientists, the state on the other hand did view 
them as such. Stephen Pleasonton often referred to Winslow Lewis and the other 
lighthouse contractors as engineers when corresponding with them and others about the 
work Lewis and the other contractors performed.99 In his report to Congress, Pleasonton 
claimed, “in building all the more important lights I have employed engineers, with as 
much science, united to practice, as any to be found in the country.”100 Some might argue 
Pleasonton did not know the difference, but in a letter dated October 3, 1838, he 
specifically called out those engineers formally trained in that field as inadequate 
compared to those who learned the trade through the hands on practical experience of 
building structures.101 
The state also viewed lighthouse keepers as mechanics. A lighthouse keeper’s 
duties included properly adjusting and repairing the lamps, lenses, and in revolving 
lights, the clockwork mechanisms. These adjustments required the keeper to possess a 
mechanical ability. Many of these adjustments were done through screws, but sometimes 
																																								 																				
98 Brown to Parker, May 18, 1831, Box 2, Folder 38, JRPC. Beck to Parker, January 22, 
1825, Box 1, Folder 24, JRPC. 
99 Pleasonton to Winslow Lewis, October 3, 1837, RG 26, Entry 18, Vol. 12, 340, 
NARA. Pleasonton to Levi Woodbury, October 3, 1838, RG 26, Entry 18, Vol. 13, 503, 
NARA. Pleasonton to Winslow Lewis, October 5, 1838, RG 26, Entry 18, Vol. 13, 514, 
NARA. Pleasonton to Winslow Lewis, October 24, 1838, RG 26, Entry 18, Vol. 14, 9, 
NARA.  
100 Pleasonton to Thomas Corwin, March 8, 1852, in United States Treasury Department, 
Light-Houses: A Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury…in Reply to a Report Made to 
Congress by the Light-House Board, by Thomas Corwin, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 1852, H. 
Doc. 88, 4. 
101 Pleasonton to Woodbury, October 3, 1838. 
156 
the adjustments meant precisely filing the lamp burner to ensure an even flame. As 
Winslow Lewis explained to Stephen Pleasonton in 1822, if the flame caused the lamp’s 
air tube to “become uneven,” the uneven part must be “taken off with a file.”102 Filing the 
burner of an Agrand lamp not only required a keeper to possess precise mechanical 
knowledge of the lighthouse lamps, but also an understanding of chemistry and physics. 
When filed correctly, Lewis claimed “the lamp then is the same as when new,” but if the 
burners were filed too much, the lamp was rendered useless. This filing of the lamp 
burner may have resulted from the inferiority of Lewis’ lamps. 
Wicks were another aspect the required the lighthouse keeper to perform the 
duties of a mechanic. Lewis noted that if the wicks were not expertly trimmed and raised, 
the keeper will “fill the lantern with smoke in much less time than one hour.”103 
Trimming and raising the wick required the keeper to possess a basic knowledge of 
chemistry and physics. They also required precision on the part of the keeper. The 
Argand lamp used a wide flat woven wick, usually made of cotton fibers. If the wick 
were trimmed too close to the burner, the flame would cause the wick to char, or “crust.” 
Crusting prevented the lamp from burning properly and wicks were required to be 
trimmed every four hours through the night as a result.104 Once the wick burnt down 
completely, the lighthouse keeper had to replace the wick. This task required the keeper 
to disassemble the burner before inserting the wick and reassembling it afterwards. 
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Cleaning the lamps, lenses, and reflectors also required a mechanic’s hand. 
Cleaning could easily cause a misalignment that needed to be fixed. Often times keepers 
had to remove the lamp from the lantern in order to clean it properly. Removal from the 
lantern presented its own set of mechanical problems since each lamp required precise 
placement to ensure the light’s maximum brightness and efficiency. Lewis’ lamp and 
reflector system used screws to adjust the lamp’s placement in front of the reflectors.105 
Keepers had to be careful in their removal and replacement of the lamps. Even a small 
adjustment could affect the quality of the light and impact mariners at sea. 
Perhaps the most mechanically involved aspect of a keeper’s duties was 
maintaining the clockworks mechanism for revolving lights. Revolving lights, that is 
those that appeared to “flash,” helped mariners distinguish one lighthouse from another. 
The speed of the light’s revolution determined how often the light “flashed” its signal.  
To create the effect of a “flashing” light, the lamp and reflector system rotated on a gear 
driven mechanism. The motor operated by a gravity-fed weight attached to a cable. The 
lighthouse keeper would raise the weight by hand cranking the mechanism and wrapping 
the cable around a barrel. Once the weight reached the top of the lighthouse, it would fall. 
The falling weight caused the barrel to rotate and this motion was transferred to the lens 
through a series of gears somewhat resembling the interior workings of a clock.106 
According to John T. Graham, because Winslow Lewis’ Argand-style lamp and reflector 
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system was relatively light, the amount of weight needed to turn the clockwork 
mechanism was correspondingly very little.107  
This clockwork mechanism ran continuously from dusk until dawn each day. 
Keepers were responsible for maintaining the mechanism to ensure the gear-driven motor 
ran smoothly. The keeper inspected gears and weights daily making sure everything was 
properly aligned for an effortless rotation of the lens. If the gears jammed, became 
misaligned or worn, or for any other reason prevented the mechanism from rotating the 
lamp and reflector, the keeper was responsible for the repairing the mechanism. 
Sometimes repairs might require extensively mechanical work such as filing rough spots 
or adjusting the spacing between gears. Other times, simply keeping the gears properly 
oiled might prevent future problems. 
If the state saw these men as mechanics, the keepers themselves did not 
necessarily see themselves in that same light. The keepers most likely saw themselves as 
laborers, rather than as mechanics. A poem written by Fred Morong, a lighthouse keeper 
in Maine, illustrates how much lighthouse keeper’s self-identified with their labor. 
excerpt from the poem “Brasswork” 
  by Fred Morong 
“Oh, what is the bane of the lightkeeper’s life,  
That causes him worry, struggle, and strife, 
That make him use cusswords and beat up his wife? 
   It’s brasswork. 
What makes him look ghastly consumptive and thin, 
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What robs him of health, of vigor, and wim, 
And causes despair and drives him to sin? 
   It’s brasswork. 
The devil himself could never invent 
A material causing more worldwide lament, 
And in Uncle Sam’s service about ninety percent 
   Is brasswork. 
The lamp in the tower, reflector and shade, 
The tools and reflectors pass in parade 
As a matter of fact, the whole outfit is made 
   Of brasswork. 
The oil containers I polish until 
My poor back is broken, aching, and still 
Each gallon and quart, each pint and gill 
   Is brasswork. 
I lay down to slumber all weary and sore, 
I walk in my sleep, I awake with a snore 
And I’m shining the knob on my bedchamber door 
   That’s brasswork. 
From pillar to post, rags and polish I tote 
I am never without them, for you will please note 
That even the buttons I wear on my coat 
   Are brasswork. 
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The machinery, clockwork, and fog signal bell, 
The coal hods, the dustpans, the pump in the well, 
Now I’ll leave it to you mates, if this isn’t, well 
   Brasswork. 
I dig, scrub and polish, and work with a might, 
And just when I get it all shining and bright, 
In comes the fog like a thief in the night 
   Good-bye brasswork.”108 
Although this poem was written several years after the period under study here, it is still 
relevant. Aside from the “buttons on the coat,” the life of the lighthouse keeper was much 
the same at the time the poem was written as it was in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. There were a few more modern conveniences, but the daily tasks were the same. 
The keepers’ lists of duties consisted chopping firewood, cleaning, painting, and other 
routine tasks that required much more labor than it did mechanical ability. The keeper at 
the Black Rock Light in Connecticut claimed they “never had much time to [even] get 
lonely” before listing all of their daily toils.109 When the retiring keeper at Egg Rock 
Lighthouse in Massachusetts in 1850 welcomed the new keeper, the former warned the 
latter of the extensive labor required to maintain the light.110 In 1851, when the newly 
formed Light-House Board surveyed the various keepers, they listed many as having “no 
vocation.” Several, including James Hubbard, the keeper at Navesink Twin Lights in 
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New Jersey (appointed 1851); Epraim L. Lockerman, keeper of the Reedy Island 
Lighthouse (1850); and William Vennard, keeper of the Portsmouth Harbor Light (1849) 
were farmers before their respective appointments as keepers.111 
Reading the correspondence between the lighthouse keepers in Boston and the 
marine telegraph shows lighthouse keepers to be primarily unskilled and untrained in the 
arts. Although the state considered Lighthouse keepers to be mechanics, Stephen 
Pleasonton acknowledged that many keepers possessed little training or experience in the 
arts when he was called before Congress to defend his administration of the Light-House 
Establishment. In a letter to John P. Kennedy, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Commerce, Pleasonton stated, “There is not a single keeper, out of about two hundred 
and forty, in charge of the reflector lights, so far as my knowledge extends, who is 
capable of taking charge of and conducting a lens light properly; and there are few in our 
country who are capable and would be willing to receive the inconsiderable sum for their 
services which we give Mr. Lopez, the present keeper at Navesink….It would, therefore, 
only be in the vicinity of large towns that we should have it in our power to obtain 
suitable keepers, and at the same time proper assistants, and materials with which to 
repair the machinery.”112 
Natural philosophy and the mechanical arts were primarily practiced by white 
males in the early United States republic, but this democracy of science did not limit 
itself to the Anglo-American genteel society. Andrew J. Lewis argues, all classes 
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participated in natural philosophy during the first few decades of the nineteenth century 
and that scientific practice was a far more variegated enterprise than simply white men 
observing and classifying nature.”113 Lewis uses the example of South Carolina slaves 
assisting Dr. William Read, a rice plantation owner,  with analyzing fossilized teeth of an 
unknown creature. But scientific practice was even more variegated than Lewis contends. 
African Americans, women, and even children engaged in the collection and construction 
of scientific knowledge.114 This was true even in the United States Light-House 
Establishment. 
The records and examples of African Americans, women, and children 
participating in science are sparse due to the high degree of paternalism in the white male 
community towards these classes of individuals, yet there is evidence of their 
participation. In the south, the Light-House Establishment offered opportunities in 
science and the arts for a predominantly African-American labor force. Although their 
participation in science was forced upon them due to their bonded state, African 
Americans engaged in early American science in the construction of port infrastructure. 
In 1811, Thomas Walker and James Evans were awarded a contract to build a lighthouse 
for the port of Georgetown, South Carolina. With few other options for labor, Walker and 
																																								 																				
113 Andrew J. Lewis, 4-5. 
114 See Londa Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic 
World, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). James Delbourgo, A Most 
Amazing Scene of Wonders: Electricity and the Enlightenment in Early America, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 183-9. Nina Baym, American Women 
of Letters and the Nineteenth Century Sciences: Styles of Affiliation, (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002). Schiebinger, Delbourgo, and Baym discuss African 
Americans and women. My study will introduce children as mechanics and 
experimenters.  
163 
Evans hired slaves from local plantations to haul and lay the bricks of the tower.115 
Hauling bricks for the tower required manual labor, but laying the bricks required slaves 
to have knowledge beyond even basic schooling. The tapered brick tower stood 87 feet 
tall. Calculating the gradient of the walls was no easy task. It required a strong 
knowledge of mathematics and construction techniques. Local historian Robert 
MacAlister describes the beacon as having walls five and a half feet thick at the bottom 
and two feet thick at the base of the lantern room.116 While knowledge of brick 
construction and mathematics may have been available on the plantations, experience in 
building structures of the lighthouse’s height was only available in the seaports, where 
imposing structures were a necessity for the safety of maritime commerce and navigation. 
African Americans thus participated in and were taught the art of practical engineering.  
They gained useful knowledge which they carried with them back to the plantation or on 
to other projects, such as the construction of the lighthouse at Cape Romain outside 
McClellanville, South Carolina.117 
Women also served as mechanics in the Light-House Establishment. In 1826, the 
Establishment appointed Edward Shoemaker’s widow keeper of the Old Field Point 
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lighthouse in New York.118 Although other women such as Catharine Moore had 
unofficially performed the duties of the lighthouse keeper at Black Rock Harbor, 
Connecticut as early as 1817, Shoemaker was the first woman officially hired by the 
federal government to serve in the position of a keeper. Appointing the lighthouse 
keeper’s widow as the new keeper followed the long standing tradition of European craft 
guilds. As Londa Schiebinger notes, “guild regulations gave a widow the right to run the 
family business after the death of the husband.”119 Elinor De Wire acknowledges, it 
“became an unofficial rule concerning the appointment of most women” as lighthouse 
keepers and the state “had few reservations about hiring women with several years of 
apprentice-type experience.”120  
In many cases, the widow was already familiar with the duties of keeping the 
lighthouse, having assisted their husbands in an unofficial capacity. The state recognized 
this fact in appointing widows to their husbands’ former post. De Wire notes, “lighthouse 
keeping was largely a family affair.”121 The state preferred to appoint married men with 
families as lighthouse keepers knowing the family could assist them in tending the light. 
De Wire continues stating that “by 1851, 30 widows had succeeded their husbands at 
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American lighthouses.”122 In all, 53 women were officially employed by the United 
States Light-House Establishment as lighthouse keepers between 1820 and 1859.123 
Interest in female lighthouse keepers has increased substantially in the last three 
decades as several scholars have examined the role of women in the United States Light-
House Establishment and later the Lighthouse Service. These include the mother-
daughter team of Mary Louise and J. Candace Clifford, Patricia Majher, Elinor De Wire, 
Bethany Bromwell, and Virginia Neal Thomas among others.124 Thomas and Majher 
acknowledge the duties of the keeper by including a transcription of Stephen 
Pleasonton’s instructions to lighthouse keepers, but unfortunately, none of these studies 
fully examine female keepers as mechanics or scientific experimenters. Most explore the 
social aspects of female lighthouse keepers and focus on women laboring in a man’s 
world without addressing their engagement in practical science. Thomas’ thesis comes 
the closest by comparing the work of the lighthouse keeper to the domestic work of a 
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homemaker. Majher surmises that this oversight into the science and mechanical arts may 
result from the “remarkably little detail about these women’s lives.”125  
Despite these studies overlooking the scientific and mechanical role of female 
keepers, it is possible to understand the extent that women lighthouse keepers were 
mechanics and experimenters by examining the primary sources relating to male keepers. 
Those sources can be applied to female keepers as well since they performed the same 
job.  As previously discussed, serving as a lighthouse keeper required one to possess a 
mechanical ability. Keepers were responsible for properly adjusting and repairing the 
lamps, lenses, and the clockwork mechanisms used in revolving lights. While Thomas 
notes that women’s domestic work involved tending fires and lamps in the home, filing 
the burner of a lamp would not have been common practice for women in the nineteenth 
century.126 Filing was considered a man’s work and in many cases the artisan craft of a 
metalworker. According to Catherine E. Beecher’s 1843 treatise on domestic housework, 
if a lamp burner in the home needed to be filed, it was to be done by the male in the 
household.127 Londa Schiebinger, however, complicates this idea and the notion of 
gender roles. Schiebinger argues what went on in private homes outside the view of the 
public eye may or may not have followed the accepted gender conventions of the day.128 
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Within the Light-House Establishment, the tasks for tending the light were the same for 
men and women with the exception of painting the lighthouse. According to Dennis 
Noble, “Stations whose principle keepers were women were excused from this chore.”129 
Additionally, as previously noted, cleaning the lighthouse lamp required 
mechanical knowledge. The Argand oil lamps used in lighting the United States’ coastal 
beacons were nearly identical to the Argand lamps used in homes. Catharine Beecher’s 
domestic manual instructed women to “take the lamp to pieces and cleanse it.”130 
Disassembling the lamp to clean it not only required knowledge of the lamps mechanical 
construction, but again, also required the keepers to remove the lamp from its very 
precise placement between the lens and reflector. Some lighthouses had as many as thirty 
lamps; each with their own exact placement for providing the best light possible.131 
Even children participated as mechanics and scientific experimenters within the 
Light-House Establishment. As early as 1813, David Melville employed Benjamin 
Marshall to assist him in “attending the gas apparatus.” The boy was only thirteen years 
old at the time. In a deposition supporting Melville’s patent infringement suit against 
Winslow Lewis, Marshall claimed he had worked for Melville off and on for at least the 
next five years.132 While neither Melville or Marshall specify the latter’s exact duties in 
assisting Melville, it is logical the Marshall’s duties included mechanical work. Melville 
would have instructed Marshall on how to perform that mechanical work until the boy 
																																								 																				
129 Dennis L. Noble, Lighthouses & Keepers: The U.S. Lighthouse Service and its 
Legacy, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 92. 
130 Beecher, A Treatise on Domestic Economy, 282. 
131 Stephen Pleasonton to John A. Dix, January 1847 in United States Congress, Light-
Houses: Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury…in Reply to a Report Made to 
Congress by the Light-House Board, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 1852, H. Doc. 88, March 23, 
1852, 14. 
132 Melville, 17. 
168 
became proficient enough to complete the tasks on his own. Because of the inconsistency 
of Marshall’s off and on employment, it seems unlikely that the boy was any sort of 
apprentice to Melville. Rather it is more likely that Marshall was an assistant whom 
Melville hired when he needed an extra set of hands to help him with the mechanical 
duties tending to the gas apparatus. 
Children were also employed in tending the light. In 1857, fifteen-year-old 
Idawalley (Ida) Zoradia Lewis took charge of the Lime Rock Lighthouse when her father, 
Hosea Lewis, the keeper of record, had a stroke.133 Normally the task of keeping the light 
would have fallen to Hosea’s wife, Zoradia Lewis. Zoradia, however, was pre-occupied 
with caring for her husband and Ida’s younger sister who had also fallen ill.134 Most 
historians have focused on Ida’s daring and heroic rescues, but the fifteen-year-old girl 
also performed all the mechanical duties of keeping the light. She trimmed the wicks, 
polished the reflectors, filed the burners, maintained the clockworks mechanism and 
made all of the necessary adjustments for keeping the light lit every night. Ida’s 
contributions went unpaid because she was tending the light while her father was 
incapacitated. As Elinor De Wire notes that it was not uncommon for children to assist in 
keeping the light. In many ways it was unofficially expected. According to De Wire, the 
Light-House Establishment preferred to hire married keepers with families because of the 
shear amount of work that needed to be done at the lighthouse.135 De Wire also notes 
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there were no age restrictions for lighthouse keepers in the first half of the nineteenth 
century.136  
What is at issue here is the question “What constituted science in the early United 
States?” Science can be defined simply as knowledge. Individuals performing science 
and engaging in the mechanical arts gained knowledge through empirical observation and 
testing. Although the Charles Becks, James Hubbards, Ida Lewises, and Benjamin 
Marshalls of the Light-House Establishment were simply doing what they had to do to 
get by in their day to day tasks, they were engaged in scientific activities. These 
individuals constructed knowledge through their daily tasks because their daily routine 
relied on empirical observation and testing. Many of these individuals did not even 
realize they were engaging in empirical observation and testing and even if they did, they 
were not necessarily interested in the knowledge the produced. Beck, Hubbard, Lewis, 
Marshall and the so many other average Americans in the Light-House Establishment 
may have constructed knowledge for their own gain, but their primary goal was doing 
their job and doing it to the best of their ability. As we will see in the following chapter, 
civic duty played an important role in early nineteenth century American science. The 
lack of interest in the knowledge produced by these individuals does not change the fact 
that they were engaged in science. Their work helped make the Light-House 
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CONCLUSION 
Similar to the Coast Survey’s impact on surveying, the Army Corps of Engineers’ 
influence on American engineering, and the marine telegraph’s role in the advancement 
of communications, the United States Light-House Establishment played a major role in 
the creation of scientific knowledge in America. As this chapter has demonstrated, the 
Establishment conducted numerous experiments in the chemical analysis of fuels and the 
physical science of illumination to produce new knowledge about the natural world. This 
construction of knowledge and engagement in scientific experimentation made the Light-
House Establishment one of the premier scientific organizations in the United States and 
placed the agency at the forefront of American science prior to the outbreak of the 
American Civil War. 
The Establishment employed a diverse lot of workers including men, women, and 
children of all ages. The Establishment’s men and women of science also included both 
the formally educated, such as the engineers of the Topographical Corps, and the 
tinkerers who learned through the successes and failures of their practical experiences. 
These mechanics and scientists did more than make observations and record their 
findings. They engaged in the construction of knowledge; knowledge that these 
scientifically-minded individuals used to find ways of improving the nation’s coastal 
navigation. They invented dozens of lighthouse innovations including new new lamps, 
lenses, reflectors, clockwork mechanisms, and other devices designed to provide a 
brighter, more consistent light. Some of these mechanics applied for Letters Patents and 
the United States Patent Office granted many patents for lighthouse innovations between 
1789 and 1860. Men, such as Winslow Lewis and David Melville, sought to profit from 
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their ideas and secure their livelihood. Others, including including Winslow’s nephew, 
Lieutenant I. W. P. Lewis, Lieut. George Gordon Meade, and Captain Henry Stansbury 
were content with knowing they had done their civic duty. Although it is possible that 
Lewis, Meade, and Stansbury did not wish to pay the fee to patent their inventions, they, 
and others like them, seem to have cared more about improving navigation than they did 
about any personal gain they might have received from their work. For this reason, many 
innovations went unpatented by their inventors. There are no known records of the Light-
House Establishment’s female mechanics inventing new apparatuses for the service.137 
Other historians have argued that women of the Light-House Establishment, such as Ida 
Lewis, seemed more concerned with performing their civil service faithfully, accurately, 
and to the best of their ability.138 This may be true, but it may also be the easiest 
assessment given the lack of records within the Light-House Establishment highlighting 
the scientific and mechanical contributions of women. Ruth Oldenziel argues nineteenth-
century women made all kinds of things, they simply were not the sort of thing one 
would patent.139 Additionally, it is also possible the Establishment’s women invented 
new devices and innovated new methods, but simply did not record their discoveries or 
share them with anyone else. 
With the majority of the nation’s lighthouses being placed in or near its harbors, 
the Light-House Establishment provide the perfect opportunity for men and women to 
engage in science. The environment of the harbor provided the perfect space to pursue 
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experiments. These experiments turned early republic seaports in to scientific laboratories 
and workshops for the practical arts. Ports were more than gateways of exchange. They 
were more than end nodes on a global trading network. Early republic ports were centers 
for the exploring and obtaining knowledge. They were field schools for those who wished 
to learn about science, the arts, and the natural world. 
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CHAPTER 5 
REPUBLICAN VALUES AND INNOVATION 
If the environment necessitated the involvement of the state in science and the 
practical arts as discussed previously in Chapter 3, the government’s entrance into these 
fields was heavily influenced by republican values. Specifically, the values of civic duty, 
prudence, honesty, and self-reliance shaped the manner in which the government engaged 
in scientific endeavors. These values were at the core of American republicanism. Values 
such as civic duty and self-reliance promoted the advancement of practical science and 
mechanical innovation, while prudent management of government expenses seemed, at 
least on the surface, to slow, or even oppose, scientific progress. Opinions over defining 
these republican values also developed into a long-standing debate over who was best 
qualified to manage the government’s scientific endeavors. 
In the late 1830s, complaints against the Fifth Auditor of the Treasury, Stephen 
Pleasonton, and his administration of the Light-House Establishment began to mount. By 
the mid-1840s, those complaints had reached the halls of the Capitol Building.1 The 
complaints were of a scientific nature. Edmund Blunt, Assistant to the Coast Survey, and 
Lieutenant I. W. P. Lewis of the Topographical Engineers were the most critical of 
Pleasonton’s administration, but even the Secretary of the Treasury, Walter Forward, 
chimed in on the need for a “competent scientific and practical engineer” to provide 
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guidance for the Establishment.2 Of the three, Blunt was by far the loudest critic. He 
wrote to public officials, editors of important newspapers, and mariners involved in the 
transatlantic trade. Blunt argued the lights in the United States were “greatly inferior in 
brilliancy, in the distance they may be seen, and in good management” in comparison to 
those  in Britain and France.3 Blunt continued, stating, “We have been for years behind 
other nations in taking advantage of other improvements.”4 Lewis confined his 
complaints to his official report, which was authorized by Congress and commissioned 
by the Secretary of the Treasury. Similar to Blunt, Lewis claimed the lights in France and 
Great Britain were far superior to those in the United States, Lewis argued, France and 
Great Britain had “called in the aid of their most eminent scientific men to improve the 
construction and illumination of their coastal lights,” but noted “the establishment of this 
country has languished under the rule of ignorant and avaricious contractors, unrestrained 
by law or other influences requisite to the proper government of so important a branch of 
public service.”5 Lewis went on to say, “everything like systemic arrangement is utterly 
unknown; obscure inland beacons have more lamps than exterior lights of the highest 
importance.”6 As an example, Lewis noted, “the beacon-light on the Penobscot river has 
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as many lamps, and much larger and better reflectors than the great coast light of Petit 
Manan, where three wrecks have occurred since the period of this examination.”7  
While Blunt and Lewis shared common views, it is difficult to say whether or not 
the latter came to his views independent of Blunt. The young Lewis was an up and 
coming engineer who undoubtedly sought to make a name for himself. Blunt on the other 
hand already held a great deal of influence through his association with the Coast Survey. 
Blunt was the first Assistant appointed to the Coast Survey under Ferdinand Rudolph 
Hassler.8 In a letter to Walter Forward, the Secretary of the Treasury, Lewis 
acknowledged his debt to Blunt, “who in the most liberal manner, supplied me, 
graciously, with a number of costly astronomical instruments that I could not have 
obtained from any other source.”9 Lewis needed these instruments to perform his survey 
of the coastal beacons. With Blunt’s views being previously known, it is plausible to 
believe Blunt had ulterior motives for supplying Lewis “in the most liberal manner” of 
such expensive equipment.10  
Might Blunt not have been trying to influence the outcome of Lewis’ report? As 
an Assistant to the Coast Survey, Blunt was a man of formal science. He believed the 
Coast surveyors and the Army Corps engineers were the true keepers of science in the 
United States. Blunt wished to see the Survey and the Corps take charge of the Light-
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House Establishment similar to how the Navy had taken control of the Coast Survey 
earlier. Additionally, Blunt invented a lighthouse lamp that he hoped would be adopted 
by the Establishment. By making formal charges of mismanagement against Pleasonton’s 
administration, Blunt attempted to undermine Winslow’s Lewis’ exclusive lamp contract 
with the Establishment so that the former would get an opportunity to introduce his lamp 
into the agency. 
As Secretary of the Treasury and Pleasonton’s direct superior, Walter Forward 
also expressed his concerns about the possibility of mismanagement in the agency. In a 
letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, John White,  Forward stated,  “it 
has been found impossible to guard against all abuses,” because the Establishment was 
“unaided by the science and skill now sought.”11 Despite the Secretary’s belief that it was 
“impossible to guard against all abuses,” he did not blame the Fifth Auditor’s 
management of the system.12 Forward stated the abuses “necessarily result from the 
existing defects in the system, and must not be readily imputed to mismanagement of the 
Department.”13 The defects mentioned in Forward’s letter resulted from the republican 
values that guided Pleasonton’s administration of the Establishment. Those values 
included a strong sense of civic duty, prudent management, honesty, and a focus on self-
reliance. Pleasonton was a staunch Jeffersonian republican. Jefferson appointed 
Pleasonton federal office in the state department as a reward for the Democrat-
Republicans delivering Pleasonton’s home state of Delaware to Jefferson in the election 
of 1800.  
																																								 																				




For his part, Pleasonton defended his administration of the Light-House 
Establishment stressing the growth of the Establishment and his prudent fiscal 
management of the agency.14 Pleasonton claimed the Establishment was “maintained 
annually at about one-third the expense of the British lights of the same kind, upon an 
average, and for a somewhat less sum than the French light-houses cost for their 
maintenance.”15 Pleasonton also stressed his strong sense of civic duty noting that he did 
“all I can do, under a clause which has been inserted in each light-house law for some 
years past.”16 Pleasonton argued that he built up the Establishment “from the 
inconsiderable number of 54 to the number of 330 light-houses and 41 light-ships, with 
numerous buoys, beacons, &c., within the 32 years I have had charge of it.”17 Lastly, 
Pleasonton stressed the importance of eliminating corruption in government transactions. 
He cited the lighthouse at Parmet river as an example. Pleasonton argued, the 
“commander in the navy, of high standing,” who surveyed the site and recommended the 
establishment of the lighthouse, was irresponsible in his civic duty. According to 
Pleasonton, the river “was supposed to be a harbor for vessels in bad weather,” but it 
“was found to be only two feet deep.”18 Pleasonton stated, “for some years past” the navy 
had “recommended the establishment of lights where they have since been found useless 
or unnecessary.”19 Although Pleasonton did not explicitly state why the navy 
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recommended useless sites, he implied either the naval officers were incompetent or they 
had a personal, corrupt interest in the establishment of the lights. The Fifth Auditor 
believed only, “a single officer attached to the Treasury Department” could provide for 
“the proper application of the moneys appropriated” for the navigational aids and “insure 
the best attention” the the Establishment with “the most economical expenditure of the 
public moneys.”20 Pleasonton thus demonstrated that he not only believed in the core 
republican values of civic duty, prudence, honesty, and self-reliance, but that he also 
embodied those ideals with every effort. 
Much has been said about republican values their relationship to innovation and 
commerce in the early nineteenth century United States. David Nye, for instance, claims 
the Jeffersonian idea of an agrarian republic was not about “preserving the wilderness or 
halting development,” but rather “the citizen who contemplated such public 
improvements became aware of the power of democracy” and saw it as his civic duty to 
be a vanguard for the republic.21 Nye’s mentor, Leo Marx, argues Americans failed to 
acknowledge the “root contradiction between industrial progress and the older, chaste 
image of a green republic.”22 Indeed, Joyce Appleby and Drew R. McCoy earlier noted, 
the idea of a truly agrarian republic devoid of any industrial development was a myth.23 
McCoy argues there was “an uneasy suspicion (and sometimes recognition) among the 
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Revolutionaries”  that America “was already a relatively advanced commercial society” 
and that an agrarian republic was unrealistic.24 And as John F. Kasson argued, “the 
ideology of republicanism helped to provide a receptive climate for technological 
adaptation and innovation.”25 More recently, Mehdi Achouche argues Jefferson did “not 
repudiate science when he laud[ed] the rural virtues, but he [did] express an extreme 
defiance towards science’s practical applications,” because he felt they “theaten[ed] the 
virtue underpinning the American republic.”26  
American republicanism and innovation were therefore not in direct opposition to 
one another. As Eda Kranakis demonstrates, rural communities, such as those in Fayette 
and Lancaster counties in western Pennsylvania, relied heavily on innovation for access 
to commercial markets.27 Yet in the sphere of government there was a mixed reaction to 
innovation and scientific progress. The state embraced commercial expansion by 
providing for the Coast Survey, the Light-House Establishment, and the coastal defense 
system. According to Merritt Roe Smith the government also held an interest in 
exchangeable part manufacturing for supplying the nation’s military needs.28  
In terms of the specific values discussed in this chapter – civic duty, prudence, 
honesty and self-reliance - Hugh R. Slotten argues some viewed scientific practice as a 
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civic duty. According to Slotten, Ferdinand R. Hassler, Superintendent of the Coast 
Survey, “argued it was the ‘duty’ of every government to ‘to promote as much as possible 
the general benefit of the nation, and especially its scientific improvement.’”29 Yet, the 
state practiced prudence in its involvement with innovation and scientific enterprise 
because the state feared corruption. Slotten notes Congress was concerned about 
Hassler’s slow progress on the charting the coast because they worried “the longer the 
results were kept within the Coast Survey office, the more easily they might be 
manipulated or ‘cooked’ by some unscrupulous employee.”30 Similar feelings of 
prudence were expressed toward the Army Corps of Engineers. According to Todd 
Shallat, Jefferson objected to the public financing of internal improvements because 
Jefferson “viewed as a source of boundless patronage” and “a bottomless abyss of public 
money.”31 Shallat goes on to say that “science, engineering, and internal improvements – 
the things Jefferson loved – might feed the dens of corruption.”32 Honesty and the 
prevention of corruption were key values in Jefferson’s republican ideology. Smith 
acknowledges that “Jefferson wanted to proceed with caution” and was pained with 
anxiousness over balancing progress with republican values.33 Smith claims Jefferson 
“simply did not want to jump headlong into a frenzied program of national development 
at the expense of what mattered most – the preservation of values associated with a rural 
society” and a virtuous republic. John Lauritz Larson’s political study of public works 
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projects confirms the state’s prudence with their tepid involvement in internal 
improvements.34 Smith, however, claims innovation and scientific progress reinforced 
republican values rather than undermining them.35 
This chapter adds to the historiography of the history of science and technology in 
two significant ways. First, it examines science and technology in the early United States, 
a period that has often been wanting in the history of science and technology. Ann 
Johnson surmised this lack of science, technology, engineering and medicine (STEM) in 
the early American republic is because STEM played “a key, but unmentioned role” in 
negotiating the interaction between mankind, nature, and society.36 This chapter confirms 
Johnson’s theory showing the importance of science and innovation in the early United 
States while at the same time demonstrating why it remains mostly invisible. Second, this 
chapter examines the interaction of innovation and scientific progress and the American 
brand of republicanism. Whereas others have generically alluded to the republican values 
that influenced innovation and scientific progress, this chapter takes a deeper look at 
some of those republican values. Particularly, this chapter examines how civic duty, 
prudence, honesty, and self-reliance impacted science and innovation in the first half of 
the nineteenth century in the United States. 
CIVIC DUTY 
Civic duty was one of the most important republican values held by the state and 
those who served in government. Gordon S. Wood first equated republicanism with the 
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“public good” in his The Creation of the American Republic (1969).37 Wood argues by 
definition, republicanism has “no other end than the welfare of the people,” and that civic 
duty, that is sacrifice, was seen as a public virtue.38 Those individuals who engaged in, 
oversaw, and promoted practical science in the early American republic believed their 
scientific endeavors represented their civic duty. Learned men, such as Ferdinand R. 
Hassler, Alexander Dallas Bache, and George Gordon Meade saw their work in the 
sciences as their duty to their country; whether that country be their native home or their 
adopted one. 
As previously noted, Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler, the first superintendent of the 
United States Coast Survey, believed it was the government’s duty to promote scientific 
advancement. In his “Report on the Works executed for the Survey of the Coast of the 
United States, upon the Law of 1832, and their junction with the Works made in 1817 by 
and under the direction of F. R. Hassler,” which he included in his 1834 publication of 
the Principal Documents Relating to the Survey of the Coast of the United States since 
1816, Hassler argued it was the government’s responsibility to promote “scientific 
improvement,…upon a liberal scale.”39 Hassler also believed that it was his civic duty to 
employ military officers in the Coast Survey’s scientific work because they were more 
economical than civilians and he valued the military’s obedience and discipline.40 
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Hassler, however, argued the “character of our Republican military” mandated their 
subservience to a civil power.41 
Hassler saw himself as a man of science. He believed Americans were incapable 
of producing science and men of science in the same mold as European nations.42  As a 
civil servant of the United States government, Hassler saw the promotion of science as 
his personal civic duty. Hassler attempted, in his mind, with every effort to carry out that 
civic duty faithfully. Unfortunately, according to Slotten, Hassler did not understand the 
differences between American and European political cultures. Slotten argues Hassler, 
“ignorant of Washington politics” did not do “enough to educate Congress and cultivate 
influential friends and political supporters.”43 Hassler tried to force the United States to 
accept European scientific standards, such as the French metric system, civilian oversight 
of government surveys, and the belief that scientists possessed superior moral qualities.44  
Hassler may have been one of the premier scientists in the United States at the 
time, but his mightier-than-thou attitude prevented him from seeing that everyday 
Americans were producing science. This was actually the case with many formally 
trained engineers, philosophers, and scientists. Interpreting Hassler’s actions and attitudes 
returns us to the question asked in Chapter Three – what constitutes science? Hassler did 
not believe the work of Americans constituted science because many had not be formally 
trained in the sciences. Hassler, however, failed to realize that science had less to do with 
training than it did with the methodology. Even though many Americans had not been 
formally trained in philosophy or science, they still engaged in a method of empirical 
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observation and testing. Empirical observation and testing is what qualified the work of 
Americans as science. 
Congress refuted Hassler on several occasions including the use of the French 
metric system. Congress’ rebuttal of Hassler mainly resulted from the latter’s arrogance, 
but the rebuttal nevertheless gives the appearance that the American brand of 
republicanism conflicted with science. This is clearly not the case. If one sees Hassler’s 
point of view on the relationship of civic duty and the promotion of science, it becomes 
easy to reconcile republican values with innovation and science. 
Similarly, Pleasonton understood it was his civic duty to promote science within 
the Light-House Establishment. Over the course of his 32-year tenure as Superintendent 
of the Light-House Establishment, Pleasonton authorized, monitored, and even suggested 
experiments and practical improvements conducted by local entrepreneurs and mechanics 
working for the agency. Some of those experiments and practical improvements were 
discussed in the previous. In 1823, for instance, Pleasonton authorized the installation of 
lamps and reflectors at Cape May, New Jersey “on the principle of a revolving triangle 
including the apparatus of Melville & Black’s improvement for heating the oil.”45 David 
Melville ran experiments on his apparatus for heating oil in lighthouse lamps “for several 
years previous” to 1814 in order “to keep the oil in a fluid state” during cold winters.46 
Melville’s experiments proved successful enough that Pleasonton authorized the 
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installation of the improvement in northern lighthouses. In other instances, Pleasonton 
monitored experiments involving lamps and lenses in Boston and New Jersey, a 
“ventilator” to eliminate frost and condensation on lenses and lantern windows in 
Newport, and fuel experiments in various locales.47 In 1840, Pleasonton wrote to one of 
his contractors, “this is an age of improvement and we must keep up with it.”48 
One instance that Pleasonton monitored very closely was the manufacturing of the 
lamp and reflector system used by the Light-House Establishment. Throughout February 
1840, Pleasonton advised Winslow Lewis to change his method of manufacturing 
lighthouse reflectors. Lewis hammered his reflectors while others manufactured theirs 
using molds.49 Pleasonton noted that reflectors made on molds had a “true parabola 
form.”50 Pleasonton continued saying, “I would advise you to also have your reflectors 
made in moulds, for without adopting that mode, it is impossible to have them of a true 
parabola, or the focus properly made.”51 When Lewis objected by explaining his method 
of manufacturing, Pleasonton replied that reflectors made in molds were, “so much 
superior to the hammered reflectors, that there can be no room for hesitation in 
employing them in preference to the those that are hammered.…the moulds not only 
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produce a smoother surface than can be obtained by hammering, they must necessarily all 
be alike, which is a matter of great consequence.”52 Still Lewis was reluctant. Perhaps 
Lewis felt his friendship with Pleasonton was stronger than reality.53 Lewis did not 
interpret Pleasonton’s advice with much concern until Pleasonton took a more direct 
tone, stating,  
As I understand your mode of making them [the 
reflectors] however, I am clearly of the opinion that it is 
not as good as that adopted by the British and as tried by 
Mr. Blake of Boston. You hammer yours upon a block, as 
I understand you, to give them the proper curve, whilst 
the British and Mr. Blake form theirs in a die of steel and 
pressure. Whilst yours therefore presents an uneven 
surface, theirs presents a surface as smooth as plate glass, 
and is capable of reflecting the light in a much greater 
degree. It was for this reason I recommended to you to 
employ moulds or dies of steel in making your 
																																								 																				
52 Pleasonton to Winslow Lewis, February 17, 1840, RG 26, Entry 18, Vol. 15, 270-1, 
NARA. 
53 Every historian of the USLHE has commented on the relationship between Pleasonton 
and Lewis as being friendly. Their relationship was in fact a business relationship. 
Pleasonton looked to Lewis in areas where the former had little expertise, such as 
maritime affairs, but numerous letters from Pleasonton take a very harsh tone with Lewis 
indicating they were not personal friends. In fact, Lewis only maintained his relationship 
with Pleasonton by forcing the Fifth Auditor to award him contracts based on his 
consistently low bids. Lewis’ low bids eventually led other contractors to stop bidding on 
lighthouse contracts. At that point, Pleasonton often went directly to Lewis for his lowest 
price to perform the work, but this was more out of expediency and efficiency in the 
absence of competing bids. It should not be construed as Pleasonton having anything 
more than a business relationship with Lewis.  
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reflectors…I am apprehensive that he [Mr. Blake] will 
obtain a preference over you in supplying the 
Lighthouses, unless you adopt the same mode, and I 
should very much regret that you should be cut out of this 
business after you have devoted so long a time to it.54  
Lewis had been in the “business” for thirty years and it was with Pleasonton’s response at 
the end of February indicating Lewis would be left out of government contracts, that the 
contractor finally understood the Fifth Auditor’s polite ultimatum. Thereafter, Lewis 
agreed to use molds for manufacturing his reflectors, and Pleasonton was “glad to learn” 
that Lewis would “not be superseded by new comers.”55 
Pleasonton took his civic duty seriously. In September of 1807, for instance, 
while serving as a clerk in the state department, Pleasonton refused to issue a commission 
signed by President Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson appointed Benajah Nicholls as the 
surveyor of the Port of Windsor, North Carolina. Pleasonton “discovered” a previously 
issued commission to “William H. Ruffin appointing him to the same office,” and 
therefore refused to execute the President’s orders.56 In a letter to Pleasonton, Jefferson 
claimed he had “no recollection of the name of William H. Ruffin,” but found 
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Pleasonton’s actions “perfectly right.”57 Jefferson’s lack of recall is surprising. Jefferson 
was well known for his meticulous note taking.  Pleasonton, for his part, simply carried 
out his civic duty, without regard to Jefferson’s higher authority. Another President might 
have viewed Pleasonton’s actions as disrespectful and insubordinate. Jefferson’s 
acquiescence, however, illustrates the importance of civic duty and the correctness of 
Pleasonton’s action in adhering to his civic duty as a core republican value. 
Pleasonton often performed his civic duty at great personal expense; neglecting 
his own family or risking his own life for the greater good of the nation. For instance, in 
1821, Pleasonton remained at his post in the federal government despite his wife 
Matilda’s “obstinate & distressing disease.” In a letter to his cousin Caesar Augustus 
Rodney, Pleasonton acknowledged, “Mrs. P[.’s] health has been so bad for the last two or 
three weeks, and continues to get worse, that I have concluded to take her to the 
Shenandoah Springs in Virginia,” but would “return myself immediately.”58 Another 
time, Pleasonton wrote to family and friends that “Mrs. P[.] is absent in Pennsa.”59  
Pleasonton’s most well-known civic duty came during the War of 1812 when he 
risked own life to save valuable State Department papers during the British attack on 
Washington in 1814. Pleasonton’s boss, Secretary of State James Monroe, serving double 
duty as James Madison’s Secretary of War, scouted British encampments on the 
Chesapeake, Patuxent, and Potomac and sent word back to Washington of the impending 
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attack. Pleasonton, with the help of First Lady Dolly Madison answered the call, taking 
the State Department papers and hiding them at Roxeby Plantation near Leesburg, 
Virginia until it was safe to return them to the city.60 Among the papers Pleasonton 
gathered and couriered out of the city were the original copies of the Articles of 
Confederation, the Constitution of the United States, the Declaration of Independence, 
and Washington’s Commission as General of the Continental Army. Several historians, 
beginning with John B. Ellis in 1869, have diminished the importance of Pleasonton’s 
actions and relegated the incident to the status of mere trivia. Michael Farquhar calls the 
incident a “footnote” in the historical record.61  
Years later, Brigadier General William H. Winder asked Pleasonton to explain 
why State Department books and records were moved during the attack on Washington. 
Pleasonton responded in a modest republican fashion stating he could not recall whether 
or not it was he or Mr. John Graham, the chief clerk of the office, who received Colonel 
Monroe’s message. Pleasonton remembered only that “it was the part of prudence to 
preserve the valuable papers of the Revolutionary government.”62 Not once in his 
recollection did Pleasonton portray himself as anything more than a civil servant doing 
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his civic duty. He did not play the hero, nor did he so much as acknowledge the danger to 
his own personal life. The British torched Washington as Pleasonton crossed the Potomac 
into Virginia.63 
Such devotion to civic duty was not uncommon in the early American republic 
and Pleasonton extended his expectations of civic duty to his subordinates and 
contractors working for the Establishment. In 1830, Winslow Lewis requested partial 
payment for work already completed in order to meet his expenses, but Pleasonton was 
unable to make an exception for even his most favored contractor. Pleasonton explained 
that, “although the law of January 1823, allows a discretion to make payments for work 
done for the United States as it progresses,” he found it necessary “to lay down a rule to 
defer all payments until the entire work executed.” He further explained, “From this rule I 
have made no exceptions, and I regret that my duty now, will not permit me to make an 
exception in your favor.”64 In another instance, Pleasonton denied a leave of absence for 
a subordinate stating, “it is considered inconsistent with the public service to grant leave 
for so long a period.”65  
Entrepreneurial mechanics, such as James Elford, David Melville, and Winslow 
Lewis also saw their work as part of their civic duty. Historian Robert E. Shalhope sees 
entrepreneurial work as a commercial brand of republicanism that allows “men to view 
themselves as committed to the harmony, order, and communal well-being of a republic 
while actively creating an aggressive, individualistic, liberal one,” based on their 
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capitalistic desires.66 Elford, a resident of Charleston, South Carolina, patented a 
universal signal code for maritime communication. Elford and his Boston agent, John 
Rowe Parker, believed the advantages of early communication were important to local 
merchants, but that a universal system was advantageous to the state.67 Elford’s and 
Parker’s civic duty was to see the national adoption of the universal code. Such 
widespread adoption of Elford’s system would not only tie the nation together, it would 
help facilitate national economic growth by accelerating port operations and reducing the 
time in port.  
Melville invented several apparatuses for the Light-House Establishment 
including an oil heater, a method of eliminating the accumulation of frost and humidity 
on lenses and lantern windows, and a method for burning natural gas in the lighthouse 
lamps instead of spermaceti oil. The entrepreneurial mechanic detailed these inventions 
in a report to the government in 1819. Although the purpose of the report was to expose 
the alleged abuses of his inventions by an agent of the Treasury Department, Melville 
provided a glimpse into his sense of civic duty regarding his scientific experiments and 
practical improvements .68 Melville began conducting his experiments and perfecting his 
apparatuses five years before his report. Melville believed it was “a duty of every citizen” 
and a “privilege of the citizens to represent” the sanctity of their work to the 
government.”69 
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Lastly, Lewis saw his entrepreneurial work on lamps and lenses as his civic duty. 
In a letter to Albert Gallatin, Lewis demonstrates his sense of civic duty noting his work 
for “Commodore Rogers [sic],” and the Light-House Establishment over the past four 
years inventing lamps, reflectors, and other lighting apparatuses.70 In an earlier letter to 
Gallatin, Lewis’s sense of civic duty is also apparent when he offers to “reimburse the 
money paid for [his] patent as well as every Expense [the] government may have been at” 
should his improvements “be found not to answer the purpose now calculated & that the 
saving of oyl [sic] is not equal to one half of the quantity consumed in the present 
system.”71 Additionally, Lewis offered to repair “att [sic] my own expense all the 
apparatus that may be put into any lantern under my direction” if they failed to meet this 
standard.72 
Others also viewed Lewis’ improvements to the lighthouse lamp as part the 
general idea of civic duty. The editors of the Boston Gazette noted Lewis’ invention was 
part of the “ingenuity and public spirit” exhibited by Americans. The newspaper 
continued by saying Lewis’ invention, along with the inventions of other Americans, 
“exhibit to the world, the most unequivocal proofs” of their republican virtue.73 
As individuals and the state constructed knowledge and gained experience in 
innovation and practical science, they did so for the benefit of the nation as a whole. 
Civic duty was one of the most important characteristics of American republicanism. 
Civic duty was the responsibility of every citizen to look out for the public good. As 
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Chapter 2 highlighted, individuals engaged in science and the arts to solve commercial 
problems. While some participated for profit, many others produced scientific knowledge 
out of their sense of civic duty. Chapter 4 highlighted the many individuals who forewent 
patenting their inventions and improvements out of their sense of civic duty. Today, 
innovating technologies is much more a choice. Individuals are more inclined to 
participate because of profit because the nation’s most absolute, most basic needs have 
already been met. In the young nation, innovation was a necessity to secure the future of 
the country. In seeking to solve commercial and environmental problems before profit, 
American engineers, mechanics, and tinkerers invoked their sense of civic duty. Civic 
duty, in turn, thus shaped the development of innovation and practical science in that it 
determined the sorts of inventions that were produced and the type science that was 
performed. 
PRUDENCE (cautious and responsible management) 
Prudence was also a core republican value and those who demonstrated prudent 
management of government affairs were rewarded with long tenures in office. Of the 
republican values discussed here, the virtue of prudence might be the one most opposed 
to science. Noah Webster’s 1828 and 1844 dictionaries claimed prudence was “wisdom 
applied to practice.” The dictionary noted that, “prudence implies caution in deliberating 
and consulting on the most suitable means to accomplish valuable purposes.” Webster’s 
dictionary continued stating, “prudence differs from wisdom in this, that prudence 
implies more caution and reserve than wisdom, or is exercised more in foreseeing and 
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avoiding evil, than in devising and executing that which is good.”74 These definitions of 
prudence were well articulated by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in 
their essays on the Federalist system which have since been collected under the title The 
Federalist Papers. Madison championed, “shrewdness in management of affairs” and 
“good judgment in the use of resources,” in the 43rd essay of The Federalist Papers.75 
“Shrewdness in management of affairs” and “good judgement in the use of resources” 
was synonymous with “caution in deliberating…the most suitable means to accomplish 
valuable purposes.” Madison then argued “theoretical reasoning…must be qualified by 
the lessons in practice,” and that “the existence of a right to interpose will generally 
prevent the necessity of exerting it.”76 Although Madison’s language is speaking to 
explicit powers of government, Madison is advocating moderation and accommodation, 
or “caution and reserve.” Madison also championed “caution” as a republican value in the 
38th essay of The Federalist Papers. Madison argued, “whence could it have proceeded 
that a people, jealous as the Greeks were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules 
of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen.”77 Madison went on to 
say the lessons learned from the American improvement of the ancient system exposed 
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the “great imprudence” of multiplying the hazards, difficulties, and objections “to such 
experiments.”78  
Any one of the above referenced definitions, and in some cases all of them, 
defined the federal government’s involvement in innovation and practical science in the 
early United States. Science was, and still is for that matter, an expensive endeavor. The 
federal government, however, had limited experience and resources with which to engage 
in the scientific practice. In terms of management of affairs, Congress forced the 
superintendents of the Coast Survey, Corps of Engineers, and Light-House Establishment 
to pursue shrewd fiscal policies by repeatedly underfunding those agencies and their 
scientific endeavors. Pleasonton proved a most able administrator in this respect, but 
others, particularly Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler of the Coast Survey, often drew the fury 
of Congress for their lack of fiscal accountability. 
Although Hassler garnered the indignation of Congress, his administration of the 
Survey actually embodied the republican value of prudence. To begin with, Hassler was a 
shrewd administrator. He insisted on doing things properly, which meant conducting the 
survey with accuracy and precision. In fact, Hassler felt so strongly about the accuracy 
and precision of the survey that he refused to allow his assistants to perform any of the 
calculations associated with completing the survey.79 This display of caution slowed the 
progress of the work, but Hassler remained unconcerned. He understood the importance 
of the survey and the dangers associated with even the smallest inaccuracy, or what 
Hassler perceived as evil. Miscalculations on charting the coast and underwater hazards 
put the lives of mariners and passengers at risk; not to mention the dangers to commerce. 
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Hassler felt his assistants were unqualified. He felt they would make mistakes in their 
computations. Hassler, therefore, chose to prevent his assistants from performing the 
essential functions of the survey and handled all of the mathematical calculations 
himself.80 In preventing his assistants from performing the core of the survey work, 
Hassler attempted to avoid what he perceived as the evil of unqualified assistants 
computing the triangulation. 
Drawing on European precedents, Hassler requested military officers to assist him 
in the triangulation of the Survey. According to Slotten, Hassler believed the use of 
military personnel was compatible with Jefferson’s brand of republicanism because it 
reduced expenses and waste. Military salaries were already accounted for under the Army 
and Navy. As the survey was conducted primarily during times of peace, the use of 
military officers provided an efficient use for soldiers who would otherwise be under- or 
un- employed. Prudence thus came from the shrewd frugality of shared expenses. There 
was no need to pay out expenses twice when there were a number of highly skilled 
military officers available. Additionally, the Coast Survey trained military officers in 
practical science, which Hassler believed aided the officers in performing an essential 
part of their civic duty.81  
Congress, however, did not see the Superintendent of the Coast Survey as fiscally 
responsible. In 1841, Congressman Caleb Cushing, for instance, claimed Hassler was 
spending millions of dollars of taxpayers’ money with little to show for the expenses.82 
According to Slotten, Congress claimed the work on the  Survey was “too expensive” and 
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progressing at “too slow” a pace.83 Congress shut Hassler out of the Survey in 1818 and 
shifted responsibility for the work to the military in part because of the slow progress 
being made.84 Hassler was reappointed as head of the Survey in 1832, but Congress 
moved control back to the military between 1834 and 1836 on account of what they 
deemed was Hassler’s lack of prudence and adherence to republican values of responsible 
fiscal management.85 As a result of Cushing’s attack on the Survey, Congress forced 
Hassler to be more accountable for the Survey’s finances in the final years of his 
employment with the agency.86 
  The state’s republican value of prudence did not limit itself to the Coast Survey. 
Nearly every government agency was affected by the state’s prudent fiscal policies. 
Similar to the Coast Survey and the Light-House Establishment, appropriations for the 
Army Corps of Engineers were often insufficient for their purpose.87 Additionally, 
economic historian Mark R. Wilson illustrates how the republican virtue of prudence 
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influenced the actions of the United States Army’s Quartermaster Corps throughout the 
American Civil War.88 According to Sally Kenney and James F. Nagle, the state’s frugal 
fiscal policies originate in the republican values of the early nineteenth century.89 Shortly 
after Congress authorized the Coast Survey in 1807, the legislative body passed laws 
regulating government contracts, which codified the bidding process and payment 
procedures.90 
In the early nineteenth century, as they often are today, government appointments 
were politically motivated. Many of these appointees possessed little experience in 
financial management beyond their own personal finances. Others did not see fiscal 
accounting as a high priority. Hassler, for instance, even believed accounting was beneath 
him. In a letter to President Andrew Jackson, Hassler is noted as saying anyone could be 
a “Voodbury [sic]” (referring to Levi  Woodbury, secretary of the Treasury and meaning 
anyone could be a treasurer or accountant), but there could only be one Hassler.91 
Similar to Hassler, and perhaps even more so, Stephen Pleasonton was a shrewd 
administrator who took his civic duty for prudent fiscal management seriously. 
Throughout his tenure, Pleasonton ensured that government contracts were executed in 
the most cautious manner. When bids were too high for the Congressional appropriations, 
he either returned the money to the surplus fund for the next fiscal year or he got 
contractors to lower their bids. For instance in 1835, Pleasonton asked Winslow Lewis to 
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“reconsider the subject” and inform him if he could refit the lighthouse at Mobile Point 
for $500 less than Lewis’ original bid.92  
At least one historian of the Light-House Establishment has argued that 
Pleasonton took pride in returning funds to the Treasury, but this claim shows a general 
lack of understanding about government spending policies. 93 By law, any unspent 
appropriations must be returned to the Treasury.94 Much of the money Pleasonton 
returned to the surplus fund resulted from insufficient congressional appropriations. 
Pleasonton could not move forward on projects that were not adequately funded by 
Congress. Fifth Auditor returned the money to the Treasury, not because he was a penny-
pinching bureaucrat, but because he was forced to return it by law and Pleasonton saw it 
as his civic duty to follow the letter of the law.  
If Pleasonton is to be viewed as a shrewd penny-pinching bureaucrat, it is because 
Congress consistently failed to provide adequate appropriations for the Establishment. 
Pleasonton, however, repeatedly informed Congress of the need for additional 
appropriations. On December 19, 1823, for instance, Pleasonton noted that he could not 
accept Winslow Lewis’ proposal for the Fort Gratiot Lighthouse because the 
appropriations were “but $3,500.” Pleasonton went on to say, “An additional sum has 
been asked for, and when the appropriation shall be made, proposals will again be 
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invited.” 95 In December 1835, Pleasonton wrote to Joel B. Sutherland, Chairman  of the 
Committee of Commerce, noting “an appropriation was made at the last session of 
Congress of one thousand and fifty dollars, for placing buoys in Nanticoke, Wicomoco, 
and other rivers on Eastern Shore of Maryland,” but “that the sum of three thousand 
dollars more is desirable for the purpose of procuring additional buoys for the rivers; and 
a further sum of one thousand dollars to employ persons to take care of them.”96 
Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Pleasonton had to ask Congress for additional 
appropriations for the construction of the Carysfort Reef lighthouse in 1838.97 
The lack of sufficient funding for the Light-House Establishment did not limit 
itself to Pleasonton’s administration. Even before Pleasonton’s administration, Albert 
Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, was known to ask Congress for additional funding. 
On December 11, 1811, Gallatin informed Thomas Newton, Chairman of the Committee 
on Commerce, that extending an improvement recently adopted in the Boston area “to all 
the light houses…would however exceed the ordinary appropriations.” Gallatin 
continued, “Should it be thought proper to authorize the expense, nothing more will be 
necessary than to introduce an item to that effect in the general appropriation law.”98 In 
September 1819, the Treasury Department acknowledged the possibility of insufficient 
appropriations for a lighthouse at Long Island Head, but the Treasury Secretary declined 
“making any application to Congress for any deficiency in the appropriation.”99 
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In reality, any money Pleasonton saved because of his prudence was likely spent 
on unexpected expenses. It was impossible to predict when a beacon or pier might be 
destroyed by a storm and need to be replaced. These unexpected expenses had to come 
from the Light-House Establishment’s general appropriations and similar to the 
appropriations for specific projects, they were often inadequate. If Pleasonton’s prudence 
in managing his accounts is to be interpreted as pride, it is because Pleasonton prided 
himself on being a good civil servant, doing his civic duty and possibly on being able to 
cover these unexpected expenses without having to ask Congress for more money, not 
because he took pride in returning money to the Treasury. 
Although Pleasonton’s prudence is most evident in his frugal management of the 
Light-House Establishment, the Fifth Auditor was prudent in other aspects of his 
administration. For instance, Pleasonton was cautious about wasting resources and 
supplies. In November 1819, Pleasonton was cautious about letting Lewis reduce the 
number of lamps in certain lighthouses, even though Lewis’ reduction provided a better 
light. In a letter to the then Secretary of the Treasury, Pleasonton wrote that “I am of the 
opinion that a deduction should be made of the oil allowed Mr. Lewis of at least 5,000 
gallons; that he should be required to replace all the lamps originally fitted up, unless 
otherwise directed by the [local] Superintendent of the Light House.”100 In another 
instance, Pleasonton allowed Winslow Lewis to reuse some of the bricks from Benjamin 
																																								 																				
100 Pleasonton to William H. Crawford, November 13, 1819, RG 26, Entry 18, Vol. 5, 
213, NARA. 
202 
Henry Latrobe’s lighthouse on Frank’s Island when Lewis contracted to rebuild the 
beacon after Latrobe’s collapsed.101 
HONESTY (elimination of corruption) 
Closely related to prudence and civic duty is the republican value of honesty. 
American republicanism sought honest men to serve in and watch over government. One 
of the chief concerns was the elimination of corruption that naturally came with the 
power of governing. As the United States continued to industrialize, the vices of greed, 
power, and wealth began challenging the Jeffersonian value of honesty. In the early 
republic period, land speculators were among the most corrupt. They often lied to 
prospective landowners about the quality of the land and future amenities to sell the land 
a values higher than its real worth. According to Drew McCoy, Jefferson expressed some 
concern with the problem of land and the challenges the land speculators created for an 
ideal republic even though Jefferson’s vision for a virtuous republic was grounded in 
landownership.102 After the Civil War, corruption ran rampant in reconstructing the South 
and the expansion of the railroads. For instance, in a stock-for-votes exchange, the 
railroad industry’s Crédit Mobilier scandal reached to the highest levels of government 
implicating the Vice President of the United States along with several Senators and 
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Congressmen.103 Rampant corruption during reconstruction and the Gilded Age following 
the American Civil War finally buried the Jeffersonian ideal of a virtuous republic.104  
In 1828, Noah Webster defined corruption as “Depravity; wickedness; perversion 
or deterioration of moral principles; loss of purity or integrity.”105 At least one modern 
historian adds intent and purpose to Webster’s definition arguing corruption can be 
defined as an intentional act of dishonesty, usually with the purpose of achieving some 
sort of personal gain for the perpetrators.106 Aside from land speculation, corruption in 
the early United States usually resulted from large scale public investment in 
infrastructure projects.107 These large-scale infrastructure projects could range from 
canals and turnpikes to coastal defenses, lighthouses, public piers, and surveys; projects 
which involved commerce, engineering, innovation and the state through the 
government’s institutions of science. 
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, government officials feared 
corruption. They made it their civic duty to prevent corruption whenever possible. When 
fraud occurred, government officials sought to immediately remove the source of the 
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dishonest actions. The elimination of corruption was thus a chief factor in the state’s 
funding of practical science. As previously mentioned, Congressman Cushing accused 
the Coast Survey of spending millions of taxpayers’ dollars, without anything to show for 
it.108 Where were all the appropriations going? Congress initiated an investigation into 
the Coast Survey for possible fraudulent activity before it would authorize the coming 
year’s appropriations.109  
In his position as Fifth Auditor of the Treasury, Stephen Pleasonton spent his 
entire career combating corruption. Early in his tenure with the Treasury Department, 
Pleasonton refused to pay for work on a Grand River pier. In a letter to Thomas Foster, 
the regional customs agent for the Sandusky, Ohio area, Pleasonton noted his suspicions 
of fraud. The Grand River Harbor Company offered to sell one of its piers to the federal 
government. In anticipation of the purchase the Grand River Harbor Company hired 
Abraham Skinner to make repairs to the pier. The company sought to increase the value 
of its property so the company could ask a higher price for the structure. Skinner sought 
payment from the United States before the repairs were completed rather than from the 
Grand River Harbor Company. Pleasonton saw through the scheme informing Foster that 
the Grand River Harbor Company “expect[ed] the United States to buy it [the pier], 
probably at a high rate. This could not have been the intention of the law, and I cannot 
undertake to authorize any such measures.”110 
In another instance, Pleasonton reprimanded Winslow Lewis, one of the primary 
building contractors for the Light-House Establishment for poor workmanship at two 
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Florida lighthouses. Lewis won the contract to build the beacons at St. John’s River and 
St. Mark’s Island by underbidding all other contractors. In turn, Lewis subcontracted the 
job to a local builder who “committed so great a fraud,” in the workmanship of the 
buildings.111 In the original contract, Lewis had the “option to build the house either of 
brick or stone, but none to erect the walls of both materials.”112 Lewis’ subcontractor 
built both lighthouses of brick and stone against the protests of the regional 
superintendent. Pleasonton stated that in deviating from the specifications of the contract, 
Lewis “exonerated the United States from all obligations to receive the work [finished 
lighthouse] or to pay you one dollar for it.” Pleasonton was “determined in all cases 
where contractors make arbitrary alterations in executing work for the United States, 
under contracts, they shall be the sufferers.”113 After a lengthy correspondence on the 
subject, Lewis rebuilt both lighthouses at his own expense.114 In fact, Pleasonton closely 
watched all of Lewis’ contracts and corresponded regularly with Lewis on issues of 
fraudulent work performed by the contractor or his workers.115  
In January of 1842, Pleasonton questioned the unexpected increase in oil 
consumption at the two Erie, Pennsylvania lighthouses. In a letter to Charles W. Kelso, 
the regional superintendent of the lighthouses, Pleasonton demanded an explanation for 
the excessive oil usage, 
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Now on referring to your return for the year 1840, I find 
there was consumed at both the light houses and beacon, 
in that year, 364 gallons of oil, making it not quite 23 
gallons per lamp. How has such a difference arisen? Your 
letter affords no explanation,….It seems to me incredible 
that there should be a difference of eight gallons per lamp 
between the two years, or that 31 gallons per lamp could 
have been consumed, if the keepers had done their 
duty.116 
But that was not all. Pleasonton continued,  
And what appears to be equally strange, is that although 
you inform me you had suspended both lights, one on the 
18th and the other on the 25th December, neither of which 
can be relit before April, yet you inform me you had been 
under the necessity of purchasing forty-four gallons of oil 
for the present quarter and insert a sum of 73 06/100 
dollars in your estimate, to enable you to pay for it.117 
Clearly, Pleasonton had uncovered a fraud which most likely stemmed from Kelso or the 
keeper’s selling the oil to supplement their income. A similar instance occurred in 1829 
in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Pleasonton wrote to John P. Decatur, a recently 
appointed customs collector, telling Decatur not to hire a man named Godfrey as an 
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assistant keeper. According to Pleasonton, Godfrey had “embezzled oil and iron from one 
of the lighthouses.”118 
Pleasonton’s strong commitment to the eradication of corruption in the Light-
House Establishment is best demonstrated by the importation of the Fresnel lighthouse 
lens. In 1838, Congress responded to Lieutenant I.W. P. Lewis’s report on the Light-
House Establishment by authorizing the purchase of two French made Fresnel lighthouse 
lenses to be used on an experimental basis. If the lenses proved to be an improvement 
over the current system, Congress would authorize the purchase of additional lenses. To 
facilitate the purchase of the lenses, the Treasury Department commissioned Captain 
Matthew Calbraith Perry of the United States Navy to meet with Monsieur Lepaute, the 
French manufacturer of the Fresnel lens, and Léonor Fresnel.119 Perry was also to visit 
Britain and report on the state of the lighthouses there. Pleasonton authorized Perry’s 
expenses to be paid for by the Treasury through its agent General Lewis Cass. 
Perry completed his commission, yet he encountered difficulties in paying for the 
lenses. In a letter to his friend Eugene A. Vail a year after his assignment, Captain Perry 
complained of “General Cass communicating his determination not to comply with the 
request of Mr. Pleasonton in reference to the payments for the lenses manufactured by 
Mr. Lepaute.” Perry believed “Mr. Pleasanton has purposely thrown these difficulties in 
the way.”120 Scholars have cited this letter as evidence condemning Pleasonton, however, 
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the Fifth Auditor had nothing to do with General Cass’ refusal to pay Perry’s bills.121 
Perry did not submit his bills in accordance with the agreed upon contractual installment 
plan; a plan designed to prevent corruption in government transactions. As Pleasonton 
noted in his September 27, 1838 correspondence with Perry, “Although we do not make 
advances for work done at home, yet, in the case of these lenses, which are made by 
artists employed by the French Government, you will make such advances, from time to 
time, as may be necessary to secure a prompt and faithful execution of the work.”122 
General Cass followed protocol, a fact Perry acknowledged in his letter to Vail. “General 
Cass was undoubtedly right in declining a responsibility that might at some future time 
involve him in trouble.” Pleasonton, however, had no hand in the matter until later when 
he criticized Perry for “neglecting or declining” to fulfill the agreed upon arrangement.123 
Pleasonton admonished Perry, “Had you drawn bills for the different instalments [sic], 
stipulated to be paid Mr. Lepaute, agreeably to the arrangement made with this 
Office,…every difficulty and inconvenience would have been obviated.”124  In fact, 
Pleasonton hoped Perry would be able to speed up the purchase by procuring “the lens 
and apparatus already made for the French Government, paying them for it whatever sum 
the one you have contracted for will cost.” Pleasonton wanted to have the lenses sent over 
“in time to try it before the meeting of Congress, as their next session will be a short one, 
and I should be very glad to have something definite done in regard to our lighthouse 
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establishment before they adjorn.”125 Pleasonton remained faithful to his republican 
values of civic duty and the elimination of corruption. 
When Pleasonton learned of the difficulties created by Captain Perry, he wrote to 
General Cass and requested that Cass pay Monsieur Lepaute for the lenses. In making his 
request of Cass, Pleasonton stated very plainly the reasons for the difficulties. Perry, 
entered into a contract with Mr. Lepaute at Paris for the 
manufacture and delivery by him, at Havre, of two sets of 
Dioptic and Lenticular apparatus, with a lantern for 
Lighthouses, for which Mr. Lepaute was to be paid by 
installments in the manner described in the 
contract….Capt. Perry, on leaving Paris, made no 
provisions for paying these several installments to Mr. 
Lepaute, as they became due.126 
Perry was apparently too consumed with his naval duties in testing the new steam 
frigate Fulton to concern himself with properly securing the two Fresnel lenses. Perry 
admitted as much in a April 10, 1840 report to Congress when he claimed he was “deeply 
occupied with other official engagements.”127 Pleasonton’s tight-fisted and prudent fiscal 
policies, thus, must be viewed in the light of Jeffersonian values as the Fifth Auditor’s 
most effective weapon against greed and corruption, or the possibility thereof. Despite 
Pleasonton’s attempts to prevent corruption in the Light-House Establishment, his 
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Jeffersonian values were an obstacle to the individuals working with the Fifth Auditor. 
Pleasonton’s efforts at preventing corruption were greatly appreciated by his superiors 
and others concerned with the Light-House Establishment. For instance, in 1852, the 
Light-House Board noted, “great credit is due to the zeal and faithfulness of the present 
general superintendent, and to the spirit of economy which he has shown.”128 Walter 
Forward, the Secretary of the Treasury, found not fault in Pleasonton’s management of 
the Light-House Establishment. Forward wrote the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives that “defects in the system” and not the “mismanagement of the 
department,” were the root cause of any complaints against the Establishment.129 
Other historians have noted Perry’s mission, but have sided with Perry when he 
stated, “Mr. Pleasanton has purposely thrown these difficulties in the way.”130 These 
historians have ignored Pleasonton’s explanation that Perry failed to follow the proper 
procedures for procuring the lens. Pleasonton was simply doing his civic duty to prevent 
any possible corruption from occurring by making sure Captain Perry followed the 
Treasury’s protocol. 
SELF-RELIANCE (small domestic production) 
In addition to civic duty, prudence, and honesty, self-reliance played a significant 
role in technical labor and commercial products in the early United States. To 
Jeffersonians, the core value of self-reliance translated to domestic production by small 
artisan shops in the fields of innovation and practical science. As Jefferson noted in 1821,  
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the value of science to a republican people, the security it 
gives to liberty by enlightening the minds of citizens, the 
protection it affords against foreign power, the virtue it 
inculcates, the just emulation of the distinction it confers 
on nations foremost in it; in short, its identification with 
power, morals, order and happiness…these 
considerations are always present and bearing with their 
just weight.131 
 Hugo A. Meier argues Jefferson and his followers understood the United States would 
have to rely heavily on foreign science until the nation could establish its own scientific 
institutions and programs.132 According to Terry S. Reynolds, many of the engineering 
instructors were French.133 Ferdinand Hassler, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, was a 
Swiss mathematician. However, the state also expected that the reliance on foreign 
science would be brief and that America would be producing its own science and 
scientific identity before long. According to Merritt Roe Smith, by the 1850s, “the young 
republic had relinquished its abject dependency on European technology and no longer 
stood in awe of the Old World’s industrial prowess.”134  
Self-reliance also meant domestic production of the equipment used by the state’s 
scientific endeavors. Early in the Coast Survey’s history, Hassler travelled to Europe to 
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purchase all of the equipment used by the Survey. Hassler could not find high quality 
scientific instruments manufactured in the United States. When Hassler regained control 
of the Coast Survey in the early 1830s, he continued the practice of procuring the 
Survey’s scientific equipment abroad. Hassler also shipped the Coast Survey work abroad 
to be engraved for printing. Eventually, the Secretary of the Treasury, Levi Woodbury, 
informed Hassler on the necessity of using domestic producers and suppliers for the 
Survey’s needs. 
In reply to your letter of the 27th ultimo, asking 
permission to send abroad for Engravers to execute the 
Coast Survey Charts, I would observe, that it is deemed 
preferable by the President & myself, that you should 
make inquiry and employ engravers in this Country, for 
the Coast Survey work, if suitable ones can be obtained, 
And it should be only in the event of a failure to obtain 
such ones here, after a full inquiry, that persons should be 
obtained elsewhere.135 
The republican value of self-reliance was one of the primary concerns early in the 
history of the Light-House Establishment that prompted Congress to approve the 
purchase of Winslow Lewis’ patent lighthouse lamp and reflector system. As the editors 
of the Boston Gazette noted, “such inventions raise the character of a nation and 
essentially contribute to its real dignity and importance.”136 Lewis’ business was that of a 
mariner turned small artisan mechanic. Lewis was an entrepreneur, but in his nearly forty 
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years of supplying the Light-House Establishment with his patent lamps, he never 
employed more than a few  workmen. His lamps and reflectors were handmade one at a 
time as needed by the establishment. Lewis, thus was the embodiment of small artisan 
manufacturer desired by early republican values.137  
Self-reliance proved essential for ensuring prudence in the Light-House 
Establishment. Throughout his tenure as Superintendent of the Light-House 
Establishment, Pleasonton maintained Lewis’ domestically produced lamps and reflectors 
were both cheaper and superior to the apparatuses used in Britain and France.138 
Furthermore, Pleasonton argued the United States’ reliance on domestically produced 
spermaceti oil also realized the state a savings over colza oil used by France.139 
Yet there were some items the United States was simply unable to produce of 
high enough quality to protect the lives of mariners and the safety of commerce. Glass 
was one of those items. Although glass manufacturing was one of America’s first 
industries, production and quality were limited prior to the mid-nineteenth century. In 
1798 when Lewis first “discovered” the effect of placing a lens in front of a lamp, he 
“found that the Lenses Could Not be made in this Country.”140  
There are several reasons for the limited production and quality of American 
glass. First, as Steve W. Martin argues, American glass manufacturers, such as the 
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Boston & Sandwich Glass Company, used wood as their primary fuel for manufacturing 
glass until the second half of the nineteenth century when coal came into more common 
use.141 Wood does not burn as hot as coal. The lower intensity of heat from wood creates 
imperfections in the glass. The most common imperfections are bubbles.142 The French 
glass manufactories at Saint-Gobain experienced similar issues in the late eighteenth 
century according to industrial revolution historian John Raymond Harris.143 
The low heat from wood fired furnaces also caused American glass manufacturers 
to produce a thicker glass. For the lenses used in lighthouses, the thickness of American 
glass was a major concern. As Francis Ross Holland, Jr. points out, when Lewis used 
domestically produced glass, the glass had a greenish tint which diminished the brilliancy 
of the light.144 Presumably, the green tint of Lewis’ glass resulted from the iron oxides 
present in soda-lime. These oxides become more apparent with thicker glass made from 
soda-lime. 
The production and quality of American glass was also limited by the lack of 
skilled gaffers. A gaffer was a skilled master artisan who oversaw a team of glassmaking 
laborers. According to Brooke Hindle, most gaffers in the United States had to be brought 
over from Europe, while Arlene Palmer contends the most prominent gaffers in the 
eighteenth century United States were from Germany, including Caspar Wistar, John 
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Frederick Amelung, and Henry William Stiegel.145 Joan E. Kaiser notes English gaffers 
staffed the many Boston glassworks factories, but they too, experienced labor issues with 
high turnover and a lack of experienced gaffers.146 
Finally, glassmaking was an expensive venture. Many early American glass 
manufacturers fell victim to poor fiscal management. As one historian notes, prior to 
Deming Jarves’ acquisition of the New England Glass Company of East Cambridge in 
1817, “the company continually suffered from management problems and changed hands 
several times until it was ready to go under.”147 
For the reasons stated above, Lewis limited his use of American glass to inner and 
outer wick tubes.148 These tubes were responsible for providing the proper draft (air flow) 
to the wick to ensure the wick burned at an acceptable and uniform rate. Elsewhere, such 
as the plate glass windows in the lantern room, Lewis used “the best French plate 
glass.”149 Although the French experienced problems at Saint-Gobain in the late 
eighteenth century similar to the Americans, the French produced a higher quality glass 
than the Americans. The quality of French glass came from their longer duration of 
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experience in manufacturing glass at lower heat and their industrial espionage of the 
British glass manufacturing processes.150 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, a political battle was brewing over the control of the Light-House 
Establishment and science was at the heart of the arguments. Military officers, such as 
Blunt, Lewis, and later Lieutenants Richard Bache and Thornton A. Jenkins, used science 
to support their claims that the Light-House Establishment could be better managed by 
the military and the scientifically trained men who made up the military’s officer ranks. 
Although Pleasonton’s main defense was grounded in his republican beliefs, he too used 
science to support some of his arguments. For instance, according to Edmund Blunt, 
Pleasonton noted “the distance that each French light is visible,” and compared them to 
the distance at which each American light can be seen.151 Yet, the Blunt brothers argued 
that Pleasonton’s distances at which the American light could be seen were unrealistic. 
The Blunts noted, “the distance at which any object may be seen, or the limits of extreme 
visibility, is determined by the tigure [sic] of the earth; and it is demonstrably impossible 
for an observer at sea, at any attainable height, to discover lights at the distances he 
pretends.”152   
A similar battle had raged over the control of the Coast Survey since mid 1810s. 
Civilian and military leaders clashed over the who was best suited to manage the survey 
and science was at the forefront of the political conflict. Civilian science eventually won 
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out over the military in 1836. Diplomatic efforts of the Survey’s second superintendent in 
the 1840s smoothed the relationship between the Survey and the military. 
The republican values of civic duty, prudence, honesty and self-reliance did not 
exist in isolation from one another. They provided the foundation of American 
republicanism and created a sense of completeness for the citizen striving to help build 
the young nation. One could not be self-reliant without being prudent. One could not 
claim a sense of civic duty without honesty. One could not thrive in the new nation 
without the passion of holding these values as part of their being. Thus, these core 
republican values worked together as men of science sought to solve commercial and 
environmental problems while using practical science and the mechanical arts to secure 
the future of the republic. 
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CHAPTER 6 
STATE INVOLVEMENT IN INNOVATION AND KNOWLEDGE 
CONSTRUCTION 
The previous chapters have shown how commercial problems facilitated 
Americans’ engagement in practical science and innovation, how the environment 
necessitated the government’s interaction, the solutions the resulted from both the 
government and its citizens, and how the values of a republican society impacted the 
development of science and shaped the government’s involvement in the field. This 
chapter explores the government’s involvement in America’s early scientific ventures. 
What follows is an examination of government’s uneven acquiescence of its role in 
practical science and innovation. 
On October 23, 1770 the HMS Carysford ran aground a previously uncharted reef 
on the outer reaches of the Florida Keys.1 The HMS Carysford’s “discovery” of the shoal 
prompted the British Admiralty to add the underwater hazard to their nautical charts over 
the next five years.2 Despite the barrier’s inclusion on British maps, Carysfort Reef, as it 
was mistakenly named, remained physically unmarked for more than 50 years.3 It was 
only after the United States Light-House Establishment placed a floating lightship, the 
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Caesar, on the reef in 1826 that the shoal’s location become physically and visually 
marked for the first time.4  
The lightship, however, proved ineffective. A year after the Light-House 
Establishment stationed Caesar at the reef, the coral barrier claimed both the Spanish 
slave ship Guerrero and the British anti-slaver HBM Nimble. According to historian Gail 
Swanson, the signal from the lightship “had been too weak to warn where the dangerous 
reef was.”5 Additionally, hurricanes frequently blew Caesar off its moorings.6 As a 
result, the Light-House Establishment commissioned a second lightship, Florida, to 
replace Caesar in 1830. Although the lightship Florida fared better than Caesar in terms 
of longevity, it too proved inadequate for the intended purpose. In 1851, Thomas Budd, 
Captain of the U.S. Mail packet steamship Union noted the lightship at Carysfort Reef 
“shows two miserable lights, and does more harm than good.”7 That same year, 
Lieutenant David Dixon Porter remarked, “On the reef near Cape Largo, the floating 
lightship, showing two lights, intended to be seen twelve miles, but they are scarcely 
discernable from the outer ledge of Carysfort reef, which is from four to five miles 
distant. On two occasions, I have passed it at night, when the lights were either very dim 
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or not lighted.”8 Porter went on to acknowledge, “Five vessels have gone ashore on and 
about Carysfort reef since I have been running this route, all of them a total loss, and no 
doubt all of them deceived by the lightboat.”9 Historian Kraig Anderson claims 63 
vessels ran aground at Carysfort between 1833 and 1841 while the lightship Florida was 
stationed at the reef.10 
In 1837 Congress appropriated $20,000 for a more permanent light station at 
Carysfort Reef. The Light-House Establishment in turn commissioned Lieutenant I. W. P. 
Lewis of the Army Corps of Engineers to survey the reef, a practice that gradually 
became more common after the late 1830s.11 Lewis’ survey suggested three possible sites 
for the Carysfort beacon, but more importantly indicated the Congressional appropriation 
would be insufficient for the work that needed to be done. Stephen Pleasonton, the Fifth 
Auditor of the Treasury and Superintendent of the Light-House Establishment responded 
to the survey noting, “a further appropriation of 80,000 dollars,” was needed, but 
“doubted whether anything more will be appropriated this year.”12 
Congress made further appropriations for Carysfort in July 1838, but as 
Pleasonton remarked to one of his contractors, it was only “forty thousand instead of 
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eighty thousand dollars.”13 With the funds for the lighthouse still lacking, the Fifth 
Auditor was unable “to commence the work this season.”14 In 1847, ten years after 
Congress originally authorized the construction of the Carysfort Reef lighthouse, the 
legislative body finally appropriated sufficient funds to build the beacon.15 According to 
Michael J. Rhein, the federal government eventually spent $105,069.00 building the 
Carysfort light.16  
While awaiting further appropriations, Pleasonton solicited proposals for the 
construction of the Carysfort light. He settled on the design submitted by Lieutenant 
I.W.P. Lewis. Lewis’ plans incorporated a new construction technique known as a 
screwpile foundation. Alexander Mitchell, a blind Irish engineer, pioneered the screwpile 
technique in England earlier that year when he superintended the construction of the 
Maplin Sands lighthouse in the mudflats of the Thames Estuary. Prior to Mitchell’s 
innovation, most contractors constructed offshore foundations by driving piles into the 
ground. Mitchell premised his technique on the principles of a screw; attaching a coiled 
flange to the end of his piles and twisting them into the seafloor until they were securely 
anchored in the earth. Mitchell reasoned the spiral blades would hold more securely in 
the soft ocean bed than driven piles.17 
The iron piles used in constructing the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse represented the 
latest knowledge in innovation and practical science. They were manufactured in an iron 
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foundry at Philadelphia with such precision and exactness that any one section of the 
piles could be interchanged with any other section. The piles were then assembled in 
Philadelphia to ensure their universality before being shipped to the engineers and 
contractors building the lighthouse at Carysfort. Merritt Roe Smith, a historian of science 
and technology, argues the government’s involvement in interchangeable parts 
manufacturing began with assembling weapons for the Ordinance Department in 1823.18 
Thus, by the late 1840s, the government had more than twenty years of experience 
producing interchangeable parts. This experience represented the most advanced 
knowledge and innovation available at the time. 
In addition to the screwpile foundation, Lieutenant Lewis’ plan also called for the 
installation of a Fresnel lens, an optical apparatus invented by French civil engineer 
Augustin Jean Fresnel discussed in Chapter 4. Unfortunately for Lewis, the Fresnel lens 
purchased for the Carysfort Lighthouse was misplaced when it arrived in New York. The 
lens arrived in several crates that were not clearly marked. The customs agent in New 
York sold the crates at auction, only to find out later that it was the lens intended for 
Carysfort. By the time the government recovered the lens, it was too late. The Carysfort 
Reef lighthouse was already complete and operating with a different set of lenses.19 
Physically marking the shoal with a navigational beacon may have helped mariners 
visualize the boundaries of the coral reef, but charts and maps also needed to be updated 
with more accurate information. Numerous shipwrecks over the previous two decades at 
the site highlighted the necessity of having an accurate map of the area. (Anderson holds 
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the Carysfort Reef responsible for 20 percent of all Florida Keys shipwrecks in the 
1830s.)20 The federal government recognized physically marking the underwater hazard 
was not enough and ordered a survey of the site. Under the direction of Alexander Dallas 
Bache, Army Lieutenant James Totten completed the triangulation portion of the survey 
while civilian cartographer Isaac Hull Adams carried out the topographic survey at 
Carysfort.21 Totten and Adams completed their charting of the shoal in 1855. 
Marking the Carysfort Reef represented two things for the state. First, the 
Carysfort Reef Lighthouse was the culmination of the state’s expertise in innovation prior 
to the Civil War. The lighthouse showcased the latest innovations in engineering and the 
most current knowledge of practical science. Second, Carysfort also represented the 
collaborative efforts of the government’s most prolific scientific institutions in the first 
half of the nineteenth century – the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Survey, and the 
Light-House Establishment. While these institutions worked together previously on other 
projects prior to Carysfort, marking the Carysfort Reef was the one of the first 
infrastructure projects in which all three organizations came together for the common 
goal of protecting commerce and navigation. The triumvirate achieved this aim through 
innovation and scientific practice.  
This chapter chronicles the story of how the aforementioned government agencies 
interacted and constructed knowledge. These institutions were the United States’ leading 
scientific centers and at the forefront of the federal government’s involvement in 
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constructing knowledge in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Corps of 
Engineers, Coast Survey, and Light-House Establishment actively constructed, learned, 
and transmitted knowledge through their interactions with each other and their individual 
engagement in practical science and mechanical innovation along the nation’s coasts. 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The story of the triumvirate begins with institutional histories of government 
agencies. In 1889, Arnold Burges Johnson chronicled the history of the United States 
Lighthouse Service in The Modern Light-House Service. Johnson became Chief Clerk of 
the United States Light-House Board in 1869.22 Johnson completed the history of the 
Light-House Service in his spare time at the request of the International American 
Congress.23 His narrative is a broadly encompassing work that not only chronicles the 
administration and growth of the United States Light-House Establishment and Light-
House Board, but also provides a comparison with the lighthouses of other nations. 
Johnson includes the technical specifications for the construction of lighthouses and 
lightships and provides information on customs duties, tonnage, and other commercial 
statistics. It is the first comprehensive history of the Light-House Establishment and 
succeeding Light-House Board presented in a straightforward, unbiased, factual manner. 
In 1910, President William Howard Taft transferred the responsibilities of the Light-
House Board to a newly created civilian managed Lighthouse Bureau. He appointed 
George Rockwell Putnam the first Commissioner of the Bureau. Seven years after his 
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appointment, Putnam wrote the most comprehensive history of the Lighthouse Service (to 
that date) with Lighthouses and Lightships of the United States.24 Putnam’s narrative 
places American lighthouses in the realm of humanitarian work and provides an overly 
“general and rather non-technical” examination of the history and administration of the 
Service. Putnam’s study is divided geographically, which became a common trend in 
future histories of the Lighthouse Service. Despite its age, it remains one of the most 
cited references on American lighthouses.25 Putnam served as the Commissioner of the 
United States Lighthouse Bureau for 25 years from 1910 to 1935.26  
Government sanctioned histories of the Army Corps of Engineers began 
appearing in the 1970s. These narratives were based on the activities of the individual 
Corps districts and while they were written by government employees, each narrative is 
as unique as the work of each district. There is an attempt at standardization among these 
narratives. They present a factual history of the Corps with very little interpretation. 
Notable editions used in this study include Harold Kanarek’s Mid-Atlantic Engineers: A 
																																								 																				
24 George R. Putnam, Lighthouses and Lightships of the United States, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917). A brief note on the naming convention of the 
lighthouse agency in the United States. References to the Light-House Establishment 
usually refer to the period from 1789 to 1851 as this was the name officially referred to in 
correspondence by Stephen Pleasanton, the Fifth Auditor and Superintendent of 
Lighthouses. The Light-House Board refers to the period from 1851 to 1910. This is the 
official name given by Congress in the act that established the Board. The Lighthouse 
Service generally refers to the period from 1910 until 1939 when the agency was known 
as the Bureau of Lighthouses. Because Putnam’s narrative was written during this period, 
scholars often refer to the Lighthouse Service, however, Putnam’s study encompasses the 
entire history of the agency from its establishment under the Treasury Department in 
1789. After 1939, lighthouse came under the jurisdiction of the United States Coast 
Guard Service. Occasionally, scholars will use the Lighthouse Service to also refer to this 
period. 
25 Putnam. 
26 Judi Kearney, “George Rockwell Putnam, Commissioner, Bureau of Lighthouses,” 
Lighthouse Digest 20, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2011), 42. 
226 
History of the Baltimore District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1774-1974 (1975), 
Aubrey Parkman’s Army Engineers in New England: The Military and Civil Work of the 
Corps of Engineers (1978), and Henry E. Barber and Allen R. Gann’s A History of the 
Savannah District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1989). Frank N. Schubert’s The Nation 
Builders: A Sesquicentennial History of the Corps Topographical Engineers (1988) 
provides a brief, but informative history of the Corps’ short-lived topographical survey 
division.27 These government-sanctioned histories tended to look inward at the activities 
of the institutions under review rather than placing them in the context of social, political, 
and cultural events.  
About the same time the government began sanctioning the histories of the Army 
Corps of Engineers, mainstream historians began writing histories of government 
institutions. Francis Ross Holland, Jr’s America’s Lighthouses: Their Illustrated History 
since 1716 (1972) provided a much needed update to Putnam’s 1917 history of the 
United States Lighthouse Service. Todd Shallat’s Structures in the Stream (1994) 
examines the work of the Army Corps of Engineers in building breakwaters and clearing 
obstacles from the nation’s rivers and harbors. Hugh R. Slotten’s Patronage, Practice, 
and Culture of American Science (1994) explores the interrelationship of patronage, 
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politics, and science in nineteenth century government institutions.28 Newer studies of the 
United States Lighthouse Service, such as Elinor De Wire’s Guardians of the Lights 
(1995) and Dennis L. Noble’s Lighthouses and Keepers (1997) tend to focus more on 
individual lighthouses and their keepers rather than the institution.29 One of the most 
recent histories of a government agency is Mark R. Wilson’s study of the United States 
Quartermasters Corps during the American Civil War. The Business of Civil War: 
Military Mobilization and the State 1861- 1865 (2010) argues the North won the war 
between the states because the officers in charge of procuring the Army’s war supplies 
pieced together a system of highly functioning relationships between the government, 
suppliers, and labor production in a holdover of ideals based on Jeffersonian 
republicanism.30 
The issue with these institutional studies is the they examine the institutional 
structures in isolation of the other agencies. Thomas G. Manning’s U. S. Coast Survey vs. 
Navy Hydrographic Office (1988) is one exception. Manning looks at the long running 
political battle between the two government agencies regarding the role of civilians and 
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the military in state science.31 Unlike the existing narratives, this chapter seeks to 
highlight the interaction of the Army Corps of Engineers, Coast Survey, and the Light-
House Establishment rather than examining them in isolation. 
In addition to the institutional histories, this chapter engages the literature of 
knowledge construction. How knowledge was constructed in the United States in the first 
half of the nineteenth century has been a topic of interest for historians of science and 
technology since at least 1976 when Alexandra Oleson and Sanborn C. Brown published 
an edited volume of essays on The Pursuit of Knowledge in the Early American Republic. 
The Pursuit of Knowledge examined the influence of regional learned societies regarding 
the construction of knowledge in the United States prior to the American Civil War. 
Oleson argues these learned societies, “fostered the development of science and 
scholarship and provided invaluable communication links between the far-flung members 
of the young republic’s intellectual community.”32 Andrew J. Lewis’s more recent 
monograph, A Democracy of Facts (2011), contradicts Oleson’s claims arguing 
Americans generally mistrusted the knowledge constructed by learned men. In Lewis’ 
study of naturalists in the early American Republic, Lewis found natural philosophers did 
not achieve credibility with the general populace until after it became involved with the 
state.33 In between these two narratives, Eda Kranakis’ Constructing a Bridge and Ann 
Johnson’s essay “Material Experiments: Environmnet and Engineering Institutions in the 
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Early Republic,” focus more on the individuals constructing knowledge and the methods 
they used. Kranakis’s study of James Finley’s suspension bridge argues the construction 
of knowledge was shaped by both class and society. According to Kranakis, early 
Americans constructed knowledge through their experiences, but later adopted a hybrid 
method of experience and mathematical theory after the French attempted to build a 
version of Finley’s bridge across the River Seine.34 Johnson’s essay examines the work of 
Army Engineer Joseph G. Totten in constructing coastal defenses for the young nation. 
Johnson argues engineers constructed knowledge on the strength of materials using a 
“cookbook formula” of empirical research that led engineers to predicting how 
construction materials would react once they were part of a built infrastructure.35  
This study compliments the aforementioned works by examining government institutions 
as centers of knowledge construction. 
DEFINING THE STATE 
While my research studies the work of individuals, I consider individuals 
employed by the state to be a part of the state. I define “the state” as the agent of 
government. My definition of the state includes the federal, state, local municipalities, 
and the individuals in the employment of these entities. The actions and decisions of 
individuals employed by the state were not necessarily seen as being the work of the 
individual. Rather, these actions and decision, especially those by individuals in positions 
of authority, often became viewed by society as the actions, decisions, and policies of the 
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the government. Henry A. S. Dearborn’s and Samuel Harrison Smith’s decision not to 
adopt natural gas for use in the Light-House Establishment discussed later in this chapter 
provides an excellent of how individual actions become government policies. Dearborn 
was the Collector for the Port of New York and Smith was the Commissioner of 
Revenue. At the time of their decision to forego the adoption of natural gas lighting, the 
two individuals were in charge of managing the lighthouses in the region surrounding 
New York. 
TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS 
The government’s involvement in innovation and knowledge construction went 
through many trials and tribulations. Their involvement began with the new constitutional 
government. In just the ninth official act of Congress, passed on August 7, 1789, the 
federal government assumed responsibility for the safety of the nation’s commerce and 
navigation. The act provided for the: 
…support, maintenance and repairs of all lighthouses, 
beacons, buoys, and public piers erected, placed or sunk, 
before the passing of this act, at the entrance of, or within 
any bay, inlet, harbor or port of the United States, for 
rendering the navigation thereof easy and safe…36   
The passage of the act thrust the government into the realm of practical science for which 
it was ill-prepared. The federal government not only acquired the 12 lighthouses then in 
																																								 																				
36 United States Congress, An Act to Provide for the Establishment and Support of Light-
Houses, Beacons, and Buoys,” 1789, 1st Cong., 1st sess., ch. 9, sec. I, 1789. 
231 
existence, but also two beacons under construction; one in Massachusetts and one in 
Virginia.37  
Assuming responsibility for the nation’s navigational aids immediately invested 
the government with a need for practical knowledge of engineering and mechanical arts if 
it were to properly oversee the construction, maintenance and repairs of the aids as 
required by the new law. Although a few of the engineers who served in the Continental 
Army continued to serve the new government in various positions, as a whole, 
government employees and contractors lacked the practical knowledge and expertise 
needed for managing coastal navigation as the nation entered the nineteenth century. 
Europe earlier experienced a similar problem identifying proper expertise. As Eric H. 
Ash notes, “The rise of the expert and the development of the early modern state are 
parallel stories.”38 In his Power, Knowledge, and Expertise in Elizabethan England, Ash 
argues the the meanings of the word “expert” was undergoing a transformation from 
meaning experience to also include skill.  Ash claims it was this transformation that gave 
rise to expert mediators as the state sought expertise in the various areas of knowledge. 
Ash’s expert mediators were the go-betweens between the royal administrators and those 
who were experts in their fields of knowledge and scientific practice.39 Deborah Harkness 
makes a similar claim for Elizabethan London arguing it was the city of London that 
nurtured the development of the expert through its “minor vernacular figures and their 
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small successes, trial-and-error progresses, and mundane aspirations.”40 The author 
surmises these minor figures embraced the emerging empirical and print cultures 
available to them. In the fourth case study of her narrative, The Jewel House, Harkness 
examines “Big Science” in Elizabethan London and how the municipality sought out and 
vetted expertise knowledge.41 Across the English Channel, the French were equally 
seeking out expert knowledge. Chandra Mukerji’s Impossible Engineering examines the 
search for engineering expertise in building the Canal du Midi in the late seventeenth 
century. Mukerji argues the learned men and so-called engineering experts were unable 
to solve the problem of getting water to flow up the mountains without the expertise of 
local female peasants who lived and worked with the water on a daily basis.42 
INITIAL INVOLVEMENT 
Between 1789 and the turn of the century, the federal government finished the 
Portland Head and Cape Henry lights. In Portland, the government contracted with stone 
masons Jonathan Bryant and John Nichols. Bryant and Nichols used local rubblestone to 
build the Portland Head Light, employing teams of oxen to haul the rubblestone more 
than six miles overland to the construction site near Cape Elizabeth. Initially, the 
government contracted with Bryant and Nichols for a fifty-eight-foot tower. As the tower 
neared the expected height, however, everyone involved with the project realized the 
light’s focal plane would not be tall enough to provide an adequate aid to navigation. The 
area’s frequent heavy fogs diminished visibility as the clouds lifted off the ocean along 
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Cape Elizabeth’s rocky coast. Public officials worked with the contractors on altering the 
original plans for the lighthouse. They increased the height of the Portland Head Light to 
72 feet with a focal plane of 101 feet above sea level.43 
Construction on the Cape Henry lighthouse at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay 
also experienced problems which public officials and contractors failed to anticipate. The 
federal government contracted with John McComb, Jr., a bricklayer from New York, to 
complete the lighthouse started by the Virginia Commonwealth at Cape Henry. 
McComb’s contract called for a foundation 13 feet deep, but the instability of the cape’s 
sandy ground forced McComb to alter the plans. At one point, after McComb had cleared 
the area for the foundation, the wind whipped up the sand and deposited fifty cartloads of 
the coastal ground cover over McComb’s work. In the end, McComb added seven feet to 
the depth of the foundation to compensate for the instability of the sandy shore.44 
Although the government contractors ran into unforeseen problems when building 
the Portland Head and Cape Henry lights, the projects were ultimately successes. Not 
only did both structures provide protection for the safety of commerce and navigation for 
many decades, those involved with the projects also gained valuable knowledge in the 
fields of engineering and natural philosophy. The successful completion of the Portland 
Head and Cape Henry lights gave ship owners, merchants, and mariners something to 
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FAILURE AT FRANK’S ISLAND 
The issues at the Portland Head and Cape Henry, however, were minor in 
comparison to the problems the government experienced in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century at the Frank’s Island lighthouse near the mouth of the Mississippi 
River. Within three years of securing the Louisiana Purchase from France, Congress 
authorized the construction of a lighted beacon to mark the entrance of the Mississippi 
River.45 Gallatin initially inquired of Barthelemy Lafon, a local architect and surveyor, to 
draw up plans for the Frank’s Island light. Gallatin, however, found Lafon’s plan 
unacceptable and commissioned Benjamin Latrobe, the Surveyor of the Public Buildings, 
for a proposal. Latrobe was the United States’ leading architect and engineer at the time. 
Latrobe studied engineering and architecture in England under the famed John Smeaton 
and Samuel Pepys Cockrell, respectively. 
From the outset, the proposal for a lighthouse at the mouth of the Mississippi 
River was fraught with problems. To begin with, the government took 12 years to adopt a 
plan for the lighthouse. According to architectural historian Michael W. Fazio, Latrobe 
submitted four proposals between 1805 and 1817. Latrobe’s first design was very 
utilitarian. The plan called for a simple octagonal stone tower similar to the beacon at 
Sandy Hook New Jersey.46 Latrobe’s estimate for the building was $20,000.47 
Latrobe’s first proposal also incorporated engineering methods he had previously 
used in constructing the Bank of Philadelphia, which “spread the weight over the whole 
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surface covered equally.”48 Gallatin, however, questioned Latrobe’s expertise, fearing the 
“the top of the pyramid would bend, in heavy storms.”49 The Treasury Secretary asked 
Latrobe to “dispel [his] fear of the bending,” before he solicited construction bids “in 
conformity with [the] plan.”50 Latrobe dispelled Gallatin’s fears by engineering a 
structural innovation that allowed the tower to act monolithically. Fazio explains 
Latrobe’s method as a reinterpretation of “Smeaton’s achievement [interlocking stone 
joints] at Eddystone,” by “bond[ing]the courses of stone at intervals by means of the 
individual units of the spiral staircase extended ‘thro’ the wall from inside to outside.’” 
According to Fazio, Latrobe’s innovation significantly reduced the structure’s mass, 
“allowed the masonry cross-sections to act monolithically,” and integrated “internal 
spaces and structure into a single system.”51  
Second, while the potential bending of the tower was a concern for the Gallatin, 
congressional leaders, and other government officials, it proved minor in comparison to 
the ground upon which the lighthouse was built. The mouth of the Mississippi was (and 
still is) an alluvial delta. The soft, muddy ground made the weight of the structure much 
more important than its height. Concern over the alluvial soil’s suitability slowed the 
process of erecting a beacon at the mouth of the Mississippi River. Gallatin 
commissioned Latrobe’s assistant, Lewis De Mun to survey the mouth of the Mississippi 
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River.52 De Mun took soil samples of three possible sites and visually analyzed them for 
their content and suitability. De Mun’s survey determined the alluvial soil was mostly 
made up of clay. He then issued his report to Latrobe and the Treasury Department with 
his recommendation for building the lighthouse on Royal Island to the west of the 
Southwest Pass of the Mississippi River.53 Latrobe seconded the recommendation solely 
on De Mun’s report, telling Gallatin “the deeper you dig, the harder it [the soil] 
becomes.” Latrobe also claimed the clay soil “is perfectly watertight.”54 Latrobe, 
however, never personally inspected any of De Mun’s three sites in making his 
recommendation. Years later, Latrobe noted in his journal, “these old islands consist of a 
hard blue Clay from the surface to a depth of 45 feet.”55 
In the interim, Latrobe’s redesigned the lighthouse. According to Fazio, the new 
design incorporated several architectural innovations that surpassed the brilliance of 
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Smeaton’s work and transcended anything yet seen in European engineering, practice or 
theory.56 Yet, the final design also abandoned the simplicity and frugality of Latrobe’s 
original proposal. Recognizing the future importance of New Orleans as an entrepôt to 
the world, Latrobe’s last proposal intended to showcase the grandeur of the new nation. 
Latrobe’s latest vision included arches, columns, an elegant piazza, and marble stairs 
imitating the style of the ancient Greeks.57 
Although Latrobe found the the alluvial soil suitable for his design few others 
agreed. Over the next several years, the Treasury Department advertised for bids to 
construct the beacon according to Latrobe’s plans, but it received no offers. Fazio claims 
this was mostly Latrobe’s fault. Latrobe wanted to circumvent the federal government’s 
bidding process and hand-pick his own contractor. In soliciting bids, Latrobe wrote a 
very technical and complex advertisement which he knew few contractors would be 
willing to undertake. An excerpt of Latrobe’s advertisement read: 
…The buttress walls (which must be founded upon 
sprayed arches (sic) turned on a brick wall erected on the 
rim of a smaller inversed Cupola turned within the larger 
one) to be united with each revolution of the stairs, by 
brick splayed arches forming the well of the staircase and 
extending to the external wall of the tower; and on the 
crown of those splayed arches, reverse arches must be 
turned, the reverse feet of which support the buttresses 
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above. These arches forming a succession of recesses 
rising with the spiral line of the steps will continue to the 
elevation of fifty feet;…58 
Carter et als., believe the lack of interest in contracting for the lighthouse lie in the 
unfamiliar environment of the Gulf coast.59 In either case, contracting issues stalled the 
government’s progress for seven years before the War of 1812 delayed the construction 
further. 
After the War of 1812 ended, the Treasury Department commissioned another 
survey of the mouth of the Mississippi River under the direction of United States Navy 
Commodore Daniel Patterson, Benjamin Henry Latrobe’s eldest son Henry Sellon 
Boneval Latrobe, and the customs collector for the state of Louisiana, Pierre LeBarbier 
Duplessis, Jr. Similar to De Mun’s earlier survey, the 1816 survey found the clay soil got 
harder the deeper they surveyors dug. After digging to a depth of fifty feet at several 
sites, Patterson, Latrobe, and Duplessis found the soil on Frank’s Island “the most solid 
of all those in the neighborhood, and even more so than that selected by Mr. De Munn 
[sic].”60 
At the conclusion of the survey, the Treasury prodded Winslow Lewis, into 
bidding on the project. As previously mentioned in earlier chapters, Lewis contracted 
with the Light-House Establishment to fit up all the lighthouses with his patented lamp 
and reflector system. He also contracted with the government to deliver the annual supply 
of spermaceti oil to each lighthouse. While fitting up the navigational aids with his 
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patented lamp and reflector system, Lewis made minor repairs to the lighthouses. Lewis, 
however, had never built a complete lighthouse. Similar to the others who refused to bid 
on the project, Lewis recognized the inherent problems with Latrobe’s design and 
adamantly refused to be held accountable for the foundation’s failure if he undertook the 
contract. 
Despite the federal government’s careful approach to the construction of the 
Frank’s Island lighthouse by commissioning two surveys, building the lighthouse at 
Frank’s Island proved to be one of the young republic’s biggest failures regarding coastal 
navigation. Government officials made two fatal decisions. First, on the advice of 
Patterson, the younger Latrobe, and Duplessis, the government selected Frank’s Island on 
the Northeast Pass, for the lighthouse’s construction.61 De Mun originally recommended 
Royal Island, but noted that all three sites he surveyed, including Frank’s Island, were 
suitable for building the elder Latrobe’s simplistic tower. Over the course of planning for 
the lighthouse, the design changed several times. With each new design, the architecture 
of the lighthouse grew more elaborate and the weight of the structure increased 
significantly. De Mun could not have anticipated the new design and therefore his survey 
provided no assurances of the soil’s suitability beyond the original plan for a simple 
tower. The survey by Patterson, Latrobe, and Duplessis took the revised plans into 
consideration when recommending Frank’s Island. As noted in a letter to Samuel H. 
Smith, the Commissioner of the Revenue, Patterson, Latrobe and Duplessis stated, “it is 
our opinion that a building may be erected of the heaviest materials.” The three surveyors 
understood the government’s “decided preference would be given to a stone or brick 
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building.” They included their own plan, presumably drawn by Henry Latrobe, “to be 
built principally of the latter materials.”62 
This brings up the second, more fatal decision made by the Treasury. Treasury 
officials accepted the design submitted by Henry Latrobe. Similar to the senior Latrobe’s 
last proposal, Henry’s design was quite elaborate. The younger Latrobe incorporated 
several of his father’s features into the design including the integration of the tower 
resting atop the keeper’s house and a wraparound cast-iron column supported piazza. The 
elder Latrobe praised his son’s work as doing him “infinite credit,” and noting that 
“Smeaton himself could have designed nothing of better construction.”63  
Unfortunately, Henry Latrobe succumbed to yellow fever in 1817 a year after he 
submitted his design for the Frank’s Island light and a year before Winslow Lewis and 
his contractors began construction on the lighthouse. Henry’s father became the point of 
contact for any questions relating to the plans for the lighthouse. The elder Latrobe was 
already in New Orleans simultaneously working on the city’s water supply with his other 
son, Benjamin Henry Latrobe II during the lighthouse’s early construction. The senior 
Latrobe inspected the lighthouse in 1819 while it was still under construction and claimed 
the work was “faithfully executed & of good materials.”64 Fazio, however, argues the 
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senior Latrobe never inspected the piles underneath the lighthouse. If he had, the elder 
Latrobe would have known the piles were improperly constructed and not watertight.65  
Even before construction was finished, the beacon’s foundation settled sixteen 
inches. Latrobe found this settling harmless because the foundation had not cracked and 
the settling was uniform.66 Eventually, however, the foundation did crack under the 
massive weight of the structure. As the foundation gave way, the lighthouse sunk into the 
soft alluvial soil and collapsed entirely. The Treasury Department commissioned an 
inspection of the wreckage to determine its salvageability. Various inspections between 
April 1820 and March 1821 gave conflicting reports. The first expressed optimism of 
rebuilding the tower with guidance from Latrobe. This option ultimately proved 
unattainable. Similar to his son Henry, Benjamin Latrobe succumbed to yellow fever in 
September 1820 while inspectors were continuing their assessment of the collapse. The 
second inspection, conducted by Major Joseph Jenkins deemed the repairs too costly, 
having already spent 15 years and $85,000 constructing the light.67  
Mr. Ruddock, a civil engineer from Carolina who happened to be in New Orleans 
at the time, unofficially conducted a third inspection. What possessed Ruddock to inspect 
the lighthouse remains a mystery. The government did not commission his opinion, 
having already received two reports from other qualified engineers. Fazio says, Ruddock 
claimed, “had I not have seen the necessity of interfering in this business, never should I 
have run myself into the trouble, expense, and hazards, that I on this account have 
																																								 																				
65 Fazio, 244. 
66 Carter, 287n. 
67 Fazio, 232, 245. 
242 
done.”68 Fazio claims Ruddock was the only engineer to inspect the pile foundation and 
takes soil samples from below the lighthouse.  
Patterson, Latrobe, and Duplessis took soil samples “to the depth of fifty feet” and 
similar to De Mun’s survey, found the clay “grew gradually harder as we descended.”69 
Ruddock’s inspection noted the clay “weighed 95 lbs. to the cubic foot,” but also that the 
island was being inundated by water from below; a fact that seems to be confirmed by the 
elder Latrobe’s visit in April 1819 when he acknowledge the erosion on the island.70 
When Ruddock “thrust a pole two inches in diameter, down among the pilings, ten feet 
deep…and drew the same out again…the water, immediately rose within two inches, of 
the top of the ground, being 4 feet above high water.”71 According to Ruddock, the 
contractors had failed to fill the piled timbers with “shells or solid materials” as called for 
by the contract which would have prevented the water from undermining the structure. 
Ruddock also claimed the workmen “removed the scaffold poles too soon, before the 
work had got properly dry, and consolidated together.” Ruddock further noted, “the 
arches were not sprung, in a proper manner” and the “walls were carried up too high.”72 
The consequence of this poor workmanship, according to Ruddock, was the weight of the 
structure proved too heavy for the foundation and the supports. 
Ruddock and others were quick to blame Lewis and his subcontractors for the 
failure at Frank’s Island. Given some of Lewis’ other shady dealings with the Light-
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House Establishment, historians have been too eager to follow suit.73 While criticism of 
Lewis’ workmanship is certainly warranted, pointing fingers and placing blame does not 
address the more important question of why the government proceeded to carry out the 
project over the concerns of qualified contractors. The fact the Treasury commissioned 
two separate surveys eleven years apart before attempting to build the lighthouse at the 
mouth of the Mississippi River demonstrates the extent to which government officials 
learned from the experience constructing the Cape Henry light at the mouth of the 
Chesapeake Bay. Building the light at Cape Henry informed government officials of the 
environment’s impact on construction. From that point forward, surveys would be a 
regular aspect of constructing aids to navigation. On the other hand, that the Treasury 
proceeded to carry out Latrobe’s plan over the objections of the contractors shows the 
government still had much to learn and that it was still somewhat unprepared for its role 
in practical science. That no contractor was willing to undertake Latrobe’s project should 
have raised concern with the Treasury Department, but it did not. Additionally, Lewis’ 
refusal to be held accountable if the foundation failed should have held sway with 
government officials, but the government likewise passed on its obligation to consider the 
knowledge presented. 
Two important questions arise out of the failure at Frank’s Island. First, why did 
the Treasury reject the plan by Barthelemy Lafon? Lafon was a former United States 
Army Engineer, architect, cartographer, local city planner, and surveyor.74 Presumably, 
Lafon knew the area much better than the federal government’s surveyors, engineers, and 
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contractors. As Fazio notes, Lafon’s 1806 and 1813 maps of Louisiana and the 
Mississippi delta were the primary sources of information on the area prior to the 1838 
chart made by Andrew Tabott.75 Second, why did the government proceed with the 
construction of the Frank’s Island light when no contractor, including Winslow Lewis, 
was willing to stake their name on the project’s foundation? The first question can easily 
be addressed. The second requires a deeper analysis. 
ANALYZING THE GOVERNMENT’S DECISION 
 Lafon’s plan provided for a square wooden tower built on a truncated pyramid 
base. Lafon recommended building the structure of local cypress timbers for their 
strength and resistance to decay.76 Frank’s Island Lighthouse historian Jay Riedl implies 
the government rejected Lafon’s plan because it was not monumental enough.77 This 
implication is problematic. While Lafon’s plan may not have met requirements of being a 
monument, neither did Latrobe’s first design.78 Rather it seems the Treasury rejected 
Lafon’s plan for a variety of cultural reasons. First, Lafon was a Creole with a French 
heritage.79 Given the prevailing attitudes about race in the early nineteenth century, it 
seems likely Treasury officials dismissed Lafon’s plan as unsuitable because of Lafon’s 
status as a Creole. Although there is no direct evidence that race played a factor in the 
Treasury’s decision, Creoles were often considered inferior because of their non-
European heritage. Creoles were therefore believed to be less capable of producing tracts 
of a knowledgeable character. 
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The Treasury Department may also have rejected Lafon’s design because of his 
French heritage and education. Fazio also implies the government wanted to announce 
the elimination of the French from the Mississippi Valley. With the United States having 
recently acquired the Louisiana Purchase from the French, constructing a monument 
designed by a French Creole ran counter to the federal government’s vision for the area.80 
Additionally, Lafon used French theoretical methods in engineering his cypress tower.81 
In the early nineteenth century, engineering in the United States tended to follow the 
British method of tried and true practical experience rather than using mathematical 
theory.82 
Lastly, and perhaps equally probable, the Treasury Department may not have 
trusted Lafon’s design based on the engineer’s personal character. As early as 1802, 
Lafon engaged in illicit privateering and was a close associate of the pirate Jean Lafitte.83 
By late 1814, a grand jury indicted Lafon for his illicit acts of piracy against the Spanish. 
While this indictment came almost a decade after Treasury officials dismissed Lafon’s 
plan for the lighthouse, historian William C. Davis indicates the government was aware 
of Lafon’s illegal activities much earlier.84 Compounding the issue of Lafon’s personal 
character was the fact that Lafon’s son, Thomy Lafon, was a mulatto.85 If Barthelemy’s 
status as a Creole was not enough to concern the government, his intimacy with a negro 
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woman most certainly flew in the face of what was publicly acceptable in the early 
decades of the nineteenth century. 
Despite Lafon’s status as a Creole and his personal character, Lafon’s knowledge 
and design for a lighthouse at the mouth of the Mississippi River should not be disputed. 
As Jim Frasier notes, Lafon constructed several buildings in New Orleans including the 
Pedesclaux-Le Monnier House.  Originally designed as a one residence, later architects 
have added three additional stories to the Pedesclaux-Le Monnier House attesting to the 
quality of Lafon’s knowledge and original plan.86 
This leads to the second question. Why did the government proceed with 
executing Henry Latrobe’s plan for the Frank’s Island lighthouse against the objections of 
qualified contractors? This question requires a deeper analysis of the government’s 
values. Economics undoubtedly played a major factor in the decision to proceed with the 
project. Since colonial times, the mouth of the Mississippi River had been known as an 
important point of entry into the interior of the continent. The federal government 
envisioned New Orleans as a major entrepôt that could aid in the nation’s westward 
expansion and economic growth.87 The government wished to provide safety for vessels 
sailing through the various passages of the Mississippi delta and the surrounding islands. 
The interest in commerce appears to have trumped all other concerns. As Patterson, 
Latrobe, and Duplessis noted, “vessels can stand close in with the land without any 
danger, and the distance between that and the northeast pass being small, the light would 
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be very perceptible, and enable them to run in with confidence to a good anchorage off 
the bar.”88 Additionally, the mouth of the Mississippi frequently experienced heavy fogs, 
which mandated the presence of a light for the safety of vessels. 89 Frank’s Island, thus 
“unite[d] all the advantages that can be obtained here.”90 
Aside from the commercial interests, however, it appears the Treasury 
Department also highly valued the knowledge of professional engineers and men of 
science. In the mid-1810s when the surveys were conducted, the federal government 
remained in want of knowledge of the natural world. They turned to those who were well 
respected for their knowledge in similar areas of natural philosophy and the mechanical 
arts. Evidence extracted from the second state-sponsored survey seemed to confirm the 
findings of the first survey completed 11 years earlier and validate Latrobe’s claims. 
Furthermore, Latrobe’s track record with the Virginia State Penitentiary, Bank of 
Philadelphia, and United States Capital Building undoubtedly held great sway with 
Treasury officials in accepting Latrobe’s opinions being the best available. Thus, in the 
eyes of the government, the opinions of Latrobe, De Mun and Patterson were more 
informed than those of Lafon and Lewis. The Treasury Department had little reason to 
doubt the opinions of their most trusted scientific minds. 
THE DEBATE OVER NATURAL GAS LIGHTING 
If Winslow Lewis’ opinion did not hold promise with the government in regards 
to the Frank’s Island Light, the contractor held great sway with the Treasury Department 
and the regional lighthouse superintendents in terms of lighting the coastal beacons. In 
																																								 																				




1816, David Melville of Rhode Island, approached the Light-House Establishment about 
using natural gas as a source for lighting the nation’s lighthouses. Melville spoke with 
Lewis about introducing natural gas lighting into coastal beacons one evening and Lewis 
promised to raise the issue with Pleasonton the next time he was in Washington. Lewis, 
however, failed to follow through on his promise. Being the primary contractor for 
supplying the Light-House Establishment with its annual supply of spermaceti oil, Lewis 
was adamantly opposed to Melville’s assertion that natural gas provided a brighter light 
because it was a direct financial threat to his own contracts with the government.91  
Melville had to attend business in Washington as a designated representative of 
the electorate for Rhode Island in that year’s presidential election. While in the District of 
Columbia, Melville argued natural gas would eliminate many of the problems associated 
the illumination in American lighthouses such as the condensation of humid air, the high 
cost of oil, and the need to warm winter pressed oil to a liquid state for continuous 
burning.92 Additionally, Melville claimed natural gas produced an “increased and more 
certain light,” than the best spermaceti oil then in use by the Establishment.93 Melville 
secured permission to conduct an experiment with natural gas for one year at the 
Newport, Rhode Island Lighthouse.94 Lewis was forced to rescind his contract for 
																																								 																				
91 David Melville, An exposé of facts…relating to the conduct of Winslow 
Lewis…addressed to the Hon. The Secretary of the Treasury, (Providence, RI: Miller & 
Hutchins, 1819), 7, PRHC, no. 470. HAG. 
92 Ibid., 7. 
93 Ibid., 7. 
94 Ibid., 5. S. H. Smith to Winslow Lewis, October 19, 1818, RG 26, Entry 18, Vol. 5, 94, 
NARA. 
249 
supplying oil to the Newport Light, under the auspices that failure to do so would look 
badly upon him.95  
Despite giving up the Newport light for a year, Lewis continued his fight against 
Melville’s experiment. Lewis suggested to Melville that he might profit more 
handsomely if the Newport native produced a failure in the experiment. Lewis believed 
the Nantucket oil manufacturers would compensate Melville to the tune of $10,000 if 
Melville’s experiment failed.96 Melville, however, refused to be a part of Lewis’ 
underhanded scheme. Lewis then took a different route. Lewis wrote to Samuel H. Smith, 
the Commissioner of Revenue and Henry A. S. Dearborn, the regional superintendent 
who oversaw the Newport Light, that natural gas was unpredictable and dangerous. As 
representatives of the state, Smith and Dearborn accepted Lewis’ opinion as more 
knowledgeable than Melville’s and when the year on Melville’s experiment expired, the 
government chose not to adopt natural gas for wider use throughout the Establishment. 
WAXING AND WANING STATE INVOLVEMENT 
Although navigation was one of the principle sciences in the early nineteenth 
century United States, it was not the only area in which the government engaged in 
scientific practice. The federal government also engaged in innovation and practical 
science in the areas of communication, defense, infrastructure, and surveying. As the 
government learned from its early trials and tribulations, its involvement in innovation 
and scientific practice began to improve. By the late 1830s, Army Engineers such as 
Colonel Joseph G. Totten, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel James Kearney, Major William 
Turnbull, Lieutenant Robert E. Lee, and Lieutenant Joseph Mansfield had made a name 
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for themselves constructing coastal defenses and canals and assisting with other national 
public works projects.97 The Coast Survey produced its first chart of Bridgeport Harbor.98 
The Light-House Establishment had experimented with  numerous lamps, lenses, fuels, 
and other apparatuses for use in coastal navigation.99 And Congress had established the 
Bureau of Weights and Measures for regulating the nation’s standards of measurement.100 
Historian Hugh Slotten argues with the establishment of the Bureau of Weights and 
Measures, Congress recognized the scientific connection between the standardization of 
weights and measures and the Coast Survey. This realization led Congress to reappoint 
Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler as the Superintendent of the Coast Survey.101 In 1818, 
Congress removed the Coast Survey from Hassler’s oversight arguing the work was “too 
expensive and too slow” under civilian management. Congress felt the Navy could do the 
work more efficiently, but this proved incorrect.102 
Despite these advances, the federal government still failed to fully embrace 
existing innovations that could benefit the public good. For instance, on March 10, 1837, 
at the request of Congress, Levi Woodbury, Secretary of the United States Treasury 
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Department, sent a “circular to certain Collectors of Customs, Commanders of Revenue 
Cutters, and other persons” possessing knowledge of telegraphic science “with the view 
of procuring from the most intelligent sources such information as would enable 
Congress, as well as the Department, to decide on the propriety of establishing a system 
of telegraphs for the United States.”103 The telegraph in which Woodbury inquired was a 
visual telegraph that required a line of site between the signalers and receivers. Messages 
were transmitted, or “telegraphed,” through a series of flags, banners, and colored balls. 
Once the signal was received by a station, the message was then retransmitted to the next 
station down the line. Some historians have called this the “pre-telegraph” to distinguish 
it from Samuel F. B. Morse’s electromagnetic telegraph, but this designation is 
ahistorical.104 In the nineteenth century, the telegraph simply referred to any system 
relaying messages, with or without electricity. Although a few of the respondents to 
Woodbury’s inquiry mentioned the electromagnetic telegraph being tested by Samuel F. 
B. Morse, the predominant systems then in operation were those employing a semaphoric 
code. 
DEBATING THE TELEGRAPH 
Captain David Porter, Sr. proved the utility of the semaphoric telegraph in 
America several decades earlier when he erected a flagstaff on Baltimore’s Federal Hill 
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in 1796 to communicate the arrival of ships into port.105 Local merchants subscribed to 
Porter’s telegraph service for $2.50 per annum and in return received a private signal flag 
assigned to their specific ship.106 As a ship approached the port, the ship’s crew raised the 
merchant’s private colors for Porter’s observatory to see. Porter, or his observer, would 
then fly the private flag from the observatory to communicate the ship’s arrival to the 
docks. These private signals kept the system local. Unless the merchant purchased extra 
flags and subscribed to the telegraph service in other ports, the private signal was only 
relevant to the merchant’s home port. 
In addition to the private signal flags, Porter’s system also utilized a series of 
generic flags, banners and balls.107 Porter reported the arrival of foreign vessels, non-
subscribing ships, and news from the sea using these non-descript symbols. For example, 
Porter raised a “pendant” when a brig approached and a burgee, a short wide swallow-
tailed triangle triangle, signal the arrival of a topsail schooner.108 Porter’s signals were 
likely based on telegraphic systems he encountered in his 20-plus years at sea. After the 
American Revolution Porter captained the United States Revenue Cutter Active, where he 
frequently interacted with French and British naval officers.109 Additionally, Porter 
frequently sailed as a private shipmaster to the Caribbean, where marine observatories 
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had existed since at least the mid 1500s.110 A marine observatory was a land based station 
that communicated with ships either passing at sea or arriving in port. The structure of the 
marine observatory station could range from a single flagstaff from which the signals 
were flown to lookout tower with many of the observatories sitting under a cupola atop a 
port’s merchant exchange building. 
Eleven years after Porter established his marine observatory, merchants and city 
officials in Portland, Maine authorized Captain Lemuel Moody to erect a similar system 
to benefit commerce and spurn economic growth of the local community. Moody used 
Porter’s system as a basis for his own, but he added colored balls to the flags and banners 
used to communicate non-subscribing ships and other news. This addition continued the 
“Americanization” of the marine telegraph. Other ports followed. Savannah established a 
signal line running from the Tybee Island lighthouse to the city docks by 1812.111 New 
York adopted the optical telegraphic system of Captain Samuel C. Reid in 1821 and Key 
West began announcing port arrivals in 1829.112 By the 1830s, marine telegraphs were 
																																								 																				
110 Alejandro de la Fuente, Havana and the Atlantic World in the Sixteenth Century, 
(Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2011), 1. 
111 “Lamentable,” City Gazette and Commercial Daily Advertiser (Charleston, SC), 
October 5, 1812, 3. 
112 Samuel Reid to Levi Woodbury, April 1837 in H. Doc. 15. “New Telegraph,” New 
York Spectator (June 29, 1821), 2. Robert Greenhalgh Albion, The Rise of New York 
Port, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1939), 217.  “From the Key West Register,” 
Eastern Argus (Portland, ME), February 24, 1829, 2. “Shipping Intelligence,” Eastern 
Argus (Portland, ME), April 13, 1830, 3. 
254 
present in nearly every major American seaport.113 
Many of the respondents to Woodbury’s inquiry acknowledged the utility of the 
telegraph with a “national point of view.”114 As Captain Andrew Mather, commander of 
the United States Revenue Cutter Wolcott stated in his reply, “As to the utility of a 
telegraph from the seat of Government to the principal seaports and commercial cities, I 
believe there is but one opinion. There is no doubt of its great importance to the 
commercial interests, and its importance in time of war is incalculable.”115 Moody 
believed a concise message could be sent more than 100 miles between Portland and 
Boston in less than 20 minutes.116 Mather opined the rate of conveyance would be even 
faster at “six to eight miles per minute, and in urgent cases eight to ten miles per 
minute.”117 Mather’s viewpoint was seconded by Signor Penistri, an Italian living in New 
Orleans at the time. Penistri’s experience with the Italian telegraph during its war against 
Austria in 1830 noted telegraphic messages ran “one hundred miles in about 11 minutes, 
more or less, according to the communication.”118 In England, the Holyhead telegraph 
was so efficient, it could transmit a message 128 miles to Liverpool in five minutes; a 
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rate of almost 26 miles per minute.119 The Holyhead line was the most renowned among 
mariners in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; however, despite its 
remarkable efficiency, the Holyhead telegraph was not the fastest. On January 5, 1805, 
the Providence Patriot (Rhode Island) reported M. Vloers, a Belgian physician, could 
“transmit communications from Antwerp to Rome, in eighteen minutes;” by telegraph.120 
If Vloers’ claims were correct, his message travelled more 940 miles in less than one-
third an hour; a rate eclipsing 52 miles per minute and more than double that of 
Holyhead. 
Woodbury also sent the circular to the Franklin Institute, one of the leading 
centers for the promotion of mechanical arts in the early nineteenth century. The Institute 
recommended, “the propriety of causing two telegraphs to be erected, in which careful 
experiments may be made on all the points that bear upon the general question submitted 
to him by the House of Representatives.”121 One of these two telegraphs would be erected 
along the coast connecting seaports with one another, such as the line contemplated by 
John Rowe Parker, “from the [Boston] Observatory to Point-Judith” in Narragansett, RI 
via Cape Cod, Nantucket, and the Vineyard.122 The other line proposed by the Institute 
would be established for overland communication. 
Some individuals responded negatively to Woodbury’s request. William W. Polk 
of New Haven Connecticut, for instance, “doubt[ed] whether many advantages would be 
derived from such an institution in a time of peace by either the public or the 
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government,” and that if any benefit did exist, it would “by no means commensurate with 
the expense.”123 Messrs. Servel and Gonon argued the system would be inexpedient 
noting that in Russia it “often require[d] five or six hours to communicate thirty or forty 
words” over “a distance of only seven leagues.”124 
Despite the overwhelming support for the telegraph, the United States 
government did not invest in the system. Woodbury laid the information before Congress, 
but Congress failed to act upon the inquiry it had initially requested. Congress’ inaction 
may have resulted from its recognition of the advances in telegraphic science. Morse 
lobbied for his recently invented electromagnetic telegraph arguing, “telegraphs 
constructed on the ordinary principles” were “useless the greater part of the time.”125 
Morse noted, “in foggy weather, and ordinarily during the night, no intelligence can be 
transmitted.”126 He also claimed, “even when they can transmit, much time is consumed 
in communicating but little, and that little not always precise.”127 Morse then went on to 
discuss the advantages of his “entirely new mode of telegraphic communication.”128  
In a follow up letter of November 28, 1837, Morse wrote Woodbury relaying the 
results of his experiment. Morse and his associates had sent a message over ten miles 
with “perfect” results and Morse claimed, “our success has, thus far, been complete.”129 
Morse had “no doubt of its effecting a similar result at any distance.”130 Consequently, 
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Morse requested an audience with Congress to demonstrate his electromagnetic 
telegraph, asking Woodbury, “How late in the session can I delay my visit, and yet still be 
in season to meet the subject of telegraphs when it shall be presented by your report?”131 
RENEWED INTEREST IN INNOVATION AND SCIENCE 
If Congress did not follow through on the telegraph, it did show interest in other 
areas of innovation and practical science. A year after Woodbury’s inquiry into the 
telegraph, Congress passed two very important pieces of legislation regarding the state’s 
involvement in science. The first was a resolution to purchase a French made lenticular 
apparatuses for trial in American lighthouses. The Secretary of the Treasury 
commissioned United States Navy Captain Matthew Calbraith Perry for the task. Due to 
ongoing manufacturing problems in France’s glass industry, the lenses were not shipped 
to the United States for another two years.132 The Treasury contracted with the French to 
install the lenses, as they were more complicated than anything currently in use in the 
United States Light-House Establishment. The installation was completed in the winter of 
1840-1.  
The second piece of legislation was the Army Reorganization Act of 1838. The 
Act established the Corps of Topographical Engineers separate from the Army Corps of 
Engineers and repealed the General Survey Act of 1824.133 The Topographical Engineers 
had existed within the larger Corps of Engineers for decades surveying the nation’s 
rivers, harbors, and other sites for public works. Until the passage of the Army 
Reorganization Act, however, one-third of the Topographical Engineers were civilians. 
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The Act ended the Topographical Corps’ reliance on civilian engineers by prohibiting the 
Corps’ hiring of civilians for surveys. The Act achieved this measure by increasing the 
number of Topographical Engineers, all drawn from the officer ranks, within the 
Corps.134 
With the repeal of the General Survey Act of 1824, the Topographical Corps’ 
focused changed from surveying the nation’s rivers and harbors to surveying and 
constructing sites of public works. This included proposed sites for lighthouses and other 
navigational aids. The Topographical Engineers had previously interacted with the Light-
House Establishment conducting site surveys for potential lighthouses, the first of which 
came in 1834 with survey of the Brandywine Shoals in Delaware under Captain Hartman 
Bache.135  
Additionally, in 1842, the Corps was given the responsibility of assessing the 
Light-House Establishment and the condition of the nation’s aids to navigation. This task 
was assigned to Lieutenant I.W.P. Lewis, the engineer who surveyed the Carysfort Reef 
and later designed the lighthouse placed at the reef.136 The new duty of assessing the 
Light-House Establishment increased the interaction between the Establishment and the 
Corps of Engineers, but the relationship was contentious. At issue were concerns over the 
management, or mismanagement, of the Establishment and how the state might improve 
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coastal navigation. Lewis’ report was very critical of Pleasonton and the Fifth Auditor’s 
management of the Light-House Establishment. 
MORE WAXING AND WANING 
As evidence of the state’s waxing and waning involvement in innovation and 
practical science, Congress failed to act on either the Fresnel lens or Lewis’ report. 
Stephen Pleasonton, the aforementioned Superintendent of the Light-House 
Establishment, stood ready to purchase more Fresnel lenses after the initial installation 
and experiments were conducted, “if it be thought proper by Congress to authorize any 
more.”137 Pleasonton even suggested purchasing more lenses for additional experiments 
on Long Island.138 Yet, as Pleasonton acknowledged years later, Congress “determined to 
take no action upon it, and none as far as I can learn, has ever been taken on it since.”139  
Lewis’ report met a similar fate from Congress. Lewis condemned Pleasonton’s 
management of the Establishment, but Congress did little to rectify the situation. 
Congress sent a commission, Lieutenants Thornton Alexander Jenkins and Richard 
Meade Bache, to Europe to study how Britain and France managed their lighthouses, but 
Pleasonton remained in his role as Superintendent of the Light-House Establishment and 
Congress continued to underfund lighthouse appropriations. The previously mentioned 
Carysfort Reef Lighthouse provides an excellent example. Congress originally 
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appropriated only $20,000 for the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse. Pleasonton requested 
further appropriations noting the lighthouse would cost four times the Congressional 
authorizations.140 Congress appropriated an additional $40,000 the following year, but it 
was still insufficient. In all the state spent over $105,000 on the lighthouse.141 Congress’ 
continual underfunding of the Light-House Establishment not only prevented Pleasonton 
from purchasing additional Fresnel lenses on his own, it also maintained the status quo 
management of the Establishment.  
Congress’ response to the Lewis report, however, was not immediate. The process 
of authorizing the commission fell victim to the bureaucracy of the government. 
Congress appeared content with inaction, much as it had after it procured the two 
experimental Fresnel lenses. Because of the federal government’s slow bureaucratic 
process, three years lapsed between I.W.P. Lewis’ report and Congress’ reluctant 
authorization of the commission. In the interim, mariners continued their complaints 
against the Light-House Establishment. Edmund Blunt, an Assistant Superintendent of 
the Coast Survey, and his brother George Blunt, publisher of The American Coast Pilot, 
spearheaded the mariners’ efforts and became the face of the political opposition to 
Pleasonton’s administration of the Establishment.142 
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Lieutenants Jenkins and Bache were skilled surveyors and senior officers in the 
Coast Survey. Jenkins graduated at the head of his class at West Point in 1834, and as a 
result, was commissioned to the Coast Survey that same year.143 Bache joined the Coast 
Survey four years later, while it was still under the superintendency of Ferdinand 
Rudolph Hassler. Bache was the brother of Alexander Dallas Bache, who took charge of 
the Coast Survey when Hassler passed away. Jenkins and Richard Bache spent a year 
abroad conducting their investigation of the British and French lighthouses. In Great 
Britain, Jenkins and Bache paid particular attention to the lighthouses in Ireland and 
Scotland, where the climate and geography played a more significant role. Both men 
recommended wide scale adoption of the Fresnel lens and the creation of a lighthouse 
board made up of military officers and scientifically minded men to oversee the Light-
House Establishment.144 Additionally, Jenkins and Bache confirmed the opinions of Lt. I. 
W. P. Lewis and the Blunt brothers; expressing the lighthouses in the United States were 
“inferior to all they had seen in Europe.”145 
Congress acted on Jenkins and Bache’s recommendations, but once again the 
bureaucratic pace of change slowed the process. The state’s first action transferred the 
responsibility for lighthouse construction to the Corps of Engineers.146 No longer would 
the Treasury Department be responsible for soliciting, accepting, and overseeing the 
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contracts for new lighthouses. That task was now in the hands of a group with expertise 
in engineering and practical science. This transfer of responsibility limited the Treasury 
Department’s role to the administration of Congressional appropriations.   
The Corps of Engineers had been created for similar concerns in constructing 
coastal defenses and surveying the nation’s waterways had proven its worth in these 
areas, as well as in advising on privately built internal improvement projects. In the eyes 
of learned men, the transfer of this responsibility represented new possibilities for 
practical science and innovation as many of the agencies created by Congress and the 
federal government created scientific agendas for resolving problems of commerce and 
navigation. 
While Congress removed the responsibility for lighthouse construction from 
oversight by the Treasury Department, the rest of the Light-House Establishment 
remained under the superintendency of the Fifth Auditor. Congress took another four 
years before finally authorizing the establishment of a lighthouse board made up of 
scientifically-minded men as originally recommended by Jenkins and Bache’s report. In 
authorizing the Light-House Board, Congress specifically mentioned the scientific nature 
of the enterprise and the qualifications expected of the board’s members in stating, “a 
board…to be comprised of two officer of the Navy of high rank, two officers of 
Engineers of the Army, and such civil officers of scientific attainments…” The Light-
House Board assembled the best scientific minds in the United States including, 
Alexander Dallas Bache, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, and Joseph Henry, 
Superintendent of the Smithsonian Institution. Other members, such as Commander 
Samuel F. Du Pont of the United States Navy, Lieutenant Colonel James Kearney of the 
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Topographical Engineers, and Lieutenant Thornton A. Jenkins of the Coast Survey all 
had extensive education and practical training in mathematics, surveying, and other 
sciences. The creation of the Light-House Board ended the Treasury Department’s tenure 
as superintendent of the Light-House Establishment. 
One of the first changes made by the newly established Light-House Board was 
the importation of the French made Fresnel lighthouse lens. Jenkins and Bache had been 
impressed with the lens’ performance in both England and France and testimony by 
mariners in the United States indicated the experimental lens installed at Navesink 
Highlands in New Jersey was the best light in the United States. Lieutenant David Dixon 
Porter commented the twin lights at Navesink were the “only perfect lights on our coast, 
not only as regards regularity in lighting, but in the brilliancy of the light.”147 Captain 
George Barker of Boston considered the French lens at Navesink to be “among the best 
lights on our sea-coast.”148 Packet ship captain William H. Russell noted, “with the 
exception of the lights on the Highlands of Navesink, near the entrance to New York, I do 
not know of any light along the entire line of our coast, which will bear any comparison 
with those of England.”149 By 1860, the Light-House Board had installed Fresnel lenses 
in all of the lighthouses in the United States including the lighthouse at Carysfort 
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Report of the Officers Constituting the Light-House Board, 32d Cong., 1st sess., 1852, Ex. 
Doc. 28, 219. 
149 Russell to Lt. Thornton A. Jenkins, August 27, 1851, in Ex. Doc. 28, 220. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Carysfort Reef was the recipient of the state’s innovation and knowledge 
leading up to the American Civil War. The marking of the Carysfort Reef, both 
physically and visually, represented the best the federal government had to offer. More 
than one hundred and sixty years after its construction, the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse 
remains as a testament to the government’s achievements in innovation and its 
construction of scientific knowledge. Yet, while Carysfort is a testament to the 
government’s accomplishments before 1860, the state’s involvement in innovation and 
scientific practice went through many trials and tribulations. The federal government 
followed an inconsistent, often waxing and waning path of engagement similar to their 
involvement in building infrastructure, internal improvements, and public works.150  
The trials and tribulations of the government’s venture into innovation and 
science proved to be a great learning experience. Many of these trials resulted from the 
government’s unpreparedness for entering scientific practice so soon after the nation 
gained its freedom from Britain and established a strong centralized government. At other 
times, defining expertise, identifying the experts, and constructing knowledge created 
political situations that shaped the federal government’s involvement in science. By the 
time Carysfort Reef was marked and the lighthouse at the reef built, the federal 
government was fully immersed in innovation and scientific practice. 
The state established government agencies, including the Army Corps of 
Engineers, the Coast Survey, and the Light-House Establishment to deal with the 
																																								 																				
150 For more on the state’s waxing and waning involvement in internal improvements and 
public works, please see John Lauritz Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public 
Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States, (Chapel Hill, 
NC: UNC Press, 2001). 
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commercial and navigational problems that plagued the nation. While the state only 
specified the objectives of these institutions, those in charge of the agencies adopted 
agendas that either engaged in or promoted the use of practical science and innovation to 
resolve those problems. These individuals, however, represented the government and 
their decisions often became policy, or at the very least were viewed by others as the 
policies of the government. 
The government’s involvement in innovation and the construction of knowledge 
was also inconsistent; waxing and waning as the state’s priorities changed. Those 
priorities were sometimes dictated by need, as was the case in constructing the Frank’s 
Island Lighthouse. Other times, the priorities were determined by financial and political 
concerns. The Treasury Department approved David Melville’s request to experiment 
with natural gas lighting in coastal navigation because Melville argued natural gas was 
cheaper and more efficient. Politics, however, prevented natural gas from being adopted, 
despite its advantages. Still at other times, the government’s priorities reacted to public 
outcry, such as the mariners complaints against the Light-House Establishment. 
Regardless of what influenced the state’s priorities in innovation and science, men such 
as Benjamin Henry Latrobe, Lewis De Mun, Winslow Lewis, David Melville, Levi 
Woodbury, and Lieutenants Thornton A. Jenkins and I. W. P. Lewis made the federal 
government a major factor in the construction of knowledge in the early American 








The intersection of science, technology, commerce, and the state is an important 
relationship in the history of the United States, especially in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries when the fledgling nation was still developing. The nation’s need for 
a strong economy pushed the federal government into accepting responsibility for 
preserving and protecting commerce. Despite the nation’s westward expansion to the 
Pacific in the first half of the nineteenth century, maritime shipping remained the 
principle means of commerce. Shipping acted as a gateway, providing access to the 
global network of exchange. Protecting commerce, therefore, meant protecting maritime 
shipping and the state assumed that responsibility with the advent of the Light-House 
Establishment, the Coast Survey, and the Army Corps of Engineers. These agencies in 
turn pursued scientific agendas to meet their obligations.  
The path to scientific expertise, however, was not an easy one. The government’s 
involvement with science and innovation was filled with many challenges. The 
unexpected difficulties at Portland Head and Cape Henry and the failure at Frank’s Island 
highlighted the government’s unpreparedness for its new responsibilities. The War of 
1812 delayed the Coast Survey and temporarily interrupted the installation of Winslow 
Lewis’ patented lamp and reflector system, but it illustrated the expertise of the Army 
Corps of Engineers work in coastal defenses. These trials and tribulations proved to be a 
great learning experience as witnessed by the longevity of the Carysfort Reef Lighthouse. 
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Additionally, the government’s involvement often waxed or waned with the 
nation’s immediate priorities. Congress authorized the agencies that undertook building 
the nation’s infrastructure, but then often failed to appropriate enough funds for their 
successful operation. Congress also left these agencies to determine their own agendas 
until it became necessary for the legislative body to intervene. Hassler’s removal as 
Superintendent of the Coast Survey in 1816 and his later reappointment in 1832 as well 
as Congress’ dealing with the Army Corps of Engineers and Light-House Establishment 
between 1837 and 1850 help illustrate the government’s waxing and waning involvement 
in science and innovation. 
The government’s involvement in innovation and practical science was also 
shaped by the republican ideology of the early United States. Republican values 
influenced how Superintendents managed their agencies. Most attempted to adhere to 
principles of prudent management, honesty, civic duty, and promoted the idea of a self-
reliant nation. Superintendents, such as the Light-House Establishment’s Stephen 
Pleasonton, worked diligently to weed out corruption. They did their best to practice 
prudence in their management through caution and thrift. The superintendents, and many 
of the individuals who worked for them, also felt it was their civic duty to promote the 
nation’s self-reliance in innovation and science. The Treasury, for instance, admonished 
Hassler in the 1830s for continuing to use foreign equipment and suppliers for the Coast 
Survey. This idea of self-reliance generated many new inventions including Captain 
Stansbury’s diskpile foundation for offshore structures and improved methods for coastal 
illumination. When Army Corps Engineers I. W. P. Lewis and George Gordon Meade 
invented new apparatuses for illuminating the coast, they chose not to patent their 
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inventions, but instead gave them to the government without profiting because their civic 
duty was greater than their desire for fame or wealth.  
The United States Light-House Establishment played an important role in the 
creation of scientific knowledge, particularly in the areas of illumination and chemical 
analysis of various fuels. These scientific endeavors produced new knowledge about the 
natural world. Additionally, the engineering and surveying needs of the Establishment 
resulting in the agency contributing to those fields through their interactions with the 
Corps of Engineers and Coast Survey. The dual role of lighthouse keepers as telegraph 
agents also put the Establishment in position to contribute to the advancement of 
communications. The Establishment’s engagement in constructing knowledge and 
performing science, thus placed the agency at the forefront of American science prior to 
the outbreak of the Civil War. As such, the Light-House Establishment deserves to be 
recognized as one of the leading scientific enterprises in the United States alongside the 
Army Corps of Engineers and Coast Survey. 
The Light-House Establishment employed a diverse lot of laborers. The men, 
women and children who performed science for the Establishment included both the 
formally educated and the everyday tinkerers. These individuals did more than make 
observations and record their findings. They engaged in the construction of scientific 
knowledge. The Light-House Establishment was responsible for dozens of innovations, 
including clockwork mechanisms, new engineering methods, improved lamps and 
reflectors, and many other devices designed to improve coastal navigation. 
The Light-House Establishment provide the perfect opportunity for men and 
women to engage in science. The coastal and harbor environments provided the perfect 
269 
space to pursue experiments and learn about the natural world. These experiments turned 
early American seaports in to scientific laboratories and workshops for the practical arts. 
Ports were more than gateways of exchange or end nodes on a global trading network. 
Early American ports were centers for creating, exploring and obtaining knowledge. 
They were field schools for those who wished to learn about science, the arts, and the 
natural world. 
The environment also played a role in shaping both the government’s 
involvement in innovation and practical science and science’s interaction with commerce. 
Government officials, inventors, and other individuals interested in advancing science 
and the arts viewed the environment as an adversary. These individuals sought to tame 
the environment and thus approached the natural world with an antagonist attitude. The 
landscape was sort of a manifest destiny; something that must be conquered to prove 
Americans’ dominance in nature. The romantic literarists attempted to change society’s 
perception of nature and, but those engaged in scientific practice remained steadfast in 
their hostility towards the environment. 
The natural world also provided American with the means for overcoming 
environmental challenges. The extracted natural resources from the land to solve 
everyday problems. In the process, these individuals gained valuable knowledge that not 
only advanced their understanding of the natural world, but also of science and the arts. 
The environment was an unrelenting challenge and often combating the 
constantly changing natural world was beyond the capital ability of individuals. The 
federal government necessarily had to intervene. The state possessed both the knowledge 
and resources for taking on projects concerning the environment. This expertise was then 
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passed on to individuals and local communities through the construction of infrastructure. 
Internal improvements became a responsibility of the federal government as a result of its 
expertise as much as it did for the government’s ability to commandeer the necessary 
resources. Additionally, as the government expanded its role in dealing with the 
environment, they sought to simplify nature. One landscape was treated the same as 
another indicating the lessons learned at Cape Henry, Frank’s Island, and Portland Head 
may not have been learned after all. The government chose Republican values over best 
practices, which often led to complications and failures. 
As the nation’s economic interests increased, so did he challenges that needed to 
be addressed. Despite the westward expansion, eastern seaports remained the anchor of 
American commerce. Commercial problems were shipping problems. These problems 
included the British impressment of American sailors, reefs, shoals, and other underwater 
hazards, and the loss of income from ships sitting idly in port with no place to sail and no 
cargo to load. Those concerned with commerce and the economy used science and the 
practical arts to solve everyday commercial problems.  Many of these problems were 
seen as matters “of serious importance.”1  
Protecting the lives of mariners was one of the most important issues for 
American commercial interests. The loss of life had a great impact of local communities 
from the personal tragedy felt by those affected to the economic loss associated with a 
reduced labor pool for working the ships, docks, and other commercial interests. The loss 
of cargo was also important as the loss of goods had a more direct impact on the 
economy. Cargoes lost as a result of shipwrecks correlated to losses in profits, customs 
																																								 																				
1 United States Congress, Breakwater – Crow Shoal – Pier and Light-House, 25th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1838, H. Doc. 433, June 18, 1838, 1. 
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duties, and wages. These financial losses were necessary to keep the economy churning 
and the loss of a single ship, such as The Union could bankrupt a local merchant or ship 
owner. 
Practical science and mechanical arts were necessary to protect commerce and 
provide safe passage into and out of the nation’s harbors. Early on this task was taken up 
by individuals who had an interest in commerce. Men, such as Lewis Brantz and Lemuel 
Moody charted the coasts and local harbors. Others, including Winslow Lewis and David 
Melville, innovated improvements to navigation through better illumination or invented 
entirely new devices, all for the purposes of advancing the nation’s economy. The 
government relied heavily on individual citizens to produce this kind of science, 
however, by mid-century, the government began relying more heavily on its own 
scientific enterprises. The Coast Survey began providing charts and maps for selecting 
lighthouse sites and the Corps of Engineers were constructing breakwaters, lighthouses, 
and public piers. 
This shift required the government agencies to collaborate with each other. In 
order to build the breakwaters, lighthouses, and public piers used to protect and facilitate 
the nation’s commerce, the Corps of Engineers needed to understand the various 
elements of the natural world. The Corps turned to the Coast survey for information on 
tides, currents, winds, and the makeup of the ocean floor which the Survey had gained 
through their scientific studies of the harbors and coastal inlets. The Corps of Engineers 
also learned through their own work as they built the infrastructure of the ports. 
Commerce served as the underlying and unifying principle.  
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In the private sector, entrepreneurs sought to improve port efficiencies and they 
turned to science and the arts to advance their goals. The advanced reporting of ship 
arrivals through the marine telegraph, for instance, made it possible for merchants and 
ship owners to pre-arrange unlading of cargoes, sell the incoming goods, and identify 
cargos for the next voyage. The advanced notification reduced the amount of time ships 
lay idle in port resulting in a faster return to the sea where ships and crews made their 
money. An idle ship makes no money. The reduction in port idle time could average as 
much as two weeks. 
This study has provided just one way to examine the intersection of science, 
technology, commerce, and the state in the early nineteenth century United States. I have 
focused on the period between the ratification of the United States Constitution and the 
American Civil War because science, technology, and commerce changed dramatically in 
the face of railroad expansion after the war and because the federal government held little 
power prior to the Constitution. Before the Constitution, each state pursued individual 
economic and scientific agendas most likely resulting in an incoherent narrative.  
Additionally, my examination centers around the Army Corps of Engineers, the 
Coast Survey, and the Light-House Establishment. These were the first agencies 
established by the federal government to work towards the betterment of commerce and 
the economy. In an age when maritime commerce still dominated the economy, it should 
not be a surprise that these agencies focused their energies on improving navigation. 
Navigation in itself was a science, however, these agencies turned to the natural world, 
the mechanical arts, and the practical sciences of engineering and surveying to 
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accomplish their objectives. Those objectives primarily consisted of providing safe 
passage for ships sailing into and out of America’s commercial ports. 
Lastly, I have focused almost exclusively on the Atlantic states. Gulf states and 
the Midwest receive some attention, but the majority of the study is on the eastern 
seaboard’s commercial centers. This is not intended to discount the contributions of the 
Pacific west, but rather to recognize the West was just beginning its development in the 
decade immediately preceding the American Civil War. The West therefore offered a 
very different narrative. 
There are other ways to examine the intersection of science, technology, and 
commerce in the early United States. While this study has examined the intersection 
through maritime interests because of the dominance of maritime trade on commerce and 
the economy, one might also choose to look at the intersection of science, technology, 
and commerce through agriculture as Joyce E. Chaplin does in An Anxious Pursuit. 
Chaplin’s study looks at how agricultural innovations impacted commercial growth in 
colonial America and the early United States republic.2 Similar to how maritime interests 
dominated trade, agricultural products and food stuffs were the dominant products in 
commercial markets. 
In terms of the science and arts studied here, it might be more helpful to organize 
the study based on the different sciences, such as engineering, illumination, surveying, 
and chemical experimentation. This would allow a more detailed examination of the 
fields that could be brought together in a final chapter at the end rather than the arching 
narrative of the current study that begins and ends with a discussion of the various 
																																								 																				
2 Joyce E. Chaplin, An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the 
Lower South, 1730 – 1815, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1996). 
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agencies, but narrows in the middle to almost solely focus on the Light-House 
Establishment. 
A second option is to re-frame the study as an examination of the science and 
innovation in the Light-House Establishment prior to 1850. Framing the study as an 
examination of science and innovation in the Light-House Establishment prior to 1850 
would serve two purposes. First, it would fill the void in historiography of American 
lighthouses which tends to privilege the politics of Stephen Pleasonton’s administration 
and the romanticized stories of lighthouse keepers. Thomas A. Tag’s series of articles on 
lighthouse illumination in The Keeper’s Log is not enough.3 More needs to be said about 
the innovation and science in the Light-House Establishment. Second, such a study would 
answer the critics of Pleasonton’s administration who claim the Light-House 
Establishment was unscientific before the advent of the Light-House Board in 1852. 
What these critics overlook is the question, “what was considered science?” during the 
first half of nineteenth century. Chapter 3 of this study is a first step and could be used as 
the foundation for revising the dissertation into a monograph. In contrast the the currently 
held beliefs about the Light-House Establishment, answering the question “What was 
considered science?” will demonstrate the Establishment was one of the most scientific 
organizations in the early United States. The Establishment served as an outlet for 
inventors and tinkerers to test their innovations and a place to promote science and the 
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please see The Keeper’s Log volumes 13-14 (1997-8) and 21-22 (2005-6). 
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practical arts. Such a study might resemble Hugh Richard Slotten’s examination of the 
Coast Survey or Todd Shallat’s narrative of the Army Corps of Engineers.4 
																																								 																				
4 Hugh Richard Slotten, Patronage, Practice, and the Culture of American Science: 
Alexander Dallas Bache and the United States Coast Survey, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). Todd Shallat, Structures in the Stream: Water, Science, and the 
Rise of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (Austin: University of Texas, 1994). 
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